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Summary 
Humans can often report a subjective sense of confidence in a decision before knowing its 
outcome. Such confidence judgements are positively correlated to accuracy in perceptual and 
memory tasks, but the strength of this relationship (known as metacognitive accuracy) differs 
across people and contexts. Computationally, confidence judgements are believed to relate to the 
strength of evidence favouring each option, but it has been suggested that confidence also 
captures information from other sources, such as response time. This thesis explores the 
pragmatics of confidence: what factors influence confidence judgements, how accurate 
confidence judgements are, and how they might influence future behaviour. 
Our knowledge of the antecedents of confidence is extended by this work in two ways, by 
introducing novel predictors of confidence and by increasing our understanding of well-known 
ones. I find that bilinguals have worse metacognitive accuracy than monolinguals. This bilingual 
deficiency in metacognitive accuracy cannot be explained by response time and stimulus 
strength, suggesting that there is at least one important predictor of confidence that remains 
unaccounted for. I introduce such a predictor in a new eye tracking correlate of confidence: 
Gaze-shift-frequency, the number of saccades between options, negatively predicts subsequent 
confidence in perceptual and value-based decisions. In the value domain, the total value of the 
options is shown to positively relate to confidence despite being negatively related to accuracy, 
the first such dissociation to be recorded, as far as I am aware. The dissertation extends our 
understanding of response time as a predictor of confidence by showing that it influences 
confidence more for judgements that are made after a choice, relative to those made 
simultaneously with the choice. This differential influence of response time explains the higher 
metacognitive accuracy of sequential confidence reports. 
I explore the consequences of confidence judgements in the context of value-based choice. 
Lower levels of confidence are associated with changes of mind when the same options recur in 
subsequent trials. To test whether these changes of mind are rational, I approximate choice 
accuracy in the value domain. I propose a novel method based on the transitivity of the full 
choice set, so that choices that violate the most transitive ordering of the items can be treated as 
errors. I find that participants who were more metacognitively accurate showed a decrease in 
transitivity violations over time. These results extend prior work linking confidence judgements 
to error correction in the perceptual domain. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Summary 
This dissertation is about the role confidence plays in human decision making, where confidence 
is defined as a self-reported estimate of uncertainty in a choice. The introduction provides an 
overview of the current theories of confidence and empirical work informing those theories. It 
covers how accuracy is operationalised in the confidence domain and theories on the 
computational foundation of confidence, with special focus on the relationship between 
sequential sampling theories of decision making and confidence judgments. Furthermore, the 
reliability of confidence judgments across testing sessions and modalities will be discussed as well 
as the consequences of confidence. This overview will conclude by highlighting gaps in our 
current knowledge, and how the empirical chapters in this dissertation address some of these 
gaps.  
1.2. The Pragmatics of Confidence 
Human life is full of uncertainty. We face uncertainty about future events (what will the weather 
be like tomorrow? Who will win the next election?), about other people’s mental states (what 
does my manager think about my performance?) and even about our own preferences (would I 
prefer to watch an action film or a comedy?). In order for us to make effective decisions, this 
uncertainty needs to be captured, and there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that estimates of 
uncertainty are encoded in the human brain (e.g. Bach & Dolan, 2012; Beck et al., 2008; Kepecs, 
Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009). Not all of these uncertainty 
representations are consciously accessible. For example, our brains account for sensory and 
motor noise when planning and performing actions, without us ever being aware that there is 
any noise to begin with (Knill & Pouget, 2004; Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2003). 
However, people are able to self-report the uncertainty in their decisions, in the form of 
subjective accuracy, for a great variety of tasks (Fleming & Lau, 2014). These accuracy judgments 
are called confidence judgments in the psychological literature and tend to correlate with actual 
performance (though exceptions exist and will be discussed later). Confidence judgments come 
in two broad forms: a probability judgment that a categorical decision is correct (e.g. the “left 
building is taller than the right building” or “I prefer a Mars bar over a Snickers bar”) or an 
uncertainty estimate around a continuous quantity (e.g. “I believe the building is about 50 meters 
high” or “I believe this gamble pays off 25% of the time”; Navajas et al., 2017; Pouget, 
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Drugowitsch, & Kepecs, 2016).  Categorical confidence judgments are by far the more studied of 
the two, and will be the focus of the work presented here. 
Confidence is closely related to metacognition, which is defined as the ability of a cognitive 
system to monitor its own performance (Flavell, 1979; Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012). However, 
some researchers dislike the term metacognition, as they feel it implies the presence of a higher-
order system that monitors the basic decision process, an idea that they find implausible (Kepecs 
& Mainen, 2014; Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014). The presence or absence of such a higher-
order system is one of the on-going controversies regarding what computations underpin 
confidence judgments, which will be explored more in depth later in this introduction. However, 
because of its widespread usage, “metacognitive judgments” will be used interchangeably with 
“confidence judgments” in this dissertation, with neither implying anything about the generative 
process.  
Confidence judgments have also been used to investigate consciousness, as confidence 
judgments are a self-reported measure of expected performance and as such must be consciously 
accessible (Koriat, 2007; Nelson, 1996). While this is an interesting research area it depends on a 
set of complex questions relating to the nature of consciousness that is outside of the scope of 
this dissertation. Instead this work will emphasise the pragmatics of confidence judgments, 
focusing on three questions: What factors feed into confidence judgments, what computations 
underpin confidence judgments and what are the benefits of being able to make accurate 
confidence judgment? Before this last question can be explored “accuracy” must be defined in 
the context of confidence.  
1.3. What Constitutes an Accurate Confidence Judgment? 
Imagine that you notice something flying above you at high speed. Maybe it is a bird, maybe it is 
a plane, and, just maybe, it is Superman. You think you spotted the colours blue and red, so after 
careful deliberation you decide that you saw Superman. After relaying this story to a friend, they 
are justifiably sceptical and ask you how confident you are that you saw the Man of Steel?  
Confidence researchers call the original classification of what you saw a first-order choice 
(though first order choices in confidence research are typically about Gabor patches and random 
dot kinematograms rather than super heroes). The confidence judgment, on the other hand, is 
referred to as a second-order choice because it is an evaluative judgment of the first choice. 
Similarly, a process that contributes to the first-order choice is known as a first-order process 
and a process that contributes to the confidence judgment is known as a second-order process.  
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At first glance it might seem trivial to assess first order-performance in this example. After all, 
either you did spot Superman or you did not. However, say that you always assume it is 
Superman whenever something flies over your head. If we only test your super hero spotting 
ability once, and you happen to be correct, an experimenter cannot determine if your accuracy is 
due to chance or if you are actually skilled at identifying high-velocity objects. By contrast, if we 
repeat this exercise many times (perhaps by showing you videos a various flying objects in a lab) 
we may notice that you always pick the Superman option. Imagine we repeat the procedure 10 
times and 6 times the correct option happens to be a certain caped super hero –  this would 
mean that you were correct 60% of the time, despite the fact that your response criterion is 
completely independent of the evidence presented to you! In technical language, your choices 
were independent of the stimulus strength of the presented stimuli. Stimulus strength denotes 
the strength of the presented stimulus, on the dimensions that matter for the decision, so if the 
stimulus is a line stimulus strength might refer to the length of the line, the orientation of the line 
or the colour of the line, depending of the nature of the discrimination one attempts to make. In 
the case of this example, the stimulus strength would capture the “supermanness” of the flying 
objects including some combination of colour, size and shape. To distinguish between 
participants’ sensitivity to the stimulus strength of the stimuli and their response biases, it is 
common to analyse decisions like these with signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 
1996). Traditional SDT deals with binary choices (A and B) and assumes that for any given trial, 
one sample of internal evidence is drawn from a normal distribution. The mean of the normal 
distribution is determined by which of the two options is correct for the trial in question. 
Because these internal evidence distributions have arbitrary scales, standard deviations are often 
set to 1 for both distributions for mathematical convenience. The difference in means between 
when option A is correct and when option B is correct is denoted d’ (pronounced dee-prime) 
and captures the sensitivity of the respondent (or equivalently the difficulty of the trial). The 
choice is determined by where the randomly drawn evidence sample falls relative to a choice 
criterion, denoted c, which captures the participant’s preference for either option independent of 
the evidence. Because the response criterion denotes a respondent’s tendency to pick a specific 
option independently of the evidence it is also called the response bias, or bias for short. 
Assessing the accuracy of the confidence judgments becomes slightly more complicated. If the 
confidence judgment is expressed on a scale of probability correct, from 50% (guessing) to 100% 
(certain), it is meaningful to talk about the calibration of the confidence judgment. If the mean 
confidence judgment corresponds to the actual proportion correct, the respondent is said to be 
well-calibrated (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994). If the level of confidence systematically differs 
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between correct and error choices so that the level of the confidence is diagnostic of the 
accuracy of the choice, the participant is said to have good confidence resolution, or confidence 
sensitivity. Because none of the experiments in this dissertation contains confidence judgments 
that are reported on a probability scale, I will ignore confidence calibration, so terms like 
“confidence accuracy” or “metacognitive accuracy” will here always refer to confidence 
resolution. 
Historically, metacognitive accuracy has been measured by correlating the accuracy of a set of 
choices (coded as 1 for correct and 0 as incorrect) with their confidence judgments (on any scale 
where higher numbers signify higher confidence; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). This approach is 
problematic because these correlations do not account for confidence bias (how likely people are 
to respond with high confidence independent of their accuracy), so two people whose 
confidence judgments are equally sensitive to their performance, but whose biases differ can 
have different confidence-accuracy correlation coefficients (Masson & Rotello, 2009).  Because 
signal detection theory separately estimates sensitivity and bias of first order judgments, 
researchers tried to expand the same framework to achieve similar estimates for second order 
judgments (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001). 
However, directly transferring the original SDT mathematics to the second order domain has 
turned out to be problematic. SDT assumes that internal evidence is drawn from two Gaussian 
distributions with equal variances (one distribution for when Option A is correct and the other 
when Option B is correct). These assumptions tend to work well for first-order choices, 
especially in two alternative forced choice tasks (Fleming & Lau, 2014), but Galvin et al. showed 
if first-order internal evidence distributions are normal with equal variances (as traditional SDT 
assumes), the second order distributions have unequal variances and are highly non-normal 
(Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003), which means that changes in metacognitive bias 
influences the sensitivity measure (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007). 
Recently Maniscalco and Lau solved this problem by creating a sensitivity measure for 
confidence that exists in the same space as the SDT measure of first-order accuracy (Maniscalco 
& Lau, 2012, 2014): meta-d’. Because meta-d’ exist in the same space as d’, the SDT assumptions 
hold and as a result bias and sensitivity are independent (Barrett, Dienes, & Seth, 2013). How 
meta-d’ is computed is discussed at length in the methods chapter of the dissertation, but the key 
takeaway is that it captures the implied first-order sensitivity from the confidence judgments for 
a participant with perfect metacognitive insight. Maniscalco and Lau assumed that meta-d’ would 
always be lower than d’, but the reverse pattern has been observed, and would be expected in 
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situations where the confidence judgment captures more information about the true state of the 
world than the choice, for example when additional information has been gained between the 
decision and the confidence judgment (Fleming & Daw, 2017). Because first-order sensitivity 
and second order sensitivity are captured on the same scale in the meta-d’ framework, it is 
meaningful to compare them directly, for example as a ratio: meta-d’/d’. This ratio, commonly 
referred to as the Mratio (pronounced em-ratio), captures a participant’s metacognitive efficiency, or 
how good their metacognitive performance is relative to their first-order performance. This 
measure is useful because confidence judgments tend to be more accurate for easy trials than for 
hard trials (Sanders, Hangya, & Kepecs, 2016). By extension, a person who finds the first-order 
task easy will be more metacognitively accurate than a peer who finds the task hard, even if their 
introspective ability is the same. Consequently, when introspective ability is the theoretical 
quantity of interest, researchers should either keep first-order performance constant between 
participants or compute Mratios. The relationship between first-order and second-order 
performance is discussed extensively in Chapter 3. 
1.4. How is Confidence Computed? 
So far this introduction has defined confidence as a behaviour that estimates the accuracy of a 
choice. This section will move forward by discussing various theories of how confidence is 
computed, focusing on important points of contention. The fundamental question regarding the 
computation of confidence is how it relates to the computation of choice. This broad question 
can be subdivided into more specific elements, the first being whether there are any confidence 
specific computations at all or whether confidence judgments are simply a by-product of the first 
order decision (Fleming & Daw, 2017). A theory that can account for both confidence and 
choice in a single process is more parsimonious and should therefore be preferred, all other 
things being equal. Traditional SDT treats confidence as a function of the distance between the 
decision variable and the criterion (Treisman & Faulkner, 1984). Dynamic extensions of signal 
detection theory that account for decision time as well as choice (discussed in the next section) 
can derive confidence from the state of the decision variable at the time of choice (Kepecs et al., 
2008; Vickers & Packer, 1982). Preliminary neural evidence supports the link between self-
reported confidence and the state of the decision variable at the time of choice (De Martino, 
Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013; Gherman & Philiastides, 2015; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; 
Komura, Nikkuni, Hirashima, Uetake, & Miyamoto, 2013; Wei & Wang, 2015). 
However, multiple dissociations between first-order performance and confidence performance 
have been observed and must be accounted for in order for single-process theories to be 
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plausible. For example, Graziano and Sigman found that varying the time window between the 
stimulus presentation and the response influenced first-order accuracy and second-order 
accuracy differently (Graziano & Sigman, 2009). They found that confidence tended to decrease 
with artificially increased response times independent of first-order accuracy and trial difficulty.  
Similarly, Lau and Passingham showed that decreasing the time a visual stimulus was shown 
prior to a mask decreased confidence to a much greater extent than it decreased first order 
performance (Lau & Passingham, 2006). Because shorter time-windows prior to a mask make 
the stimuli less likely to be consciously perceived, this finding supports the potential relationship 
between confidence and phenomenological consciousness. This link was further investigated by 
Vlassova and colleagues who found that unconsciously processed visual information influenced 
choices but not confidence judgments (Vlassova, Donkin, & Pearson, 2014). Additionally, there 
are a set of studies that show that brain lesions and reversible disruptions of neural activity 
influence confidence judgments and first-order choices differently (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & 
Blackmon, 2014; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010). See Fleming and 
Daw, 2017 for a more extensive list of studies that have found dissociations in first-order and 
second order performance. 
Some of the dissociations between first-order and second-order performance can be explained 
by additional processing time for the second-order judgment (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Moran, 
Teodorescu, & Usher, 2015; Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009) or additional evidence 
being made available after the choice (Bronfman et al., 2015; Navajas, Bahrami, & Latham, 
2016). However, in my view the balance of evidence currently favour models that suggest that 
the computations underlying confidence judgments are at least partially independent from the 
computations underlying choices. Single process accounts are hard-pressed to explain the 
dissociation between confidence and accuracy reported in the Vlassova study (2014), as the trial 
length was the same for all trials. It is also difficult to explain why disrupting certain neural 
networks decreases confidence accuracy but leaves first order accuracy intact, without arguing 
that the two judgments rely on different brain networks and, by extension, different 
computations.  
Because of the recorded discrepancies between first-order and second-order performance it 
seems probable that confidence judgments have their own dedicated computational structure, 
but questions still remain about the relationship between confidence computations and first-
order computations. For example, are confidence judgments computed after a choice is made or 
are they are computed in parallel with the choice? Baranski and Petrusic evaluated these accounts 
by measuring the interjudgment times between choices and confidence judgments in a perceptual 
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task (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998). They reasoned that if confidence judgments were computed 
after the choice, the interjudgment times should be independent of the difficulty of the trial 
(which does influence first order response times) but relate to the level of confidence, because it 
is easier to assess strong evidence for an option than weak evidence. Conversely, if the 
confidence computations were parallel, little additional decision time would be necessary, as the 
confidence judgment had been computed in unison with the first-order decision. Their results 
suggest that confidence judgments might be computed sequentially when the original choice is 
under speed-stress but in parallel otherwise. Fleming and Daw (2017) have recently proposed a 
model where the internal evidence underlying confidence is drawn from a separate but correlated 
distribution to the internal evidence that determine choice. They show that by varying the 
relative width of the two internal evidence distributions and the strength of their correlation, 
they can account for all the results reviewed here. However, they have failed to demonstrate that 
the model can theoretically be falsified, so it is possible that it is too flexible to have predictive 
utility. 
1.5. Sequential Sampling Models of Decision Making and 
Confidence Judgments 
As mentioned in the previous section, SDT has been extended to account for response times as 
well as choices. These extensions do not treat a choice as the consequence of a single draw of 
evidence from a distribution; instead, choices are modelled as the result of multiple sequential 
draws from a set of evidence distributions. In this framework each option is associated with an 
evidence distribution with a mean that captures the strength of the evidence favouring that 
option and the variance of the evidence distribution captures uncertainty around that value. For 
each unit of time, one piece of evidence is drawn from each of the distributions, and this process 
repeats until one of the options reaches a decision-threshold at which point that option is 
chosen. The distance between the starting point and the threshold captures the speed-accuracy 
trade-off. The further away the threshold is, the more draws will be required to reach it, 
increasing response time. Additionally, because the evidence distributions are assumed to be 
symmetric, more draws increase the probability that the noise cancels out, and so improves the 
signal-to-noise ratio in the decision process (see Gold & Shadlen, 2007 for a more technical 
discussion). Because this family of models characterises a single decision as the result of multiple 
sequential evidence samples, they are commonly referred to as sequential sampling models 
(Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016). 
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The most commonly used sequential sampling model is the drift diffusion model (DDM; 
Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). The easiest way to think of a DDM is to imagine a 
particle that floats between two boundaries, representing two mutually exclusive options. For 
each unit of time the movement of the particle is drawn from a normal distribution, where the 
standard deviation is conventionally set to 0.1 (Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Lee, 2011) and 
the mean, referred to as the drift rate, captures the dominant option so that the mean is positive 
if the upper option is dominant and negative if the lower option is dominant). The ratio between 
the mean and the standard deviation captures how noisy the decision process is. The separation 
between the boundaries captures the speed-accuracy trade-off, and the starting point of the 
particle captures an a priori preference for one of the options. The model also contains a non-
decision time parameter, which estimates the non-decision portion of the response time (e.g. 
motor preparation and actual movement). Drift diffusion models are popular because they 
capture both the choices and the response times of two-alternative forced choice tasks well 
(Forstmann et al., 2016; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Vandekerckhove et al., 2011), because their 
parameters all have obvious psychological interpretations, and because they have been shown to 
be mathematically equivalent to the sequential probability ratio test (Gold & Shadlen, 2007), 
which is the normative to solution to sequential sampling problems with two options (Bogacz, 
Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006). Additionally, a wide variety of computer packages 
makes them relatively easy to fit (for a systematic comparison of different fitting programs see 
Ratcliff & Childers, 2015). DDMs are discussed more in the methods chapter. 
A wealth of choice related phenomena can be studied by allowing DDM parameters to vary 
between participants, between conditions, or both. One intriguing example is the work by 
Krajbich and Rangel, which investigated how visual attention influenced value-based decision 
making (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Lim, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 
2011). In a series of experiments they found that participants’ visual attention influenced their 
choices, as if the options they looked at got a boost to their drift rate. Originally the researchers 
assumed that this fixation bias interacted with the value of the option, so that drift rate received a 
greater boost the greater the value difference between the options. Since then, however, another 
lab directly compared the original interactive model with an additive model, so that the boost in 
drift rate from looking at an item is constant, regardless of item value (Cavanagh, Wiecki, 
Kochar, & Frank, 2014). Whilst this distinction might seem like a technicality, it is practically 
important because the additive model implies that the visual attention bias is most powerful 
when we are choosing between two low-value options but that it gets marginalised when we are 
comparing options of greater subjective value. The interactive model makes no such distinction 
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because the fixation bias scales with the value of the options. Because of its practical and 
theoretical importance I will compare the additive and interactive models of the fixation bias in 
the experiments that involve eye tracking (Chapters 4 and 5). 
One weakness of the DDM is that it cannot account for confidence judgments (Pleskac & 
Busemeyer, 2010). The reason for this is that the evidence accumulation for each option is 
perfectly anti-correlated with the other: the closer the particle gets to the upper response 
threshold the further it gets to the lower response threshold. As a consequence, the uncertainty 
in the decision-process is perfectly captured by the response time, so, according to the model, 
confidence should be a monotonic function of response time (Ratcliff & Starns, 2009). However, 
the data suggest that both response times and stimulus strength influence confidence 
independently (e.g. De Martino et al., 2013; Kiani et al., 2014; Vickers & Packer, 1982). One way 
to address this problem is simply to treat the interjudgment time as a continuation of the random 
walk of the decision particle, so that a given confidence judgment is the result of the same 
evidence accumulation process that guided choice, just with additional processing time (Pleskac 
& Busemeyer, 2010). This model is an instantiation of the single-process theories reviewed 
above. As such, they too benefit of the parsimony of accounting for both choices and 
confidence judgments from a single evidence stream. However, they also inherit the problems of 
these theories in that they struggle to explain dissociations in first-order and second order 
performance that aren’t captured by response time. Furthermore, because this model assumes 
that the same drift diffusion process that cause the first order choice then continues to cause the 
confidence judgment, it assumes an association between confidence accuracy and interjudgment 
times just as the simple DDM (correctly) predicts a relationship between choice accuracy and 
response times. However, these assumptions do not hold for interjudgment times which are 
often independent of confidence outcomes (see Baranski & Petrusic, 1998, and Chapter 5).  
An alternative way to capture confidence from a sequential sampling framework is to relax the 
DDM assumption that the accumulators for the two options are perfectly anti-correlated. The 
result can be conceptualised as two partially independent accumulators that “compete” with each 
other to reach the same decision-bound, a family of sequential sampling models known as race 
models. The distance between the winning accumulator and the losing accumulator at the time 
of decision captures the balance of evidence favouring the winning option, and is therefore a 
measure of confidence (Kepecs et al., 2008; Vickers & Packer, 1982; Wei & Wang, 2015). Some 
early models postulated a 1-1 relationship between the balance of evidence and confidence 
judgments, but modern models commonly involve an intermediary step where the distance 
between the accumulators are read out by some other process that make it accessible to self-
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report (De Martino et al., 2013; Insabato, Pannunzi, Rolls, & Deco, 2010; Shimamura, 2000). 
Race models have also been extended by computing confidence from a combination of balance 
of evidence at time of choice and response time (Kiani et al., 2014; Van Den Berg et al., 2016). 
Utilising both RT and balance of evidence at time of choice does not only fit the confidence data 
better than other race-models, this approach is also theoretically appealing as the probability of 
being correct can be recovered from the model for any given balance of evidence and response 
time. While race-models capture confidence in an elegant way, they perform worse for capturing 
response time distributions and accuracy judgments than a conventional DDM (Ratcliff & Smith, 
2004). Finally, simultaneous choice and confidence judgments have been modelled by 
postulating one accumulator for each option (e.g, “high confidence option 1”,  “low confidence 
option 1”, “high confidence option 2”, etc.) but keeping all options anti-correlated so that for 
any given time unit, one option moves closer to the decision boundary and all other options 
moves away by the same amount (Ratcliff & Starns, 2009). This model has the benefit of being 
an extension of traditional two alternative DDMs, and as such fits response times and accuracies 
well, and it can account for simultaneous choices and confidence judgments. However, it is not 
obvious how it translates to confidence judgments that are given on a continuous scale. 
1.6. The Consequences of Confidence 
The previous sections of the introduction have covered research that suggests that humans have 
systems devoted specifically to representing confidence, either as a readout of the uncertainty in 
the first order evidence accumulation (De Martino et al., 2013; Insabato et al., 2010; Shimamura, 
2000) or as a process carried out in parallel with the first order choice (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; 
Fleming & Daw, 2017). Furthermore, a number of published experiments suggest that even non-
human animals can track uncertainty in perceptual decisions (Couchman et al., 2010; Lak et al., 
2014; Smith et al., 1995) and in memory judgements (Fujita, 2009). A corpus of studies suggest 
that these results cannot be accounted for by simple associative mechanisms but imply second-
order representations of uncertainty (See Smith, Couchman & Beran, 2014  for a review and 
Kepecs & Mainen, 2014 for a principled computational and methodological argument). It is then 
natural to wonder why there would be a system specifically devoted to confidence; what benefits 
do confidence judgments bestow on an agent that justify the computational cost? 
A problem that face most animals is whether to forage from their current environment or 
whether to search for greener pastures elsewhere. These decisions benefit both from a 
representation of the mean value of alternatives as well as a representation of the variation 
around this mean (Kolling, Berhens, Mars, Rushworth, 2012). Such foraging decisions are 
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included in a broader class of problems referred to as exploration vs exploitation problems in 
contemporary computational neuroscience (Cohen, McClure & Yu, 2007). In environments with 
uncertain outcomes internal representations of uncertainty can help an agent determine whether 
they should exploit the option that currently has the best expected value or explore the 
alternatives to get a more accurate model of the different options and maximise total reward 
over time (Boldt, Bundell & De Martino, 2017). There is some evidence in that certain non-
human animals use uncertainty representations in this way. Washburn et al. (2006) applied an 
experimental paradigm where Macaques had to make a new two choice discrimination every 6 
trials. On each trial they had the option to pick an uncertain response which gave no physical 
reward but provided information on the correct answer for that trial. The Monkeys correctly 
picked the uncertain option more often in the first trial of a new discrimination relative to the 
following trials, gaining information that helped them maximise subsequent rewards. More 
broadly, explicitly representing model uncertainty helps the agent accurately price the value of 
additional information. 
Another function of representing uncertainty is that it allows agents to avoid risky decisions. A 
class of experimental designs that rely on optional opt-out illustrate this. Opt-out tasks are 
typically structured as typical two alternative choice tasks where respondents get a big reward if 
they are correct or a time-out punishment if they are incorrect. On some trials they also have the 
option to opt-out and get a small reward that is independent of the decision, the option to opt 
out may come after the initial decision is made, or as an independent option in the choice phase. 
To test whether agents use this option judiciously one can compare their performance on trials 
where they have the option to opt out, but chose not to (free choice trials), to those where they 
have no choice (forced choice trials). Rhesus monkeys, rats and humans all have shown better 
performance for the free choice trials than the forced choice trials, when objective difficulty is 
controlled for, indicating that they can use internal estimates of choice accuracy to improve their 
performance (Foote & Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996). In metamemory research this is known as the trade-off between quantity and 
accuracy, as no opt out typically leads to a higher total amount correct at the cost of a lower 
proportion correct of the trials attempted. Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) has shown that better 
internal monitoring enable people to maximise their accuracy without sacrificing quantity, as 
higher metacognitive accuracy enable people to selective use opt out for likely errors, while 
leaving correct trials intact. In the context of metamemory, respondents can also manage the 
trade-off between quantity and accuracy by adapting the granularity of their memory report to 
their confidence in the veracity of their memory (Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000). This 
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relates more broadly to the link between confidence and precision, people may spread their 
resources to deal with a broader set of contingencies when they perceive the future to be 
uncertain.  
But representing uncertainty may not only allow agents to avoid errors, it might also allow them 
to correct them: It has been suggested that the same system which is responsible for confidence 
judgments also triggers error correction in perceptual choice (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012, 
2014). Preliminary support for this idea has come from EEG studies, where multivariate analyses 
showed that the EEG signature that signals errors also predicted graded confidence judgments 
for correct trials (Boldt & Yeung, 2015). It has also been suggested that confidence judgments 
help groups of people coordinate more effectively as the uncertainty associated with various 
observations or predictions can be shared between group members (Shea et al., 2014). Just as 
confidence might improve group decision making by ensuring that more reliable reports are 
weighted more heavily, confidence might improve learning in contexts with multiple information 
sources by ensuring that we learn more from sources that are consistently predictive of salient 
outcomes (Meyniel & Dehaene, 2017). This may explain why metacognitive accuracy predicts 
learning speed when general intelligence is controlled for (Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997). In 
fact, confidence can act as a learning signal even in the absence of external feedback, helping 
people to improve their performance in contexts where the outcome is not immediately 
observable (Guggenmos, Wilbertz, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2016). 
Dehaene and Sigman (2012) have suggested that confidence plays a central role in higher-order 
planning, where multiple steps have to be completed successfully in order for the agent to reach 
their desired outcome. For example, confidence might indicate when a problem is hard so that 
more information should be offloaded onto the environment (Gilbert, 2015), or that more 
deliberation is required (Keramati, Dezfouli, & Piray, 2011). In fact, Yeung and Summerfield 
(2012) suggested that confidence might regulate the boundary separation in decision making task, 
helping respondents strike a good balance between speed and accuracy. In contexts where 
rewards only follow the successful completion of multiple steps, confidence in one’s 
performance in the first steps dictates the effort put into subsequent steps (Van den Berg, 
Zylberberg, Kiani, Shadlen, & Wolpert, 2016). Van den Berg and colleagues paired two 
perceptual decisions, and only rewarded participants if both choices were correct. They fitted a 
drift diffusion model to the second choices and found that participant confidence in the first 
choice predicted the boundary separation in the second choice, so participants invested more 
time in getting the second choice right when they were confident that the first choice was 
correct. This provides preliminary support of Yeung and Summerfield’s (2012) idea that 
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confidence helps improve performance by influencing the boundary separation of a drift 
process. There is further work to suggest that confidence help inform time and effort allocation 
in problem-solving. For example, when we encounter a problem our sense of confidence in the 
first answer that come to mind may determine whether we report it immediately or invest effort 
and time in trying to find a different answer (Thompson, Turner & Pennycook, 2011; Thompson 
et al., 2013). Conversely, the evolution of confidence over time may inform when it is time to 
stop effortful search, and either give our best guess or avoid responding (Ackerman, 2014).   
Note that the empirical work on the consequences of confidence has so far focused on the 
immediate consequences, be it an immediate reversal of a previous decision (Boldt & Yeung, 
2015) or a change in decision criteria relative to a choice immediately prior (Van den Berg et al., 
2016), so it is an open question to what extent confidence judgments influences decisions over 
time. Also, the consequences of confidence judgments have to the best of my knowledge solely 
been explored in relation to perceptual decisions. Chapter 4 will extend our current 
understanding of the consequences of confidence by studying more long term consequences of 
confidence judgments in the value domain. 
1.7. The Subfields of Metacognition Research 
Confidence has been studied extensively in at least three different areas of cognitive science: 
perception, memory and value-based decision-making. Confidence was fist studied in relation to 
psychophysics (Peirce & Jastrow, 1884), and most of the work referenced here relates to 
confidence of perceptual judgments. Perceptual discrimination tasks are useful when studying 
the neural underpinnings of confidence because we have a relatively good understanding of the 
neural underpinnings of perceptual (primarily visual) first order judgments (Heekeren, Marrett, 
Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004). Additionally, certain psychophysics tasks (e.g. the random-dot-
kinetogram) allow for much better control of what evidence is available to an agent at any given 
time, as they can be set up so that the evidence at each time point can be treated as an 
independent draw from a normal distribution (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). Together, our relatively 
advanced understanding of the neural and computational underpinnings of perceptual judgments 
makes disentangling the relationship between first-order and second-order networks slightly 
easier than in other domains (e.g. Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010). 
Confidence judgments have also been extensively studied in relation to memory (Koriat, 2007; 
Nelson & Narens, 1990). This metamemory research has extensively dealt with two 
contemporary points of contention in the perceptual choice literature, and the insights from 
metamemory are not widely appreciated there (but see Boldt, De Gardelle & Yeung, 2017 and 
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Shea et al, 2014). The first point of contention is whether confidence judgements depend on a 
direct readout of first-order evidence strength (see Section 1.4.). Metamemory researchers have 
discussed this topic since the 1960s (Hart, 1965) and it is now considered largely resolved in that 
field (Koriat, 1997). The second point of contention is how confidence judgements change based 
on when they are elicited in relation to the first-order choice. Finally, the combination of insights 
relating to the substrates of confidence and the temporal dynamics of confidence have in turn 
provided a more nuanced understanding of the functional properties of confidence, as 
metamemory researchers appreciate that the functional significance of confidence judgements 
change over time (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). Each of these points will be explored more in 
depth below. 
In metamemory research the idea that confidence judgements (referred to as feelings of knowing 
judgements: FOK) were the result of a direct readout of internal evidence was first put forward 
by Hart (1965). In his model prospective confidence judgements captured the strength of the 
memory trace, which in turn predicted the probability of recall at a later time. This model has the 
benefit that it parsimoniously explains why prospective confidence judgements tend to be 
diagnostic of recall (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). The alternative account is known as the 
inferential account of confidence. The inferential account suggests that confidence is the result 
of the weighted combination of a set of cues, that are diagnostic of performance during typical 
circumstances. The inferential view does not imply that the agent make a conscious inference 
whenever they report their confidence, just that the computation that is driving confidence 
judgements do not have direct access to the evidence that drive the decision (Koriat, 1997). The 
inferential view makes a number of specific predictions (1) Cues drive confidence because they 
are diagnostic of accuracy under typical circumstances. (2) Metacognitive accuracy is the function 
of the validity of the available cues, and whether these cues are weighted appropriately. (3) 
Experimenters can manipulate metacognitive accuracy by changing the diagnostic validity of the 
cues that feed into confidence or how participants weight them. 
This last point, that confidence judgements and accuracy can be manipulated independently from 
one another to create so called “metacognitive illusions” provides a clear empirical test that can 
arbitrate between the direct access account and the inferential account of confidence. In the 
context of metamemory research the inferential account has convincingly won this debate. For a 
review of manipulations that influence first order and second order accuracy independently see 
the general discussion of Koriat (1997), here I will just mention a few examples. Benjamin and 
colleagues (1998) first had participants answer 20 trivia questions. Each question had a single 
word response. After coming up with an answer participants were asked to rate the probability 
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that they would remember their answer 20 minutes later without any pointers to remind them. 
They then completed a 20 minute distractor task followed by 10 minutes of free-recall for the 20 
responses. Time of deliberation for the trivia questions was negatively associated with confidence 
in subsequent recall but positively associated with actual recall, so time of deliberation had the 
opposite effect on confidence and accuracy. Chandler (1994) showed participants a set of target 
and non-target pictures (learning phase), after 15 minutes of waiting participants were 
completing a 2 alternative forced choice task between the target and a previously unencountered 
distractor. Each choice was followed by a confidence judgement. In the two-alternative forced 
choice task both the targets and the distractors were scenes of lakes. In the experimental 
condition the non-target in the learning phase was also a lake but it in the control condition it 
was not.  The experimental condition, where targets and non-targets in the were related in the 
learning phase, were associated with lower accuracy but higher confidence judgements than the 
control condition. Finally, Begg et al (1989) found that participants predicted that concrete and 
common words would be easier to recognise than abstract and rare words, however, whereas 
concrete words were associated with higher recognition rates, more common words were 
associated with lower recognition rates. Begg and colleagues hypothesised that both concreteness 
and prevalence predicted ease of processing at the time of the first encounter, but only 
concreteness aided memorability, whereas more common words were in fact less memorable. In 
sum, there is plenty of evidence that confidence can be experimentally manipulated 
independently of choice accuracy, providing evidence that the computation of confidence is at 
least partially independent from the processes driving recall and recognition. 
To understand how the temporal dynamics of confidence has been explored in memory research 
it might be instructive to explore a common research paradigm in meta-memory. Participants 
first learn lists of word pairs, with one word being the pointer word and the other being the 
target. Participants are subsequently presented with the pointer and asked to recall the target 
from memory, if they fail to recall the target they may be asked to select the target from a set of 
options. Confidence in accurate recall might be extracted before studying the list, after studying 
the list, when viewing the pointer, and after an answer has been submitted. Confidence in 
accurate recognition may be recorded after participants have failed to recall the target but before 
they are presented with a set of options. This variety in the timing of confidence judgements 
together with the inferential theory of confidence made metamemory researchers question how 
the cues that influence confidence might change over time. For example,  Hertzog and 
colleagues (1990) had participants learn a word list and rate their probability of recall (judgment 
of learning: JOL), before testing their actual recall after a delay, they repeated this procedure 3 
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times with the same participants. The JOL for the first list were predicted by participants’ self-
rated memory efficacy and were only weakly predictive of memory performance. However, the 
JOLs of subsequent lists were driven by the performance on the preceding lists and were more 
accurate, as participants learned to utilise more accurate confidence cues as the task progressed. 
Another, more dramatic example of the relationship between metacognitive accuracy and the 
timing of confidence judgements is that the accuracy of JOL improve dramatically if there is 
delay between the learning session and when the JOLs are recorded (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). 
Presumably the cause of this improvement in metacognitive accuracy is that the conditions for 
the delayed JOLs are more similar to the conditions during recall, so the cues participants have 
access to in the delayed condition are more diagnostic of actual performance. The hypothesis 
that delayed JOLs are associated with higher metacognitive accuracy because they are associated 
with more valid cues is supported by an elegant experiment by Carrol, Nelson and Kirwan 
(1997). They trained participants on paired word-lists in two within-participant conditions. In the 
first condition semantically related pairs were trained until participants demonstrated two correct 
recalls, in the second condition semantically unrelated words were trained until  8 correct recalls. 
Recall was then tested two or six weeks later. Participants who gave their JOL immediately after 
the training judged that they were more likely to remember the related, less practiced word pairs, 
whereas in reality their recall rate was worse for those pairs. However, participants who gave 
their JOL one day after the training correctly judged that they were more likely to remember the 
unrelated, more practiced word pairs.  In other words, semantic relatedness was a cue that had a 
strong influence on confidence immediately after training, but was only weakly associated with 
long term retention, after a day its relative influence of confidence had decreased, resulting in 
higher metacognitive accuracy. 
Finally, the metamemory research has not only examined how the timing of the confidence 
judgement in relation to the task may influence metacognitive accuracy, but also how the 
function of confidence may change over time. Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) discuss two cues 
influencing confidence in recall memory, familiarity and accessibility. Familiarity is the extent to 
which the item that prompts recall is familiar. For example, Reder (1987) first asked participants 
to rate the frequency of words, and then had them answer general knowledge questions. Some 
general knowledge questions contained words from the first task, these were associated with 
higher confidence judgements, but not higher recall or recognition accuracy. Accessibility is how 
much information comes to mind when searching for the target. For example, Koriat (1993) 
found that the number of letters people remembered of a target word predicted confidence 
judgement, regardless of whether those letters were accurate or not. Koriat and Levy-Sadot 
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(2001) argued that these two cues influence subjective confidence at different times, because they 
serve different functional roles. Familiarity, in their account, serves as a gating mechanism that 
informs the agent whether the desired information is likely to be available in memory, and 
therefore whether it is worthwhile to engage in effortful search. Once search is initiated the 
amount of information that comes to mind serves as a cue for the probability of finding an 
accurate response. This cue is informative because the information that comes to mind during 
effortful search is mostly accurate under the normal conditions (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994; 
1996). Koriat and Levy-Sadot presented two strands of supporting evidence for their model: 
First, when they manipulated familiarity and accessibility independently they found an interaction 
effect so that the effect of accessibility was more pronounced when familiarity was high. This 
result fit the hypothesis that participants only bothered to engage in effortful search for trials 
when high familiarity cues indicated that the search might be worthwhile. Second, when the 
response time of the confidence judgements were constrained, so participants had less time to 
engage in effortful search, the interaction between familiarity and accessibility diminished. This 
work suggests a framework for thinking about confidence where the weighting of various 
confidence cues depends on how predictive they are of accuracy in typical contexts and what 
functions they fill in relation to the task. I believe this approach could enrich both the theoretical 
and empirical work on confidence if it was adapted more widely.  
To summarise, there are three ideas from metamemory that the broader metacognition research 
may benefit from: First is the idea that confidence, rather than being a direct function of first-
order evidence strength, is inferred from a set of cues. Second, the relative influence of these 
confidence cues may vary depending on the timing of the confidence judgement. Third, the 
function of the confidence judgement may also evolve over time. The first idea, that different 
cues feed into confidence judgements, will be explored throughout this dissertation, the second 
idea, that the relative weight of these cues may vary with the timing of confidence judgements 
will be explored in relation to perceptual decision making  in chapter 5. The third idea will not be 
directly explored in this dissertation but provides an interesting avenue for future research. 
Finally, confidence has recently been studied in relation to value-based choice (De Martino et al., 
2013; Lebreton, Abitbol, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2015). This research field has a disadvantage 
relative to the other two in that it is harder to evaluate first-order accuracy and, by extension, 
second order accuracy. For example, if a participant first shows a preference for a Mars bar over 
a Snickers bar but subsequently changes their mind, it is hard to determine whether the 
participant made a mistake or whether they genuinely shifted their preference (ignoring the trivial 
cases where choices can be explained in terms of fast motor errors). However, studies that focus 
32 
 
on value-judgment have nevertheless made important contributions to the study of confidence 
judgments, as they have shown that the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, that has been repeatedly 
implicated in first-order value computations (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010; Chib, 
Rangel, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2009; De Martino et al., 2013; Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009) is 
also involved in confidence judgments (Barron, Garvert, & Behrens, 2015; Lebreton et al., 2015). 
This gives rise to interesting questions regarding the utility of certainty, and more broadly the 
relationship between confidence and value. 
1.8. The Reliability of Confidence Accuracy 
Because confidence has been studied in relation to perceptual judgments, memory judgments, 
and confidence judgments, it is natural to ask how domain-general metacognitive abilities are. 
Research over the last decade has started to provide an answer. In an early test of the 
generalizability of metacognitive accuracy, Song and colleagues compared the metacognitive 
performance of participants across two visual discrimination tasks, and found strong correlations 
in metacognitive performance but not in first order-performance, and thus suggested that 
metacognitive abilities might be domain general (Song et al., 2011). McCurdy and colleagues 
extended this research by comparing confidence performance in a memory task and a perceptual 
discrimination task. They found that metacognitive performance was correlated across tasks but 
that the two types of metacognition appeared to be associated with the morphology of different 
brain regions, and that the correlation in size between these regions accounted for the correlation 
in metacognitive performance (McCurdy et al., 2013). Further evidence that confidence in 
memory judgments and confidence in perceptual judgments might be associated with different 
networks came from a neuropsychiatric study that found patients with anterior prefrontal lesions 
showed impaired metacognitive performance for perceptual discrimination but intact 
metacognitive performance in a memory task (Fleming et al., 2014). The picture gets somewhat 
complicated by a set of studies from Baird which confirmed that separate brain regions were 
involved in metacognition relating to memory and metacognition relating to perception (Baird, 
Cieslak, Smallwood, Grafton, & Schooler, 2015; Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 
2013) but showed no correlation in metacognitive performance between the two domains.  
This apparent contradiction might be resolved by recent work by Ais and colleagues, who have 
conducted the most systematic evaluation of the reliability of metacognitive ability to date (Ais, 
Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2016). They compared four different tasks (two visual 
discrimination tasks, one auditory discrimination task, and one short-term memory task) where 
each task was repeated multiple times by each participant. They found that metacognitive 
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performance was highly stable across sessions for the same participant completing the same task 
(confidence biases and the variances were also highly stable across sessions). They also found 
that metacognitive ability was correlated across modalities. However, they found that 
metacognitive ability was less stable when the task structure changed. This last point is 
important, because McCurdy and colleagues maintained very similar task structures for both the 
memory task and the visual discrimination task (two alternative forced choice tasks between two 
options presented on different sides of the screen). The Baird experiments, on the other hand 
had quite different task structures between the domains. The visual discrimination task 
sequentially showed two sets of gabor patches and the participants had to determine which of 
the sequences contained a patch that was slightly tilted relative to the other. For the memory task 
participants had memorised a set of 160 words prior to the test session, during the test session 
they were shown one word per trial, and had to indicate whether it was in the test set or not. It is 
therefore possible that the dissociation in performance recorded by Baird and colleagues might 
be driven by differences in the task structure between the tasks rather than differences in 
modality.  
To summarize, it seems as if metacognitive accuracy correlates across domains in healthy 
individuals, even though different forms of metacognitive performance is associated with 
different networks and can be dissociated when brains are damaged or disordered (David, 
Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012; Metcalfe, Van Snellenberg, DeRosse, Balsam, & Malhotra, 
2014). 
1.9. Remaining Questions 
From this brief review of confidence research it is clear that confidence tracks first-order 
performance across a number of domains and that the relative strength of this relationship 
appears to be stable within individuals. But what is driving individual variation in metacognitive 
accuracy? Findings from empirical Chapter 3 will consider a surprising predictor of 
metacognitive performance: how many languages you speak. This review also highlighted that 
first order task structure seems to influence how stable metacognitive accuracy is within the same 
person. But what aspects of the task structure matters? In Chapter 5 I show that the timing of 
confidence judgments relative to the choice can influence metacognitive accuracy, even when the 
first-order task is identical across sessions. I explore the cause of this difference by examining 
how the relationship between confidence and its predictors change as a function of the timing of 
the confidence judgment. On a trial-by-trial basis, the strength of a confidence judgment is 
influenced by at least two elements of the first order decision, stimulus strength and confidence, 
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but what other components of the first order-decision might influence confidence? In Chapter 4 
I introduce two novel predictors of confidence, one relating to the perceived value of the 
presented stimuli and one relating to the visual behaviours of the participants, and I go on to 
replicate the relationship between this new behavioural index of uncertainty and confidence in 
Chapter 5. I also show that the amount of time fixating on an option positively predicts the 
probability of choosing that option, when the stimulus strength of the option is accounted for, in 
both perceptual and value-based choice (Chapters 4 & 5). Together, these findings suggest that 
eye behaviours influence confidence and choice in the same way for perceptual and value-based 
decisions, suggesting that visual attention plays an important domain-general role in how we 
construct evidence. Finally, I have reviewed the benefits of accurate confidence judgments such 
as the possibility to quickly correct errors, but it has previously been unclear if confidence is 
associated with improved decision making over a longer time scale. I provide tentative evidence 
that this might be the case in Chapter 4. As such, this dissertation provides a number of novel 
insights regarding the origins, computational underpinnings, and consequences of confidence 
judgments.  
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2. Methods 
2.1. Summary 
This thesis relies on two mathematical frameworks: generalised linear models (GLM) and signal 
detection theory (SDT).  GLMs are a common set of mechanism-agnostic models that are 
capable of capturing both linear and non-linear relationships. Because most data in this 
dissertation is hierarchically structured (trials are structured in participants and conditions) this 
method section will also cover hierarchical extensions of the GLM framework. Hierarchical 
models enable researchers to examine individual differences, within-participant effects, and 
differences between groups in a single model, avoiding the problems associated with ignoring 
any of these sources of variance.  Parameters in the SDT framework can also be estimated 
hierarchically, but because GLM is a more common and well-known framework, hierarchical 
modelling is introduced in that context. Traditional SDT models derive independent measures of 
sensitivity and bias in two-alternative-forced-choice (2AFC) tasks. SDT can be extended to 
capture the sensitivity of confidence judgments in first order choices. Alternatively it can be 
extended to account for response times as well as choices by modelling how evidence is 
repeatedly sampled over time, so-called Sequential Sampling Models (SSM). This dissertation 
relies on a common class of SSM known as Drift Diffusion Models (DDM). DDMs attempt to 
capture the internal decision process in 2AFC tasks, by simulating a particle moving between two 
boundaries. DDMs have successfully captured relationships between stimulus strength response 
times and accuracy in a number of domains and can be considered a mathematical simplification 
of neurologically plausible decision processes (e.g. Roxin & Ledberg, 2008; see Introduction).  
2.2. Generalised Linear Models 
GLM refers to a set of models that are based on linear regression. The simplest generalised linear 
model is a univariate linear regression. It requires two vectors of quantitative data of equal 
length: Y the outcome of interest and X the predictor (note that formula in this chapter will use 
upper case letters to denote vectors and lower case letters to denote specific values). A linear 
regression is a function that transforms X to Y using the following form: 
 
𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝑋𝛽1 +  𝛦 
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Where β0 and β1 are free parameters that are estimated to satisfy some objective function, 
commonly the maximum likelihood (Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2001).  β0 + Xβ1 can be 
thought of as the predicted values of Y, denoted Ŷ. β0 is commonly referred to as the intercept 
parameter because it specifies the value of ŷ when x = 0 (the intercept if you plot the model) and 
β1 is referred to as the slope parameter because it specifies how much ŷ changes for each unit of 
x (the slope of the curve if you plot the model; see Figure 2.1. a). Ε is an error vector that 
captures the difference between Ŷ and Y, termed residual error. It is easy to generalise the 
univariate case to a model with multiple predictors: 
 
𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝑋2𝛽2 + ⋯ + 𝑋𝑛𝛽𝑛 + 𝛦 
 
Where n signifies the total number of predictors in the model. 
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Figure 2.1. Graphical Representations of Univariate Linear Regressions                           
(a) Shows a basic linear regression, with the mathematical annotation added to the graph. The 
prediction of a univariate linear model (ŷ) is the function of an intercept parameter (β0) and a 
predictor (x) multiplied by a slope parameter (β1). The difference between the prediction ŷ and 
the true value of y for any given x is captured by the error term ε. (b) and (c) Show extensions 
of linear regression to account for nested data (e.g. when trials are nested in participants). (b) 
Allows for the intercept to vary for each higher ordered structure, (c) Allows both the intercepts 
and slopes to vary. In both (b) and (c) the varying parameters are constrained in that they are 
modelled as draws from some distribution.  
Linear regression models rely on a number of assumptions to be generalisable and valid (Gelman 
& Hill, 2006). The first obvious assumption is that the predictor(s) influences the outcome in a 
linear fashion. However, even if the predictor has a non-linear effect on the outcome, a linear 
regression model may still be used if the predictor is adequately transformed. For example, if X 
has a quadratic relationship with Y, X2βn will capture that relationship even though the model 
itself is linear. Second, if the model has multiple predictors, the influence of those predictors on 
the outcome should be additive. If additivity is violated the model can be extended by terms that 
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capture the interactions between the predictors (e.g. X1X2βn). Third, the errors in a linear 
regression should be independent. Fourth, the residual errors have equal variance for all 
predicted values of Y. Fifth, the residual errors are normally distributed. This last assumption 
does not influence the estimation of the regression line, but matters when predicting new data 
from the model (Gelman & Hill, 2006). 
The linear regression framework can be extended to binary categorical outcomes (such as picking 
the left or right option in a 2AFC task) by dummy-coding one outcome as 1 and the other as 0. 
However, if Y is binary and Ŷ is continuous the residual errors cannot be normally distributed, 
and the variance of the residuals cannot be constant for all ŷ, so the assumptions of the 
regression framework are violated. This problem can be solved by predicting the probability of 
yi=1  (denoted Pr(yi=1)) rather than predicting Y directly (where i indexes one instance of y in 
Y). The function that specifies the relationship between Ŷ and Pr(Y=1) is known as a linking 
function. The most common linking function when predicting a binary outcome from a 
regression model is the logit function, and a regression using a logit function to predict a binary 
outcome is called a binomial logistic regression, often abbreviated logistic regression. The logit 
function is the natural logarithm of the odds. The long form of a univariate logistic regression is: 
 
log
Pr(𝑦 = 1 | 𝑥)
Pr(𝑦 = 0| 𝑥)
= 𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝛽1 
 
 or, equivalently: 
 
Pr(𝑦 = 1 | 𝑥) =
 exp(𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝛽1)
1 + exp (𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝛽1)
 
 
Commonly abbreviated as: 
Pr(𝑦 = 1 | 𝑥) = logit−1(𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝛽1) 
 
which is the form I will use for the rest of the thesis. 
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The logistic regression framework can also be extended to categorical predictions with more than 
two options by creating a system of logistic regressions that discriminates between each of the 
options in turn. For example, in a 4-option scenario the first logistic regression would 
discriminate between whether a participant choose option 1 or any of the remaining three. If 
they chose one of the remaining options a second logistic regression would discriminate between 
the second option and the last two. In the univariate case (with options coded as [0, 1, 2, 3]): 
 
Pr(𝑦 > 0 | 𝑥) = logit−1(𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝛽1) 
 
Pr(𝑦 > 1 | 𝑥) = logit−1(𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝛽1 − γ1) 
 
Pr(𝑦 > 2| 𝑥) = logit−1(𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝛽1 − γ2) 
 
With the constraint that 0 < ϒ1 < ϒ2. The ϒ variables are called cutpoints and the reason that 
they are ordered (and all greater than 0) is that the probability of choosing any of the categories 
must be equal to one. Therefore, if the model estimates that there is a 10% probability of 
choosing the first option the remaining 3 options must be 90% likely in total, and if the second 
option is 70% likely to be chosen, the probability of choosing either of the last two options is 
20%. This framework can be extended to an arbitrary number of options, though more options 
require larger samples to get reliable parameter estimates (because the number of free parameters 
increases with each option). 
2.3. Hierarchical GLM 
In the real world data is often nested. For example, trials are nested within participants, students 
are nested within schools, or voters are nested within districts. Models need to account for these 
patterns to accurately capture real effects. Here I will focus on the case relevant for the empirical 
chapters, where multiple participants complete many trials inside an experiment. 
Say we have a sample of 20 participants completing 500 trials each in a psychophysics 
experiment and we want to find out whether self-reported confidence increases with response 
times. Historically, researchers would have either estimated a single regression line for all of the 
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trials (a pooled model) or analysed each participant individually (an unpooled model). Both of 
these approaches are suboptimal. The pooled model is suboptimal because it conflates between- 
and within-participants effects. Returning to our example, suppose that slower participants tend 
to be more confident. However, within each participant faster trials are associated with higher 
confidence ratings. By pooling the data we obscure at least one of these effects, depending on 
which one is dominant, even though there are two very real effects in our data. The problem 
with the unpooled model is that it is underpowered because it treats people as independent. That 
is, we model the data as if the first 19 participants provide no information about how participant 
20 will behave. Therefore, the unpooled approach needlessly impairs our ability to draw strong 
conclusions from the data. 
There are 3 ways to account for nested data in a GLM framework: allowing the intercepts to 
vary, allowing the slopes to vary, or allowing both to vary. We will consider a hierarchical model 
with varying intercepts first.  
∀𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑛} 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽1 +  𝛦𝑖 
The model above estimates one intercept for each participant but only estimates a shared slope 
parameter for all participants (see Figure 2.1. b). This addresses the risk that effects operating at 
different levels in the data occlude each other in the model. In terms of the example above, each 
participant would get their own intercept, capturing that slower respondents were more 
confident, but there would only be one single slope, capturing that within people faster 
responses tended to be more confident. However, this approach is still computationally 
inefficient because it assumes that each intercept is completely independent from the others. 
This can be addressed by adding a second level to the model, which draws the intercepts at the 
first level from a distribution of intercepts. The shape of this distribution will influence our 
results. For convenience, in this example we assume that the intercepts are drawn from a normal 
distribution: 
𝛽𝑖~𝑁(𝜇,  𝜎
2) 
Both levels of the model are fitted simultaneously, so that if all of the participants had similar 
mean response times, σ2 would be small, constraining the possible intercepts for outliers. On the 
other hand, if the mean response time differed a lot between participants, σ 2 would be large, so 
the hierarchical model would give similar results to the unpooled model. Hierarchical models 
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have the added benefit that they can be expanded to account for predictors that work on the 
higher levels in the data structure. In the context of our example, maybe the researchers suspect 
that participant age influences confidence. This could be tested by adding age (with a slope 
parameter) into the higher level of the model: 
𝛽𝑖~𝑁(𝜂0 + 𝜂1𝑢𝑖 ,  𝜎
2) 
Where ui indicates the age of the participant, η1 is a slope parameter and η0 is an intercept term. 
The same principle applies if we extend the model to slopes: just as the intercepts above, they 
can also be allowed to vary by participant, with each slope drawn from a distribution (Figure 2.1. 
c). Predictors can be added at any level of the model and additional levels can be added (e.g. 
perhaps we believe that gender influences confidence judgments so we want to nest our 
participants by gender). 
An alternative to maximum likelihood estimation for hierarchical models is Bayesian estimations. 
In Bayesian estimation the information in the likelihood function is combined with prior 
information the researcher might have about the data (represented as a distribution). This can be 
useful when the researcher has a lot of information that is not captured in the data set. However, 
in cases with large data sets and with diffuse prior distributions, the likelihood tends to dominate 
the Bayesian computation so that Bayesian and maximum likelihood estimates are very similar. 
There are 3 important practical advantages with the Bayesian approach: 1) As mentioned above 
the prior constrains the likelihood, this gives the researcher freedom to implement information 
from outside of the data in the modelling in a principled way. 2) Bayesian statistics treat all 
unknown quantities probabilistically so everything from parameter estimates to predictions of 
new observations are treated as distributions, representing the uncertainty in the model and the 
data. 3) The software tools implementing Bayesian analysis tends to be more flexible than those 
implementing pure maximum likelihood approaches so it is easier for researchers to build 
models that are optimised for their datasets and research questions. 
To summarise, the hierarchical GLM framework is both flexible and powerful. Its capacity to 
evaluate both within-participants and between participants effects simultaneously makes it 
particularly well-suited to explore questions related to metacognition, where the norm is that a 
small number of participants complete a large number of trials.  
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2.4. Signal Detection Theory 
Together with GLM, Signal Detection Theory (SDT) is the modelling framework most 
important for this thesis. SDT translates a noisy observation into a decision. It has been 
successful because of its relative mathematical simplicity and its explanatory power. It is still 
relevant today because it can be extended both to capture decisions, confidence judgments and 
response times. Two extensions are particularly relevant for the work presented in the empirical 
chapters, the meta-d’ framework for measuring confidence accuracy (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012, 
2014), and drift diffusion models that capture participant performance in relation to response 
time and accuracy simultaneously (Ratcliff, 1978). Because both these extensions are highly 
relevant to the work presented here, I will briefly explain classical SDT as a foundation for the 
more complex modelling that follows. 
SDT is a framework for reaching a decision from a single piece of evidence (traditionally 
denoted e). In order for e to be meaningful it should carry information about two states we want 
to discriminate between (H1 and H0). For example, say that you try to determine whether it is day 
(H1) or night (H0) only from the outdoors temperature (e). If e is completely determined by the 
state of H the problem is trivial (if you are in a place where temperature is completely 
determined by the time of day, you know what time it is as soon as you check the temperature). 
In interesting real world settings our observations are noisy, so that they are influenced both by 
the state of H and other factors (e.g. temperature is also influenced by season and weather). To 
capture this uncertainty e is modelled as a draw from two normal distributions with one mean if 
H1 is true and the other mean if H0 is true (the average temperature is different during the night 
and during the day, but there is also considerable variation within each of these world states). For 
mathematical convenience the variance of the distributions are often assumed to be equal, σ2. In 
other words, these normal distributions are the likelihood of P(e|H1) and P(e|H0), respectively. 
The task of the decision maker (and the theory) is then to determine what state of H gave rise to 
observation e. The difficulty of this decision is determined by the difference in means between 
H1 and H0 scaled by σ (μH1-μH0/σ), because that difference determines the overlap of the 
distributions and thus the ambiguity of e (see Figure 2.2.).  This difference measure is denoted d’ 
and can be considered the strength of the signal or equivalently the sensitivity of the observer 
(the day/night discrimination becomes easier in places where temperature does not change much 
by season and the weather does not vary much and it would be harder if the thermometer is not 
very precise). 
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Figure 2.2. Illustration of Signal Detection Theory                                                     
According to signal detection theory, the response of a given trial is determined by whether the 
observation e for that trial exceeds threshold c.  e is drawn from one of two Gaussian 
distributions: the light blue distribution if the target is absent, and the dark blue distribution if 
the target is present. A participant’s discriminative ability is quantified as d’, the difference 
between the means of the distributions relative to their joint standard deviation. The response 
threshold c does not have to be in the middle of the distribution but can take any possible value 
for e. For example, if participants care mostly about hits they may choose C1 as their criterion, 
but if they care mostly about avoiding false alarms they might choose C2. The figure and text is 
adapted from Folke, Ouzia, Bright, De Martino, and Filipi (2016). 
In order to mathematically discriminate between H0 and H1 from e, two things are required: a 
decision value (DV) and some criterion c that can be compared with the decision value to reach 
a conclusion. The optimal DV in two choice decisions is the likelihood ratio l1,0(e) = 
P(e|H1)/P(e|H0), or some monotonically related variable.  In the temperature example, if we 
know the probabilities of different temperatures during the day and the night, we can work out 
the likelihood that it is day or it is night given the temperature we are currently recording. By 
taking the ratio of these likelihoods we can tell whether it is more likely that it is day or night, 
and all that is left to do is to pick a decision criterion. When determining what decision criterion 
to adopt it is useful to consider the four possible outcomes of the decision: either the participant 
can report H1 when H1 is true (a hit), they can report H1 when H0 is true (a miss), they report 
H0 when H0 is true (a correct rejection) or they report H0 when H1 is true (a false alarm). If the 
aim is to maximize correct classifications and there are no prior beliefs about the relative 
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probabilities of H1 and H0 c should be 1.  If we have different prior beliefs of the respective 
probability of H1 and H0 we can capture that by adopting the response criterion P(H1)/P(H0). 
Finally if the cost of a miss does not equal the cost of a false alarm or the reward of a hit is 
different from the reward of a correct rejection the optimal c would be given by: 
(𝑣11 + 𝑣10)𝑃(𝐻1)
(𝑣01 + 𝑣00)𝑃(𝐻0)
 
Where vij is the value of performing action j when hypothesis i is true.  Note that when the cost 
of an error and the reward for a correct response are independent of the state of the world c the 
equation above simplifies to the prior probability ratio, which lacking any prior information 
simplifies to 1. Going back to our example, if we only want to be correct as often as possible and 
we have computed the likelihood ratio P(temperature|day)/P(temperature|night) we should 
behave as if it is day if the ratio is greater than 1 and behave as if it is night, otherwise. However 
if it is more costly to act as if it is day when it is actually night than it is to act as if it is night 
when it is actually day, we can modify our response criterion to capture this imbalance. 
SDT is of interest to psychologist because the mathematics are not directional, so if a researcher 
has a record of the hits, misses, correct rejections, and false alarms of a participant they can 
calculate their sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (c).  This is useful because it provides two 
orthogonal and theoretically interesting values that capture most binary choice data well 
(Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). 
2.5. Extending SDT: ROC Curves and Metacognition 
In order to understand how SDT captures actual behaviour and how it can be extended to the 
metacognitive domain, we need to understand Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves.  
ROC curves are graphical non-parametric tools that show how hit rates and false alarm rates are 
related. Imagine a plane where one axis represents the hit rate, and the other the false alarm rate. 
We draw a point on this plane that represents the hit rate and false alarm rate of one participant 
in one particular task (point c in Figure 2.3.). Then we change the incentive structure of the task, 
so that hits are rewarded more strongly or false alarm are punished less harshly, to motivate the 
participant to adapt a more liberal response criterion. We capture this new hit rate and false 
alarm rate with another point on the plane (point c2 in Figure 2.3.). Once this procedure has been 
repeated with a variety of different incentive schemes so there is a set of points on the plane, a 
curve can be drawn to capture the general relationship between hit rates and false alarm rates. 
The proportion of the plane under this curve is a non-parametric measure of sensitivity (with a 
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value of 1 for perfect sensitivity and a value of 0.5 for chance level).  In signal theoretic terms, 
this approach incentivises the participant to change their c while keeping d’ constant, so we can 
derive a theoretical ROC curve by mathematically altering c while keeping d’ constant and record 
what that does to hit rates and false alarm rates (see Figure 2.3.). This theoretical curve has been 
demonstrated to fit the empirical curve well in a variety of different settings (Green & Swets, 
1996; Swets, 2014), suggesting that the SDT independence between sensitivity and criterion has 
empirical support. 
There are ways to draw empirical ROC curves without changing the incentive of responses. If 
participants provide confidence judgments with their choices, other points can be generated in 
the ROC space by calculating hit rates and false alarms from high-confidence H1 responses, and 
doing the same with high-confidence H0 responses. Because confidence judgments are second 
order decisions (i.e. they evaluate the accuracy of the first order decision process) this new curve 
is called a second-order ROC curve. Interestingly, this second order, confidence-derived ROC 
curve is different from the ROC curve derived from actually changing the response incentives or 
drawing a theoretical ROC curve from SDT. Specifically, the area under the curve tends to be 
smaller when the curve is based on confidence judgments relative to the other methods (see 
Figure 2.3.).   
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Figure 2.3. ROC Curves            
An ROC curve shows the relationship between hit rates and miss rates for a specific sensitivity 
(d’) as the response criterion (c) varies. There are three types of ROC curves that are of interest 
in this discussion, empirical ROC curves, theoretical ROC curves and confidence ROC curves. 
Empirical ROC curves are generated by incentivising participants to change their response 
criterion, recording how that influences the hit rates and false alarm rates (points c1, c and c2 in 
the figure) and extrapolating a curve from the observations. Theoretical ROC curves are derived 
by computing d’ and c for a single hit rate and false alarm rate and then deriving a curve by 
keeping d’ constant but allowing c to vary. Theoretical and empirical ROC curves tends to 
overlap (Swets, 2014). Confidence ROC curves can be derived for tasks where confidence 
judgments on choices are collected. By determining hits and misses based on the confidence 
judgments, these confidence ROC curves tend to cover a smaller area (the dotted line in the 
figure) suggesting that some information is lost between the choice and the confidence 
judgment. 
Maniscalco and Lau (2012) invented a way to quantify the difference between the first order-
accuracy of confidence judgements and the first-order accuracy of choices. They reversed the 
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mathematics to determine what level of d’ (sensitivity) would have given rise to the second-order 
ROC curve. This new measure, called meta-d’ tells us how well confidence judgments can 
discriminate between correct and error trials.  The calculation of meta-d’ is not analytically 
tractable because it requires extrapolating a curve from the empirical ROC points and then 
extrapolating a d’ from this curve, but there are numeric methods that offer good 
approximations (see Fleming, 2017; Maniscalco & Lau, 2014). To quantify the difference 
between first-order sensitivity (the sensitivity based on the choices) and second order sensitivity 
(sensitivity based on the confidence judgments) Maniscalco and Lau computed the ratio between 
meta-d’ and d’, called the Mratio (Mratio = meta-d’/d’). An Mratio equal to one means that the 
confidence judgments are as good at discriminating between H1 and H0 as the first-order 
responses are, an Mratio greater than one means that they are better, less than one means that 
they are worse. In most experiments, reported Mratios have been less than 1, suggesting some 
information loss between the first order and second order judgments (though this is by no 
means a universal observation, see Fleming & Daw, 2017). 
It should be noted that other ways to evaluate the sensitivity of confidence judgments have been 
proposed. Specifically, high confidence judgments for correct choices could be treated as hits, 
low confidence judgments for correct choices could be treated as misses, etc. It would then be 
possible to use these quantities to derive a “second order d’” and “second order c” from the hit 
rates and false alarm rates of the confidence judgments (Galvin et al., 2003). This approach is 
hard to implement because traditional SDT assumes that the evidence distributions for both 
“present” and “absent” trials are normal, and the second order evidence distributions are non-
normal when the first order choices are well-captured by these assumptions(Galvin et al., 2003). 
This results in the undesirable property that metacognitive bias influences the measure of meta-
cognitive sensitivity (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007). Apart from these mathematical challenges, 
independent modelling work has shown that second order d’ is influenced by changes in first 
order c, whereas meta-d’ is stable (Barrett et al., 2013). 
Meta-d’ can be estimated via maximum likelihood methods or via other forms of analytic 
approximation (Barrett et al., 2013; Maniscalco & Lau, 2014). Recently Fleming has suggested a 
new method for hierarchical Bayesian approximation of Meta-d’, this new approach is preferable 
to the earlier estimation methods for a number of reasons: 
1. Point estimates of meta-d’ are noisy, Bayesian estimation captures this uncertainty as each 
meta-d’ estimate is represented by a distribution, rather than a point. 
2. For research projects where the aim is to compare the metacognitive abilities of two 
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groups the traditional solution has been to first draw a point estimate for each participant 
and then compare the samples of point estimates with a t-test. This ignores the 
uncertainty in the point estimates. A fully Bayesian method would include this 
uncertainty when estimating the group-level parameters, and conversely use the group 
level parameters to constrain individual meta-d’ estimate, so that noise outliers are pulled 
towards the group mean. 
3.  In traditional meta-d’ estimation methods padding is used to avoid 0-cells (e.g. if there are 
6 levels of confidence ratings, the highest confidence ratings might never have been used 
for error trials). This padding might bias participant-specific estimates. Bayesian 
estimation methods do not require padding because the generative multinomial model 
can handle 0 cell count (Lee, 2008). 
4. The general benefits of using Bayesian methods apply to the meta-d’ context as well, such 
as the ability to include information obtained outside the particular experiment (Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2014) and evaluating evidence in favour of the null hypothesis (Morey & 
Rouder, 2011). 
5. Simulations have shown that the Bayesian hierarchical meta-d’ estimation show better 
model recovery than the traditional methods, especially in experiments with few trials per 
participant (Fleming, 2017). 
For these reasons, the Bayesian hierarchical approach will be used for the meta-d’ analyses 
presented in the empirical chapters. 
2.6. Extending SDT: Sequential Sampling 
The flexibility of SDT is both a strength and a weakness. It specifies the relationship between 
variables but not the absolute values themselves; so as long as the variables scale with each other 
it is mathematically unconstrained (Gold & Shadlen, 2007).  One way to further constrain these 
models is to account for reaction times as well as decision probabilities. Models that capture 
both reaction times and choices are called sequential sampling models (SSM), because they are 
extending SDT to integrate several pieces of evidence before discriminating between H0 and H1. 
SSM first asks, “Is there enough information to make a successful discrimination?”. If so the 
appropriate choice is selected; if not another piece of evidence is accumulated and integrated.  
The easiest way to visualise a sequential sampling model is to imagine this gradual accumulation 
of evidence as the movements of a particle (see Figure 2.4.). The starting point of the particle 
represents our belief before we receive any evidence, then for each unit of evidence the particle 
moves towards or away from a threshold where the threshold represents a choice. There are 
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many classes of sequential sampling models (as discussed in the introduction), but I will focus on 
drift diffusion models (DDM). The distinguishing feature of drift diffusion models is that they 
measure the relative evidence between two options, so that the evidence accumulation for 
different options is anti-correlated (the two thresholds are opposite to each other in decision-
space, see Figure 2.4.). This can be contrasted with race models, which model evidence 
accumulation separately for each option and allow for some degree of independence between 
these accumulators (Forstmann et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 2.4. Schematic of a Drift Diffusion Process         
A drift diffusion process model human decision making as a particle moving between two 
bounds. 4 key parameters are estimated from the data, bias (z), boundary separation (a) drift rate 
(v) and non-decision-time (t). 
There are 4 primary parameters in a DDM, the drift rate (v) determines the average amount of 
evidence per unit of time and can be considered a sensitivity parameter (like d’ in basic SDT). 
The boundary separation (a) captures the speed accuracy trade–off; the further away the decision 
boundaries are the greater the chance that the choice will reflect the drift rate (be accurate) but it 
will take longer for the particle to hit a boundary, meaning slower responses. As mentioned 
above, the starting point (z) of the particle captures prior beliefs or preference favouring one 
option over the other, with the result that choices in the direction of the starting point are more 
likely, and will happen more quickly when they happen. The boundary separation and starting 
point together correspond to c in SDT because they jointly capture the response criterion. 
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Finally, to accurately capture human decision data SDT requires a fourth parameter, non-
decision time (t) reflecting processing independent from the decision process itself (such as 
planning the motor response). In other words response times are a function of the time it takes 
the evidence to accumulate to a boundary and the non-decision time. Besides the primary free 
parameters described above there are three additional free parameters: inter-trial variability in 
drift rates, starting points and non-decision times. These additional parameters are necessary to 
capture the differences in response time distributions for correct responses and error responses. 
It might seem as if DDMs can capture response distributions and response probabilities simply 
because they have so many free parameters, so any results derived from this approach are 
psychologically uninformative because the parameters are not sufficiently constrained by the 
data. However, there are several pieces of evidence to the contrary. First, Ratcliff (2002) used 
simulations to show that the DDM failed to account for plausible but fake data. Second, the 
model can be constrained by theoretical considerations (e.g. only allowing task difficulty to 
influence drift rate, and changing accuracy incentives to influence the speed accuracy trade-off). 
Third, experiments that vary a specific psychological construct show that most of the resulting 
variance is being captured by the appropriate parameter (so if difficulty varies between trials, that 
is captured by the drift rate parameter but not by the threshold parameter; Voss, Rothermund, & 
Voss, 2004) 
The DDM framework has several benefits for behavioural research. Just like SDT, DDM 
captures both accuracy and bias in an intuitive way, and it also captures the speed accuracy trade-
off. This allows researchers to explore questions relating to psychological mechanisms. For 
example, it is well-known that older people have slower response times for binary decision 
making tasks than younger people, but is this difference caused by slower evidence integration, 
slower motor responses, or because they are more careful to avoid errors? DDM analyses show 
that the differences in response time are best captured by differences in non-decision-times and 
boundary separation, suggesting that older people have slower motor responses and are more 
careful, but evidence integration is unaffected by aging (Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2010). For 
a list of research that has benefited from a DDM approach see Forstmann, Ratcliff and 
Wagenmakers (2016). 
The role of experimental manipulations on the DDM parameters can be examined by applying 
linear regression models to the parameters. For example, if we have two difficulty conditions in a 
2AFC experiment and we want to test whether these affect the evidence accumulations we can 
fit two models. First a null model that ignores trial difficulty when estimating drift-rate and then 
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a second model that estimates drift rate as an intercept and a coefficient multiplied by a dummy-
variable, coded 0 for hard trials and 1 for easy trials. The extent to which the second model fits 
the data better than the first model would quantify whether the difficulty manipulation has 
worked, and the size of the coefficient would quantify how much the difficulty manipulation 
influences evidence accumulation. As with the GLM frameworks we could also draw various 
intercepts and slopes for different participants, and therefore capture both general trends across 
people and individual differences between people in the same model. 
 2.7. Software and Computational Implementation 
The hierarchical GLMs in this thesis have been fitted with the lme4 package (version 1.1-7; 
Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) in the R software (version 3.2.3.). P-values and degrees 
of freedom have been approximated using the Kenward-Rogers approximation, as implemented 
in the pbkrtest package (version 0.4-2.; Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). These approximations are 
necessary because the complex covariance structures of nested models mean that the null-
distributions for the parameters of interest are unknown, and thus need to be approximated. 
Note that because degrees of freedom are approximated they are continuous variables, rather 
than integers. Following the suggestion of Gelman and Hill (2006) fixed effect confidence 
intervals were estimated by multiplying the Wald statistic standard errors by 1.96. Because these 
confidence intervals are estimates that do not take the covariance between parameters into 
account (Bolker, 2014) they should not be used to evaluate the significance of a group-level 
coefficient, but rather serve to give the reader a sense of the precision of the fixed effect 
coefficients. 
Meta-d’ and Mratio estimates are obtained through Hierarchical Bayesian estimation, as 
implemented by Steve Fleming’s HMeta-d’ code (Fleming, 2017) in MatLab (2016 b). All 
parameters reported relating to the HMeta-d’ code were sampled with three chains, with 11 000 
samples in each with the first 1000 samples discarded as burn-in, leaving 30 000 posterior 
samples for the analyses. All posteriors reported here showed excellent chain mixing (Gelman-
Rubin statistics>=1.05), suggesting that the chains had converged and that samples were drawn 
from the true posterior. All DDM parameters are estimated by Hierarchical Bayesian estimation 
through Thomas Wiecki and Michael Frank’s and HDDM package (version 0.6.0.; 
http://ski.clps.brown.edu/hddm_docs/) in Python 2.7.12. The HDDM package includes a 
function to estimate good starting values for the chains prior to starting sampling, dramatically 
reducing the need for burn-in. All parameters estimated from the HDDM package was sampled 
with 3 chains, with 2000 samples in each with the first 200 samples discarded as burn-in, leaving 
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5400 posterior samples for the analyses, the exception being one model that took longer to 
converge and therefore was sampled with 4000 samples per chain, resulting in 11 400 posterior 
samples (see Chapter 5). All posteriors reported here showed excellent chain-mixing (Gelman-
Rubin statistic>1.05), suggesting that the chains had converged and that samples were drawn 
from the true posterior. Some responses with outlying RT’s are common in 2AFC tasks, and 
may provide a serious challenge for likelihood-based DDM estimation (Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 
2002), therefore the HDDM package offers a mixture model where reaction times are drawn 
from a mixture of a drift diffusion process and a uniform response distribution that model 
outliers. In line with the recommendation of the package creators the HDDM models estimated 
here assumed that approximately 5% of the response times were outliers when estimating the 
DDM parameters (see the HDDM documentation for more information). 
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3. Evidence of a Metacognitive Deficit in 
Bilinguals 
3.1. Summary 
Some studies have found that bilinguals have an executive function advantage relative to 
monolinguals, though the exact nature of this advantage, as well as its magnitude, is still 
uncertain. I tested whether this executive function advantage led to a similar advantage in 
metacognitive abilities. Two perceptual discrimination experiments showed a metacognitive 
disadvantage for bilinguals, an effect in the opposite direction than has previously been reported 
for executive function. I explored how the difference in metacognitive performance relate to 
how sensitive confidence judgments are to response time and stimulus strength, in the two 
groups, but fail to find any robust differences. Future work should explore whether these 
differences are domain general, and if so whether they have any implications for decision 
making. 
3.2. Introduction 
Learning a second language brings many benefits: not only does it provide a window into a 
different culture and enable communication with more people; it might also improve executive 
function outside the language domain. Early work by Bialystok and colleagues found that 
bilingual children who used both their languages frequently were better at inhibiting task-
irrelevant information than their monolingual peers (Bialystok, 2001).  Subsequently they found 
that this bilingual advantage is driven by the ability to effectively switch between tasks and 
suppress information relevant to the non-active task (formally known as executive control; 
Bialystok & Martin, 2004). Other inhibition-related abilities such as response inhibition or 
delayed gratification do not distinguish bilingual children from their peers (Carlson & Meltzoff, 
2008; Martin-Rhee & Bialystok, 2008). The bilingual advantage in executive control has been 
observed across the life span (Bialystok, Craik, Klein, & Viswanathan, 2004) and in different 
cultures (Bialystok & Viswanathan, 2009), so it appears to be robust.  
The bilingual advantage in executive control has been explained by a theoretical account 
suggesting that both languages are active by default in the bilingual mind, so the non-active 
language needs to be constantly suppressed (Green, 1986, 1998). As a result bilinguals practice 
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executive control almost constantly and get better at it than their monolingual peers. This theory 
has some empirical support in experimental work on homographs (words that look the same in 
two languages) which suggests that both languages are active by default for bilingual speakers 
(Dijkstra, De Bruijn, Schriefers, & Ten Brinke, 2000). Additionally, recent neuroscientific work 
shows that words from both the target and non-target language are activated during reading, so 
ignoring words from the non-target language requires active suppression (Van Heuven, 
Schriefers, Dijkstra, & Hagoort, 2008). There are also a lot of fMRI studies suggesting that the 
same brain regions are active for both languages, suggesting that there is a single network for 
language recognition and production and that prefrontal regions modulate which language it is 
active at any given moment (Abutalebi & Green, 2007). In other words, neuroscience supports 
the earlier cognitive model which stated that bilinguals have to suppress the non-active language, 
a designation which constantly shifts depending on context; this constant practice in switching 
and suppression leads to a bilingual advantage in these domains (Costa, Hernández, & Sebastián-
Gallés, 2008). For an up to date theoretical account of how bilingualism is implemented in the 
brain and how bilingualism might increase executive control see Stocco, Yamasaki, Natalenko, 
and Prat (2014). 
The discovery of bilingual advantages in executive control encouraged research into other 
differences between bilingual and monolingual cognition. Recent work shows that bilinguals are 
faster than monolinguals to apply new rules (Stocco & Prat, 2014), they are less prone to 
egocentric bias when reasoning about other people’s beliefs (Rubio-Fernández & Glucksberg, 
2012), and they are better able to identify who is speaking and understand what they are saying in 
the presence of verbal interference (Filippi et al., 2015; Filippi, Leech, Thomas, Green, & Dick, 
2012). As such, there might be extensive differences between bilingual and monolingual 
cognition that are still poorly understood. 
However, it is important to note that there have also been studies failing to find differences in 
executive control between monolinguals and bilinguals (Antón et al., 2014; Gathercole et al., 
2014). The earlier positive results have been attributed to researchers failing to match 
monolinguals and bilinguals on ethnicity and socio-economic status (Morton & Harper, 2007) 
and to a publication bias favouring positive results (de Bruin, Treccani, & Della Sala, 2015). 
When Paap and colleagues recently reviewed the state of evidence they concluded that the effect 
of bilingualism on executive control was either much smaller than previously thought or only 
manifested during specific and undetermined circumstances (Paap, Johnson, & Sawi, 2015). In 
sum, it seems like the way in which bilingualism influences executive function is still poorly 
understood. 
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Given the interest in the role of bilingualism in cognition in general and executive function in 
particular it is somewhat surprising that bilinguals and monolinguals have not previously been 
compared with regards to metacognitive abilities. Metacognition is the ability to monitor and 
evaluate one’s own cognitive processes, or, more informally, to have ‘thoughts about thoughts’ 
(Flavell, 1979). Metacognition has been linked to executive function because executive control 
requires the monitoring of current cognitive processes, and such monitoring is inherently 
metacognitive (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000). Behaviourally, Del Missier and 
colleagues showed that people who were better at task switching were also better at consistently 
monitoring their own performance (Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010). On a 
neurological level the anterior cingulate cortex is involved both with metacognition (Stephen M 
Fleming & Dolan, 2012) and with conflict monitoring, which is important for executive control 
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). With regards to bilingualism, one study found that bilinguals 
outperformed monolinguals in a task that required carefully monitoring and allocating cognitive 
resources (Costa, Hernández, Costa-Faidella, & Sebastián-Gallés, 2009). While these results were 
expressed strictly in terms of executive function, such monitoring processes are inherently 
metacognitive. There has been some earlier work looking at the role of metacognition in relation 
to second language learning (e.g. García, Jiménez, & Pearson, 1998; Trofimovich, Isaacs, 
Kennedy, Saito, & Crowther, 2016), but to the best of my knowledge no prior work has 
investigated whether monolingual and bilingual people differ with regards to metacognition. 
Metacognition can be described as a part of a two-level system, with an object level, or first order 
process, and a meta level, or second order process (Nelson & Narens, 1994). For example, when 
choosing which way to drive to work, the object level, first order performance could be 
operationalised as the travel time of the chosen route relative to the alternatives. Second order 
performance would be how well our subjective sense of confidence in our choice matches the 
first order performance; in other words, we would feel more confident if we indeed chose the 
fastest possible route and less confident if we didn’t. The ability to get a subjective sense of one’s 
performance is considered to be a key aspect of confidence judgments (Grimaldi, Lau, & Basso, 
2015; C. S. Peirce & Jastrow, 1884). In many cases, subjective confidence judgments are thought 
to result from an imperfect readout of the uncertainty associated with the first order decisions 
(Meyniel, Sigman, & Mainen, 2015). 
In experimental psychology, metacognitive performance is often assessed by comparing 
confidence judgments in relation to an objective measure of task performance, such as error rate 
(e.g., Schwartz & Díaz, 2014; Yeung & Summerfield, 2014). When evaluating metacognitive 
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performance three terms are of central importance: accuracy, bias, and efficiency (Maniscalco & 
Lau, 2012, 2014). 
Metacognitive accuracy is the extent to which confidence can be used to discriminate between 
correct trials and error trials (Galvin et al., 2003). For example, if a participant is shown a set of 
pictures and has to evaluate whether they have seen them before, good metacognitive accuracy 
would result in their confidence judgments being consistently higher when they are correct 
compared to when they are wrong. Metacognitive accuracy appears to be domain-general in 
healthy people, in the sense that people have similar metacognitive accuracy across tasks, even 
when the tasks depend on different first order abilities (McCurdy et al., 2013; Song et al., 2011; 
Veenman et al., 1997). However, dissociations in metacognitive abilities have been recorded 
between memory tasks and visual discrimination tasks (Fleming et al., 2014) in people with 
localised brain lesions.  
In order to gain a complete picture of metacognitive performance one must also account for 
metacognitive bias, or the tendency to generally report high or low confidence, regardless of the 
quality of the available information or the accuracy of the first order judgment. For example, 
people tend to be overconfident in certain memory tasks (i.e., overestimating how often they are 
correct), whilst still being able to discriminate between correct and incorrect performance (for a 
review see Hoffrage, 2004). Related to the concept of bias is the concept of calibration. A 
participant is well calibrated if they pick the correct option 70% of the time, and they are 70% 
certain they are correct, on average. Calibration is mathematically independent from accuracy 
because accuracy captures how well confidence can distinguish between correct and incorrect 
trials whereas calibration captures how well confidence is aligned with performance on average 
(Baranski & Petrusic, 1994). While questions regarding calibration are interesting, they only really 
make sense in tasks where confidence is explicitly equated with the probability of being correct, a 
mapping that does not always feel natural to respondents. 
Metacognitive efficiency is a signal theoretic concept that refers to how good a person’s 
metacognitive accuracy is given their first order accuracy. Imagine two people, Susan and John, 
performing a memory test, followed by a binary confidence judgment. Susan produces fewer 
errors and therefore has better first order accuracy than John. Nevertheless, both participants 
report high confidence for 80% of the correctly remembered items and report high confidence 
for 40% of the items when they were wrong. This means that they both demonstrated the same 
level of metacognitive accuracy, because their confidence judgments were equally good at 
discriminating between correct and incorrect trials. However, in a sense John is metacognitively 
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superior to Susan, because even though his first order decision process is worse, he still shows 
equally accurate confidence judgments. In the experiments presented below I controlled for first 
order performance to get a pure measure of metacognitive efficiency in two ways. First, I used 
an adaptive staircase to ensure a similar first-order accuracy for the experimental task across all 
participants. Second, I controlled for differences in first order performance mathematically.  
Historically, metacognitive accuracy was computed by correlating confidence with first order 
performance within each participant (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Nelson, 1984). However, 
this approach has been criticised for its inability to distinguish metacognitive accuracy from 
metacognitive bias (Masson & Rotello, 2009). Maniscalco and Lau (2012, 2014) recently 
addressed this problem by applying signal detection theory (SDT) to metacognition, thus 
providing separate measures for bias and sensitivity. Their measure for sensitivity, meta-d’, 
captures the extent to which confidence judgments can discriminate between correct and error 
trials. Metacognitive efficiency is captured by the Mratio (Fleming & Lau, 2014), which is 
computed by dividing meta-d’ with d’ (a measure of first order sensitivity). This approach to 
measuring metacognitive performance has been demonstrated to outperform alternatives and to 
give robust measures of metacognitive accuracy and metacognitive efficiency (Barrett et al., 
2013).  For a more in depth discussion of these constructs see the Chapter 2. 
The aim of this study was to test if the executive control advantage reported in bilinguals 
translated to a metacognitive advantage. I compared metacognitive efficiency (captured by the 
Mratio) between bilinguals and monolinguals in a perceptual two-alternative-forced choice 
(2AFC) task. Because metacognitive performance tends to be associated with task performance 
(Galvin et al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), I used a perceptual task that allowed me to adjust 
task difficulty online for each participant, titrating performance at around 71% for all 
participants. This standardisation ensured severely restricted variation in task performance across 
participants, implying that any variation in metacognitive performance could not be accounted 
for by differences in task performance. After completing an initial experiment without any 
response time constraints, I found that the monolingual group responded significantly slower 
than the bilingual group. Because previous work suggests that metacognitive judgments are 
partially computed while the first-order decision is made (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998, 2001), this 
might confound any results relating to metacognition. I addressed this confound in two ways. 
First, I ran a drift diffusion model on the choice data to test if the differences in response times 
were best captured by differences in the rate of evidence accumulation, differences in response 
thresholds, or differences in non-decision-time (for more on drift diffusion models see the 
methods section). The aim of this model was to see whether either language group accumulated 
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first-order evidence more efficiently, as such a difference could confound the second-order 
comparison. Second, I conducted an additional study with a similar set-up, except that 
participants had to respond within the first 1.5 seconds. In this second experiment response 
times were comparable across language groups. The results of both experiments are presented 
together in order to make it easy to compare the results and get a sense of the total findings.  
3.3. Methods 
3.3.1. The Dot Discrimination Task, Experiment 1 
Participants completed a two-alternative-forced-choice task programmed in PsychoPy v. 1.82 
(Peirce, 2008) presented on a 24-inch widescreen monitor using a standard keyboard. A 
MATLAB version of a similar task has previously been used in Fleming et al. (2014). On each 
trial participants saw two white circles on a black background, and indicated whether the left or 
the right circle contained more dots by pressing the appropriate arrow key on a standard 
computer keyboard. For every trial, one circle was randomly assigned to have 50 dots; the other 
circle contained a variable number of dots that was either larger or smaller than 50. The 
difference in number of dots between the two circles was modified throughout the experiment 
by a staircase procedure, so that whenever participants correctly responded to two successive 
trials the task increased in difficulty (one less dot difference between the options) and for every 
failed trial the task became easier (one more dot difference between the options). The purpose of 
the staircase was to normalise first order accuracy at 71% across the sample. After each trial 
participants were asked to indicate their confidence on a sliding scale. Response times were 
unconstrained for both first order and second order judgments. For a graphical representation of 
the trial structure see Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The Trial Structure of the Dot Discrimination Task for Experiment 1 
62 participants (31 monolinguals and 31 bilinguals) were asked to rate which one of two circles 
contained more dots and then rated their confidence on a scale going from less to more. Both 
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the choices and the confidence judgements had unconstrained response-times. One circle always 
contained 50 dots whereas the other circle contained 50 dots +/- a dot difference. The dot 
difference was calculated by a 1-up-2-down staircase procedure to fix accuracy at around 70% 
across participants.   
Participants completed 8 blocks with 25 trials in each, making up a total of 200 trials. 
Prior to beginning the main task, participants completed three practice phases. In the first phase 
they were shown pairs of circles with the number of dots indicated in writing below the circles. 
In the second phase participants started making perceptual choices without conducting any 
confidence judgments. These trials started with a 20-item dot difference, which first changed in 
increments of four, then in successively smaller increments down to one; this was performed to 
calibrate the difficulty to each participant. The second phase terminated after 8 reversals (i.e. 
when participants had switched between picking the correct and the incorrect option 8 times). 
Participants received feedback on their choices in the second calibration phase. The final phase 
consisted of 10 trials that simulated the main experimental trials in every way, i.e., without 
performance feedback, and they were asked to indicate their confidence in their choice after each 
trial. The edges of the confidence scale was labelled “less” and “more” and participants were 
instructed to report their relative confidence, i.e. reporting higher confidence on trials they were 
more certain of being correct and lower confidence when they were less certain of being correct 
in relation to other trials in the same experiment. They were encouraged to use the full range of 
the scale. No feedback was given for their use of the confidence scale. All practice trials were 
excluded from all analyses. 
 
 
3.3.2. Dot Discrimination Task, Experiment 2 
The dot discrimination task was identical to the task in Experiment 1, with the exception that 
participants now had to respond within 1.5 seconds after first seeing the dots. I also introduced 
slightly longer inter-trial intervals which featured a fixation cross in the centre of the screen (see 
Figure 3.2.). If participants took longer than 1.5 seconds to respond, the trial was terminated and 
the words “Too Slow” were presented for one second.  
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Figure 3.2. The Trial Structure of the Dot Discrimination Task in Experiment 2 
60 participants (32 monolinguals and 28 bilinguals) were asked to rate which one of two circles 
contained more dots and then rated their confidence on a scale going from less to more. Choices 
were constrained to be faster than 1.5 ms. If participants took longer than 1.5. ms to respond the 
words “Too Slow” were presented for 1 second before the next trial started. Confidence 
judgements had unconstrained response-times. One circle always contained 50 dots whereas the 
other circle contained 50 dots +/- a dot difference. The dot difference was calculated by a 1-up-
2-down staircase procedure to fix accuracy at around 70% across participants.   
 
3.3.3. Materials 
We administered standardised measures of working memory and non-verbal reasoning to all 
participants in order to ensure that the groups were comparable with regard to general cognitive 
function. The materials used were identical for both experiments. 
3.3.3.1. Working Memory Test 
Working memory was assessed using the digit span task of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
IV (Wechsler, 2008). In this task, participants are asked to repeat a set of single digits (between 
two and nine) after the experimenter. During the first round (eight sets of two trials) they are 
asked to repeat the numbers in the same order; in the second round (seven sets of two trials) 
they have to repeat the numbers in reverse. Each round is terminated once a participant has 
failed to correctly repeat both trials of one set, and a total score is calculated with a maximum of 
thirty points. 
3.3.3.2. Non-verbal reasoning 
Non-verbal reasoning was measured using the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices  (Raven 
& Court, 1986). In this task participants were presented with twelve trials. In each trial they were 
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shown an incomplete matrix of black and white abstract figures. Participants were asked to 
identify the missing piece from a selection of eight alternatives and complete all 12 trials in no 
more than 10 minutes. None of the participants reached this time limit. 
3.3.3.4. English language proficiency 
In addition to the language history questionnaire, we also measured English language proficiency 
in bilinguals using the picture naming scale of the Bilingual Verbal Ability Tests (BVAT; Muñoz-
Sandoval, Cummins, Alvarado, & Ruef, 1998). 
3.3.4. Procedure 
The procedures were equivalent for both experiments, except for which version of the dot 
discrimination task was used. All participants were tested in one hour-long session at Anglia 
Ruskin University, Department of Psychology in the same room using the same equipment. 
After informed consent was given they completed a short demographics questionnaire and the 
bilingual participants were also asked to complete an adapted version of the language history 
questionnaire by Li, Sepanski and Zhao (2006). We then administered the digit span task, 
Raven’s Matrices as well as the dot discrimination task, with task ordering counter-balanced 
across participants. The practice blocks of the dot discrimination task were presented with 
extensive instructions and participants were encouraged to ask any questions prior to task 
commencement.  
3.3.5. Participants, Experiment 1 
We tested sixty-two healthy young adults, thirty-one English monolinguals (Mage = 22.3, SD = 
3.7; 12 males), and thirty-one bilinguals from a range of linguistic backgrounds (Mage = 25.3, SD 
= 4.5; 13 males). Whilst all participants were considered to be ‘young adults’ and recruited with 
corresponding age restrictions, the bilingual group was found to be significantly older than the 
monolingual group, t(57.96)=-2.87, p = 0.006, d =-0.73. The majority of participants were 
undergraduate students (n = 41), others were postgraduates (n = 13) or professionals (n = 8), 
and all but one participant had attended university. All participants gave informed consent prior 
to testing, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and did not report to have a history of 
mental or neurological illness. All bilinguals completed a language history questionnaire adapted 
from Li, Sepanski and Zhao (2006) with this information summarised in Table 3.1. Based on the 
self-rated proficiency scores, the bilingual group was highly proficient.  
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Table 3.1. Bilingual Participants’ Language History Information, Experiment 1 
Linguistic background First language Bulgarian (n = 1) 
Creole (n = 1) 
Dutch (n = 2) 
Farsi (n = 1) 
French (n = 1) 
German (n = 2) 
Hindi (n = 1) 
Hungarian (n = 1) 
Italian (n = 2) 
Lithuanian (n = 1) 
Malayalam (n = 2) 
Polish (n = 7) 
Portuguese (n = 2) 
Romanian (n = 2) 
Sinhalese (n = 1) 
English (n = 4) 
Second language Afrikaans (n = 1) 
English (n = 26) 
Frisian (n = 1) 
Greek (n = 1) 
Gujarati (n = 1) 
Twi (n = 1) 
 Third language English (n = 1) 
Other linguistic background 
information 
Age of first exposure birth - 6 years (n = 15) 
7 - 12 years (n = 9) 
teenage years (n = 7) 
Time spent in the UK 0 - 5 years (n = 16) 
5 - 10 years (n = 9) 
10+ years (n = 6) 
Switch rarely (n = 14) 
sometimes (n = 15) 
frequently (n = 2) 
Self-rated proficiency (1-6) Reading M = 5.1; SD = 0.7 
Writing M = 4.6; SD = 0.9 
Speaking M = 4.8; SD = 0.8 
Listening M = 5.2; SD = 0.7 
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3.3.6. Participants, Experiment 2 
For the second experiment, we recruited 61 participants: 32 English monolinguals and a group 
of 29 bilinguals. One participant from the bilingual group was excluded because they reported a 
confidence of 50% on 88% of the trials of the dot discrimination task. Because the confidence 
marker started at 50% it is likely that this participant simply neglected to provide a confidence 
judgment for the majority of trials. Including this participant in the non-confidence analyses did 
not alter the direction or magnitude of any of the effects reported.  Therefore, we proceeded to 
analyse the data provided by a sample of 60 participants, 28 bilinguals and 32 monolinguals. The 
bilinguals (Mage = 21.9, SD = 4.2; 6 males) were older than the monolinguals (Mage = 20.4, SD = 
0.7; 7 males), but this difference was only marginally significant t(28.29)=1.89, p = 0.07, d 
=0.50). 
All of the participants were undergraduate students except for one, who was a postgraduate 
student. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and did not report to have a 
history of mental or neurological illness. All bilinguals completed a language history 
questionnaire adapted from Li, Sepanski and Zhao (2006). The information from this 
questionnaire is summarised in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2. Bilingual Participants’ Language History Information, Experiment 2 
Linguistic background First language Bengali (n = 2) 
Cantonese (n = 1) 
Chinese (n = 2) 
English  (n = 4) 
French (n = 1) 
German (n = 1) 
Gujarati (n = 1) 
Greek (n = 1) 
Italian (n = 2) 
Korean (n = 1) 
Mandarin (n = 1) 
Nepalese (n = 2) 
Polish (n = 1) 
Portuguese (n = 2) 
Setswana (n = 1) 
Spanish (n = 2) 
Turkish (n = 4) 
Second language English (n = 23) 
Farsi (n = 1) 
French (n = 1) 
Malay (n = 1) 
Punjabi (n = 3) 
 Third language English (n = 2) 
Urdu (n = 1) 
Other linguistic background 
information 
Age of first exposure birth - 6 years (n = 20) 
7 - 12 years (n = 6) 
teenage years (n = 3) 
Time spent in the UK 0 - 5 years (n = 13) 
5 - 10 years (n = 2) 
10+ years (n = 14) 
Switch rarely (n = 13) 
sometimes (n = 14) 
frequently (n = 2) 
Self-rated proficiency (1-6) Reading M = 5.0; SD = 0.9 
Writing M = 4.7; SD = 1.1 
Speaking M = 4.8; SD = 1.1 
Listening M = 5; SD = 1.0 
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3.3.7. Hierarchical Models 
Note that all predictors entered into the hierarchical models are z-scored on the participant level, 
and that response time was log-transformed prior to being z-scored to make RT distributions 
approximately normal. All models reported in this chapter allowed for random intercepts and 
random slopes at the participant level.  
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Control Measures, Experiment 1 
An analysis of the control measures revealed that both groups performed comparably on 
measures of working memory, t(56.17)=1.67, p=.10, d=0.42 and nonverbal reasoning, 
t(59.62)=0.74, p=.46, d=0.19. Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 3.3. 
Therefore, any differences found in metacognitive abilities are unlikely to be attributable to 
group differences in general cognitive functioning.  
Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics for Control measures, Experiment 1 
 Monolinguals Bilinguals 
 M SD M SD 
Working Memory 
(maximum score: 30) 17.97 4.85 16.03 3.73 
Nonverbal Reasoning 
(maximum score: 20) 
  
9.94 1.65 10.26 1.79 
 
3.4.2. Control Measures, Experiment 2 
Both groups performed comparably on measures of working memory, t(56.49)=-0.91, p=0.37, 
d=0.23 and nonverbal reasoning, t(57.20)=0.98, p=0.33, d=0.25, indicating that the groups were 
matched on general cognitive functioning (see Table 3.4.).  
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Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics for Control Measures, Experiment 2 
 Monolinguals Bilinguals 
  M SD M SD 
Working Memory 
(maximum score: 30) 15.66 3.55 14.93 2.62 
Nonverbal Reasoning 
(maximum score: 12)                  
 
8.66 2.47 9.21 1.91 
 
3.4.3. First Order Performance, Model Free Analyses 
We compared the bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ performance with regards to their first order 
accuracy (percentage of correct responses), the difficulty of the trials (dot difference) and the 
response time of the choices (ms) for both the first and second experiment (see Figure 3.3. 
below). Monolinguals and bilinguals had similar proportions of correct responses in the first 
experiment, Mmonolingual=70.1%(1.1%), Mbilingual=70.1%(1.2%), t(58.73)=0.66, p=0.51, d=0.17. 
However, for the second experiment monolinguals had a slightly higher proportion of correct 
responses Mmonolingual=71.3%(1.0%), Mbilingual=70.3%(1.4%), t(56.78)=3.44, p=0.001, d=0.88. 
These analyses suggest that the staircase procedure worked, as all groups are close to 70% 
correct with small standard deviations. The mean dot difference was similar for both groups in 
Experiment 1 (Mmonolingual=4.34 (1.08), Mbilingual=4.46(1.03), t(59.91)=1.25, p=0.27, d=0.29) and 
Experiment 2 (Mmonolingual=5.85 (1.80), Mbilingual=5.46(1.22), t(54.82)=1.02, p=0.31, d=0.26), 
meaning that the task was equally difficult for both groups. Note that the dot difference was 
higher for the second experiment than the first experiment, reflecting that performance dropped 
under speed stress t(103.82) = 4.90, p < 10-5, d = 0.89). Finally, monolinguals took longer to 
respond than bilinguals in Experiment 1, when response times were unconstrained 
(Mmonolingual=3359 (1474), Mbilingual=2679 (922), t(50.38)=2.18, p=0.03, d=0.55) but response times 
were similar for both groups for Experiment 2 (Mmonolingual=856 (150), Mbilingual=898 (95), 
t(52.91)=1.29, p=0.20, d=0.33). Unsurprisingly, responses were on average faster in the second 
experiment compared to the first (t(62.29) = 13.24, p < 10-10, d = 2.38). In Experiment 2, trials 
were excluded if participants failed to respond within 1.5 seconds. Both language groups lost a 
similar proportion of trials due to slow responding (3% for monolinguals and 4% for bilinguals; 
t(52.82) = 1.85, p = .07, d = 0.48). 
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Figure 3.3. Comparing First Order Performance of Monolingual and Bilingual 
Participants             
Bar graphs comparing the mean values of monolinguals and bilinguals for proportion correct 
responses (a & d) dot difference (b & e) and response time (c & f, note the difference in y 
scaling), for the first and second experiment, respectively. Mean proportion correct is close to 
the 70% target for both groups in both experiments, but it is significantly higher for 
monolinguals than bilinguals in Experiment 2. Mean dot difference was similar for both groups 
in both experiments but Experiment 2 had higher dot difference than Experiment 1, signifiying 
that the response time constraint of the second experiment reduced participants’ ability to 
discriminate between the stimuli. Monolinguals responded significantly slower in Experiment 1 
response times were similar for both groups in Experiment 2 when a response time limit of 1.5 
seconds was enforced.  
To test how response time and dot difference influenced first order accuracy I ran hierarchical 
logistic regression models. The models predicted the probability of a choice being correct from 
z-scored dot difference and log-transformed response time and interaction terms between these 
predictors and the language group of the respondent (dummy coded as 1 for the monolingual 
group and 0 for the bilingual group). Dot difference predicted accuracy for Experiment 1 
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(z=15.34, p<10-10) and Experiment 2 (z=13.55, p<10-10) and there was no difference in the 
slopes between the language groups (Experiment 1: z=0.02, p=.98; Experiment 2:z=-0.03, 
p=.98; See Figure 3.4.). 
 
Figure 3.4. Predicting First Order Accuracy From Dot difference and Response Time 
Logistic regression curves predicting accuracy (probability of being correct) from dot difference 
(a & c) and response time (b & d) for Experiment 1 and 2, respectively. Dot difference 
predicted accuracy for both experiments. There was no difference between the language groups 
with regards to the strength to this relationship. Response time predicted accuracy for both 
experiments. This relationship were stronger for the monolingual group in Experiment 1 (where 
monolinguals had slower response times than bilinguals) but not in Experiment 2 (where both 
groups had similar response times). 
Response time predicted accuracy for both experiments (Experiment 1: z=-5.95, p<10-8; 
Experiment 2: z=-2.02, p=.04), the slope is steeper for the monolingual group in Experiment 1 
(z=-2.54, p=.01), with no difference between the groups in Experiment 2 (z=0.03, p=.98). In 
sum, first order performance appear to be comparable between the groups with the notable 
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exception of the response times in the first experiment and the proportion correct in the second 
experiment. To test whether these differences reflected different rates of evidence accumulation 
in the first order task I ran a hierarchical drift diffusion model. 
3.4.4. First Order Performance, DDM 
All data from the main trials was entered into the DDM, using the HDDM package for Python 
(see Chapter 2 for more information). Drift rate was determined by dot difference, a sensitivity 
parameter and an intercept. Boundary separation, non-response time and the drift rate intercepts 
were allowed to vary between groups. Because of the hierarchical nature of the model, each 
participant had an individual parameter estimate for boundary separation, non-decision time and 
drift rate drawn from a distribution determined by which group they belonged to. Monolinguals 
had a greater boundary separation than bilinguals with a 94% probability in Experiment 1, 
corresponding to posterior odds of about 16:1. This means that monolinguals emphasised 
accuracy over speed when they responded (see Figure 3.5.). These parameter estimates fit the 
raw data where monolinguals were slower but had a (nonsignificantly) lower dot difference than 
their bilingual peers. In the second experiment this pattern was reversed: Bilinguals had a greater 
boundary separation than monolinguals with an 89% probability (posterior odds=8:1).   
 
Figure 3.5. Parameter Estimates from the DDM Model      
Probability densities for boundary separation (a & d), non-decision-time (b & e), drift rate (c & 
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f). There were no systematic differences between the groups in boundary separation, non-
decision times or drift rates across experiments. 
Non-decision times were longer for monolinguals than bilinguals in Experiment 1 with a 78% 
probability (posterior odds=3:1). The direction of this difference was reversed in Experiment 2 
where bilinguals had longer non-decision times with 67% probability (posterior odds=2:1), but it 
is also worth noting that the two distributions show 77% overlap. Finally, drift rates show 85% 
overlap in Experiment 1 (posterior odds=2:1) and 86% overlap in Experiment 2 (posterior 
odds=2:1). To summarise, Monolinguals had greater boundary separation in Experiment 1 but 
bilinguals had greater boundary separation in Experiment 2. Bilinguals have longer non-decision 
times in the first experiment but bilinguals appear to have slightly longer non-decision time in 
Experiment 2. Drift rates appear to be similar across the groups in both experiments. Together, 
these findings suggest that there are no systematic differences between monolinguals and 
bilinguals with regards to first order response strategies or first order performance. 
3.4.5. Second Order Performance 
To explore how monolinguals and bilinguals differed with regards to raw confidence scores, 
ranging from 0 for the lowest possible confidence judgement to 100 for the highest possible 
confidence judgement. I ran a hierarchical linear regression model that predicted confidence 
from accuracy, language group and an interaction between confidence and language group, while 
allowing the intercepts and the effect of accuracy to differ by participant. Confidence was on 
average higher for correct trials than for error trials in both Experiment 1 (t(60.30)=7.61, p>10-9) 
and in Experiment 2 (t(57.96)=7.9, p>10-10). Despite both groups having a similar first order 
performance, bilinguals reported feeling more confident than monolinguals in Experiment 1 
(t(60.04)=4.05, p=.001) and Experiment 2 (t(57.87)=1.78, p=.08) when first-order accuracy was 
controlled for. This difference appears to be particularly pronounced for error trials (see Figure 
3.6.), but this trend is not significant in either Experiment 1 (t(60.41)=1.92, p=.06) or 
Experiment 2 (t(58.11)=1.67, p=.10). In other words, it seems as if monolingual confidence 
judgements are more sensitive to first-order accuracy than bilingual confidence judgements but 
these differences are not significant in these rudimentary analyses. 
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Figure 3.6. Raw confidence judgements by monolinguals and bilinguals, as a function of 
the accuracy of the response. Monolinguals report being more confident than bilinguals in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Both groups report being more confident when they are 
correct than when they are wrong, and in both experiments there is a trend that monolingual 
confidence judgements are more sensitive to first-order accuracy than bilingual confidence 
judgements, but this trend is insignificant. 
In order to further examine this potential difference between monolinguals and bilinguals in 
metacognitive processing I needed a more sensitive measure. Signal detection theory offers a way 
to estimate metacognitive efficiency, which captures how good a person’s metacognitive 
accuracy is when controlling for their first order accuracy (See Chapter 2).To estimate 
metacognitive efficiency I used the Mratio, a ratio between metacognitive sensitivity, captured by 
meta-d’, and first-order sensitivity, captured by d’. This measure is useful because it accounts for 
variation in first-order sensitivity, first-order response thresholds and second order response 
thresholds, something that correlational measures, such as regression coefficients fail to do 
(Barret et al., 2013; Galvin et al., 2003). I used a hierarchical Bayesian estimation method to fit 
the Mratios. The Bayesian estimation method has the advantage that it explicitly represents the 
group level-parameters as probability distributions that accounts for the uncertainty at each level 
of estimation (Fleming, 2017; See Chapter 2). The confidence data was binned into 
participantwise tertiles prior to the Mratio estimation. I fitted each language group from each 
experiment separately, to prevent shrinkage from hiding any true group difference. I did not run 
a t-test on the individual Mratio estimates, as each Mratio estimate was constrained by the hyper-
parameter of that group, thus violating the independence assumption. Instead I operated on the 
posteriors of the group means directly. For each experiment I subtracted the posterior of the 
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mean Mratio of the bilingual group from the posterior of the mean for the monolingual group, 
creating new posteriors for the Mratio difference, quantifying how much more (or less) 
metacognitively efficient monolinguals were relative to bilinguals. 95% of the probability mass of 
the mean Mratio difference was greater than 0 meaning that monolinguals were more 
metacognitively efficient than bilinguals (posterior odds= 21:1).  The second experiment 
replicated this effect as 95% of the probability mass was greater than 0, giving 20:1 odds that 
monolinguals were more metacognitively efficient than bilinguals. Because both experiments had 
a probability distribution over the parameter of interest (the difference in metacognitive 
efficiency between the language groups) I wanted to use Bayes Rule to combine the information 
from both posteriors to get a more accurate estimate of the population difference. I am not 
aware of a method to update from two empirical posteriors. However, because both empirical 
posteriors were approximately normal (see Figure 3.6.), I could first estimate analytic normal 
distributions that fitted the numeric posteriors well, by taking the mean and standard deviation 
of each numeric posterior distribution, and then analytically combine these two analytic normal 
distribution into a new hyper posterior. Because the normal distribution is conjugate with itself, 
finding mu and sigma of the new distribution was analytically tractable. The precision of the 
hyper posterior was given by adding the precisions of the two experimental posteriors. Because 
the precision is the inverse of the variance, it was straightforward to compute the standard 
deviation of the hyper posterior. The mean of the hyper posterior was the precision-weighted 
combination of the means of the two empirical posteriors. The hyper posterior, representing the 
best estimate of the population difference in metacognitive efficiency between monolinguals and 
bilinguals had 1% of its probability mass below 0 (posterior odds=97:1). In other words, the 
combined information of these two experiments provide strong evidence that monolinguals are 
more metacognitively efficient than bilinguals, at least in the context of visual discrimination. 
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Figure 3.7. Difference in Metacognitive Efficiency Between Monolinguals and Bilinguals 
The estimated mean difference in Mratios between monolinguals and bilinguals based on 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 and the combined data from both experiments. The Mratio is a 
signal-detection-theoretic measure that captures metacognitive accuracy when first order 
accuracy and metacognitive response-thresholds are controlled for. Mratios were computed 
using a numeric Bayesian estimation method (the filled curves). The combined posterior was 
computed analytically, by fitting a normal distribution to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (the 
dashed lines) and using Bayesian updating to combine the information in both. The x-axes show 
the mean monolingual Mratio – the mean bilingual Mratio. Mratios were higher for the 
monolingual group than the bilingual group in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Because monolinguals had both higher Mratios and slower response times in Experiment 1, I 
wanted to test whether mean response times were associated with Mratios (Figure 3.8.) In both 
experiments, response times did not predict Mratios when group affiliation was accounted for 
(Experiment 1: t(59)=-0.46, p=.65; Experiment 2: t(57)=-0.52, p=.61). Finally, I predicted 
Mratios from self-reported second language proficiency among the bilinguals. In the second 
experiment self-reported proficiency predicted metacognitive accuracy (t(26)=2.41, p=.02), but 
this was not the case for the first experiment (t(29)=0.06, p=.95). 
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Figure 3.8. Mratios as a function of mean response time and group affiliation 
Mratios (measures of metacognitive efficiency) are not associated with the mean response times 
of participants in either experiment when their group affiliation is accounted for.        
To further investigate potential causes for the difference in Mratio, I explored how RT and dot 
difference influenced confidence for each group (see Figure 3.9., a and b) by predicting z-scored 
confidence from z-scored RT and z-scored dot difference. I allowed the slopes of RT and dot 
difference to vary by participant, the model contained no intercept parameters because the 
purpose of the model was to explore the relationship between the variables. Finally, the model 
contained interaction terms that allowed the effect of RT and dot difference on choice to vary by 
language group.  RT negatively predicted confidence in Experiment 1 (t(60)=-10.37, p<10-10) and 
Experiment 2 (t(58.03)=-6.60, p<10-7). There was no statistically significant difference between 
monolinguals and bilinguals with regards to the strength of the relationship between RT and 
confidence either in Experiment 1 (t(60)=1.47, p=.15) or Experiment 2 (t(58.16)=1.12, p=0.27). 
Dot difference was a positive predictor for both experiments (Experiment 1: t(60)=4.92, p<10-5; 
Experiment 2: t(57.54)=6.08, p<10-6) and the strength of this relationship was similar for both 
groups (Experiment 1: t(57.51)=-0.25, p=.80; Experiment 2: t(60)=0.25, p=.81). 
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Figure 3.9. Predictors of Confidence           
(a & b) shows how response time and dot difference influence confidence for the monolingual 
and bilingual groups. Response time and dot difference are binned into participantwise quantiles 
and the mean z-scored confidence judgement of each cell is presented.  Response time and dot 
difference seems to influence confidence in a linear and additive fashion. 
To further understand what influenced confidence in the different language conditions I split the 
data into correct trials and error trials and examined how RT and dot difference influenced 
confidence in the two language groups (Figure 3.10.).  I modelled this by running separate 
models for correct and error trials for each experiment. Apart from predicting confidence for 
errors and correct choices separately the models were equivalent to the hierarchical regression 
models described in the previous section. In Experiment 1 RT negatively predicted confidence 
for both correct (t(59.89)=-9.64, p<10-10) and incorrect trials (t(58.77)=-7.37, p<10-9). This effect 
was similar for both language groups (correct: t(59.59)=1.37, p=.18; error: t(59.16)=0.91 , 
p=.37).  In Experiment 2 slower responses were also associated with lower confidence for 
correct (t(57.01)=-7.10, p<10-10) and incorrect trials (t(52.31)=-2.80, p=.007). The influence of 
RT on confidence was marginally weaker for the bilingual group than the monolingual group 
(t(57.91)=1.67, p=.10) for the correct trials. Note that this effect was in the same direction in 
Experiment 1 but insignificant. There was no difference in the influence of confidence on RT 
for the error trials (t(53.07)=0.01, p=.99). 
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Figure 3.10. Predictors of Confidence by Accuracy 
(a & b) shows how response time and dot difference influence confidence for the monolingual 
and bilingual groups as a function of accuracy. Dot Difference is binned into quartiles from 
lowest to highest. Response times are quartile binned from fastest to slowest. Easier trials (trials 
with higher dot difference) are associated with higher confidence for correct trials, but lower 
confidence for error trials. This pattern holds for both experiments and both groups. Slower 
response times are associated with lower confidence for both language groups for correct and 
error trials in Experiment 1. The same pattern is present but weaker in Experiment 2, when 
response times were constrained. 
Dot difference positively predict confidence for correct trials in Experiment 1 (t(58.95)=5.19, 
p<10-5) and Experiment 2 (t(58.69)=6.26, p<10-7). The strength of this effect is comparable 
across groups (Experiment 1 t(59.01)=0.49, p=.61; Experiment 2: t(58.22)=0.33, p=.74). Dot 
difference does not predict confidence for error trials in Experiment 1 (t(69.85)=-0.83, p=.41) 
but has a marginal negative effect of confidence in Experiment 2 (t(64.04)=-1.86, p=.07). The 
relationship between dot difference and confidence during error trials is not mediated by 
language group in either experiment (Experiment 1: t(64.82)=-0.12, p=.91; Experiment 2: 
t(55.62)=-0.92, p=.35). 
3.4.6. Exploring Potential Non-linear Relationships 
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The previous sections point to an interesting conundrum, the monolinguals are more 
metacognitively accurate then their bilingual peers their confidence judgments do not appear to 
be more sensitive to stimulus strength (captured by dot difference) or response time. This 
suggests that there is some third variable that is diagnostic of accuracy that differentially affects 
confidence between the groups. However, it is also possible that the reason I have failed to find 
a difference in sensitivity to response time and stimulus strength is because I have only tested 
linear models. To examine whether the linearity assumption hid group differences I used a cubic 
smoothing spline on the pooled z-scored data to estimate the non-linear interaction between 
stimulus strength and response time in predicting accuracy and confidence (Experiment 1: Figure 
3.11, Experiment 2: Figure 3.12.). A smoothing spline is a method for fitting a non-linear curve 
(or in the case of two predictors a non-linear plane) to a set of observations, by satisfying a cost 
function with two components, minimising the discrepancy between the predicted values and the 
observed outcomes and keeping the curve (plane) smooth, the relative weight of minimising 
errors relative to maximising smoothness is determined by a smoothing parameter λ (Friedman 
et al., 2001).  λ Was here determined by generalised leave one out cross validation, which means 
that the smoothing parameter that led to the lowest out of sample prediction error was selected. 
Consequently I got a near optimal approximation of how stimulus strength and response time 
related to accuracy and confidence in these two experiments. I then fitted the predicted values 
(probability correct and z-scored confidence) to an equidistant 41x41 grid ranging between -2 
and +2 z-scored response time units on one axis and -2 and +2  z-scored dot difference units on 
the other axis. My aim was to see if there were any systematic discrepancies between how RT 
and stimulus strength related to confidence on the one hand and accuracy on the other that 
could account for the observed differences in metacognitive accuracy between monolinguals and 
bilinguals. 
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Figure 3.11. Map of the Non-linear Relationship between Response Time and Dot 
Difference in Predicting Accuracy and Confidence, Experiment 1       
(a & b) shows how response time and dot difference influence accuracy for the monolingual 
and bilingual groups. (c & d) show confidence as a function of response time and accuracy for 
the monolingual and bilingual groups. Values for accuracy and confidence were simulated for a 
41x41 response time and dot difference grid, based on the best estimate of a smoothing spline 
model fitted to the whole data. Response time, dot difference and confidence were z-scored. Dot 
difference appear to be predict accuracy more strongly than response time but dot difference and 
response time appear to predict confidence roughly to the same extent.  
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Figure 3.12. Map of the Non-linear Relationship Between Response Time and Dot 
Difference in Predicting Accuracy and Confidence, Experiment 2 
(a & b) shows how response time and dot difference influence accuracy for the monolingual 
and bilingual groups. (c & d) show confidence as a function of response time and accuracy for 
the monolingual and bilingual groups. Values for accuracy and confidence were simulated for a 
41x41 response time and dot difference grid, based on the best estimate of a smoothing spline 
model fitted to the whole data. Response time, dot difference and confidence were z-scored. Dot 
difference appear to be predict accuracy more strongly than response time, but dot difference 
and response time appear to predict confidence roughly to the same extent.  
 
It is noteworthy that while accuracy seems to be equally predicted by dot difference and response 
time in Experiment 1, confidence seems to be dominated by response time. Perhaps because 
participants have a more reliable internal estimate of their response times than they do of the dot 
difference? (After all, if they had a perfect internal representation of the dot difference they 
would also have perfect performance). On the second task, in which I had imposed a time limit 
on responding, z-scored response time is much less diagnostic of accuracy, in line with the 
80 
 
results from the logistic models reported above. Interestingly, participants seem to have adapted 
their response criterion for confidence, taking dot difference more into account, but as in 
experiment 1 they overweight the influence of response time in their confidence judgments. All 
in all, these results closely match the results of the linear models, suggesting that the linearity 
assumption has not unduly biased the findings. It is also clear from the graphs that the overall 
patterns are similar for monolinguals and bilinguals in both groups, so the monolingual 
metacognitive advantage cannot be explained by non-linear interactions between response time, 
difficulty and confidence. 
3.4.7. Control Analyses 
Because bilinguals were significantly older than monolinguals in Experiment 1, and marginally 
older in Experiment 2, I controlled for age when predicting Mratios from language group, using 
an ordinary least squares regressions. Age did not significantly predict Mratios for Experiment 1 
(t(59)=0.56, p=.57) nor Experiment 2 (t(57)=1.13, p=.27). Neither did it modify the strength of 
the relationship between group and Mratio for either experiment (Experiment 1: t(59)=8.74, 
p<10-11; Experiment 2: t(57)=2.96, p<.005). Similarly, because working memory scores were 
marginally different between the groups in Experiment 1, I controlled for working memory 
when looking at differences in Mratio by language group. Working memory did not predict 
Mratios (t(59)=1.49, p=.14) and did not influence the effect of Mratio by language group 
(t(59)=8.74, p<10-11). 
3.5. Discussion 
In two experiments I compared the metacognitive ability of young, healthy monolinguals and 
bilinguals in a perceptual 2AFC paradigm, in which participants tried to determine which of two 
circles contained the most dots and subsequently made a confidence judgment about their 
accuracy. The first experiment had unconstrained response times, whereas the second 
experiment enforced a 1.5-second response threshold on first order responses. The aim of this 
constraint was to keep first order performance similar across as many dimensions as possible. 
Participants' response times in Experiment 2 were significantly faster in both groups relative to 
Experiment 1. This increase in response speed came at a cost to performance, illustrating the 
well-established trade-off between speed and accuracy (Forstmann et al., 2016; Vickers & Packer, 
1982). Given the staircase procedure implemented to keep the error-rate constant, this 
performance difference resulted in easier trials (i.e., a greater dot difference) in Experiment 2 
compared to Experiment 1. When people did not respond within 1.5 seconds in Experiment 2 
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the trial was discarded. The monolingual and bilingual groups missed a similar proportion of 
trials because of responding too slowly (4% or less), and the two groups did not differ 
significantly with regards to average trial difficulty. 
Despite the staircase procedure constraining the variance in difficulty, dot difference was a 
strong predictor of accuracy in both experiments, and this effect was equally strong for both 
groups in both experiments. In the first experiment z-scored RT was a stronger predictor of 
accuracy for the monolingual group. However, this effect might just be because there was a 
greater range of response times in the monolingual group, so the z-scored response times had a 
higher resolution. For the second experiment, where the range of response times were similar 
between the groups there was no difference in the predictiveness of z-scored RT. Fitting a 
hierarchical DDM model to the data showed that the rate of evidence accumulation was similar 
across language groups for both experiments, and while the boundary separation appeared to be 
farther and non-decision times seemed to be longer for the monolinguals in the first experiment, 
these patterns reversed for the second experiment. This reversal suggests that there are no 
systematic differences in response criterion and non-decision times between the groups. In 
summary, first order performance was very similar across the two groups, and there is no reason 
to believe that the evidence accumulation leading up to the first order decision was systematically 
different for bilinguals and monolinguals. 
Bilinguals were on average more confident than bilinguals in both experiments, but because the 
participants were instructed to report their relative confidence rather than their probability of 
being correct it is impossible to say which group was better calibrated. With regards to 
metacognitive efficiency, the monolingual group had significantly higher Mratios than the 
bilingual group, in both experiments. These differences could not be explained in terms of 
differences in non-verbal reasoning, working memory or age. Because the monolinguals 
responded more slowly in Experiment 1 and also had higher Mratios, I investigated whether 
slower mean response times were associated with higher Mratios, the hypothesis being that 
slower response times would allow more time for meta-cognitive processing (see Baranski & 
Petrusic, 1998, 2001). In both experiments mean response times did not seem to be associated 
with metacognitive efficiency when the difference between the language groups was accounted 
for. 
To examine why monolinguals were more metacognitively sensitive than bilinguals I predicted 
confidence from difficulty and response time for both groups, splitting the data into correct and 
error trials.  There was no significant differences between the groups, either for correct or error 
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trials in either experiment. Slower responses were associated with lower confidence both for 
correct and incorrect trials for both experiments, but this effect was weaker in Experiment 2, 
probably because the range of response times was artificially constrained by the experimental 
design. Dot difference positively predicted confidence judgments for both experiments for 
correct trials, but not for error trials (and there was a marginally significant negative relationship 
in Experiment 2). These findings support the idea that both response time and stimulus strength 
influence confidence judgments, but does so in different ways (see Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 
2014). Finally, I ran a smoothing spline on dot difference and response time, predicting accuracy 
and confidence, to test if the previous linear models had missed any non-linear differences 
between the monolingual and bilingual groups. Visual inspection suggests that is not the case.  
Since I expected to find a metacognitive advantage for bilinguals, it might seem like these results 
are at odds with the broader literature on bilingualism. This is to some extent true, but should 
not be overstated. As discussed in the introduction, the executive function advantage in 
bilinguals has not been consistently replicated across studies, and the exact nature of this 
advantage is still controversial (de Bruin et al., 2015; Paap et al., 2015). 
It is still unclear what is causing the bilingual disadvantage in metacognitive sensitivity. Self-
reported second language ability did predict metacognitive efficiency in Experiment 2, but not in 
Experiment 1. The fact that this relationship is not reliable across studies, together with the small 
sample size, suggests that it is probably a false positive, especially considering that self-reported 
language proficiency is quite a noisy measure of actual competence (MacIntyre, Noels, & 
Clément, 1997). In order to better understand when during language learning this effect 
manifests one of my colleagues is running a follow-up study that examines metacognition in 
monolingual and bilingual school children of various ages. Though the actual cause of the 
observed difference is an open question, the current study has helped rule out some possible 
explanations. Specifically, it appears that the difference in metacognitive accuracy cannot be 
accounted for by differences in response speed, speed of first order evidence accumulation or 
how response time and difficulty influences confidence. This third point is of particular interest 
because historically response time and stimulus strength have been presumed to be the two 
primary drivers of confidence judgments (Kiani et al., 2014; Van Den Berg et al., 2016; Vickers 
& Packer, 1982). However, that they can’t explain the difference in metacognitive performance 
between monolinguals and bilinguals suggests the presence of some third variable that is 
diagnostic of accuracy and influences confidence, and acts differently on monolinguals and 
bilinguals. Hunting for this third variable would be a worthwhile research project, and studies 
that have been published after this research was conducted provide some interesting avenues. 
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First, Siedlecka and colleagues (2016) found that the accuracy of confidence judgments differed 
based on whether they were recorded before or after the choice. Fleming and Daw (2017) have 
argued that this is because the choice itself provides information to the metacognitive system, 
provided that the evidence streams for choice and confidence are at least partially decoupled. 
This means that monolingual confidence judgments may be more accurate than bilingual 
confidence judgments because monolinguals are better at integrating the information from the 
choice itself into the confidence judgment. This could be tested by a task where participants have 
to give confidence ratings either before or after they make a choice. If bilingual and monolingual 
metacognitive accuracy is similar for confidence judgments before they make a choice, but 
different for confidence judgments after they make a choice that would support this explanation. 
This idea will be discussed further in the general discussion. Alternatively, I might fail to find a 
difference in sensitivity to stimulus strength because the measure of stimulus strength is too 
noisy. Stimulus strength was here conceptualised as dot difference, but it is probable that other 
aspects of the stimuli, such as dot clustering also influence difficulty (it is harder to estimate the 
amounts of dots in a circle when they are overlapping). Additionally the current design did not 
allow me to track or control how the participants sampled evidence. Random dot kinematograms 
would have solved this problem as each “movement” can be treated as an independent sample 
from a normal distribution, and average motion strength and variation can both be controlled 
and recorded. 
Another new avenue of inquiry would be how these differences in metacognitive sensitivity 
translate to higher-order decision making. Confidence judgments have implications for how 
likely people are to change their mind when encountering the same decision again (Folke, 
Jacobsen, Fleming, & De Martino, 2016; Kaanders, Folke, & De Martino, in preparation). It is 
therefore possible that the greater metacognitive accuracy of monolinguals translate into better 
decisions in the long run. Confidence has also been shown to play a role in collective decision 
making, where the opinions of more confident people tend to be weighted more heavily (Shea et 
al., 2014). Because bilingual people tended to report greater confidence on average, this might 
suggest that bilingual people have relatively greater influence over collectively determined 
outcomes. Finally, metacognition has been implicated in tasks that require people to choose 
between staying with a current, known option, versus exploring the environment and trying 
something new, the so-called exploration-exploitation trade-off (Cohen, McClure, & Angela, 
2007; Kolling, Behrens, Mars, & Rushworth, 2012). This implies that the greater confidence in 
the bilingual population might translates into a greater resilience in sticking with their current 
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choice, at the cost of being less flexible than their monolingual peers. Obviously, all of these 
hypotheses are highly speculative and would have to be investigated in future work. 
There are a number of limitations of the current study that need to be considered. First, it is 
conceivable that the lower metacognitive performance by the bilinguals has nothing to do with 
metacognitive processing but represent a failure of the bilinguals (most of whom had English as 
a second language) to fully understand the instructions. There is some evidence that is consistent 
with this account as self-reported second-language language proficiency in the bilinguals 
correlated with metacognitive ability in Experiment 1 (but not in Experiment 2). However, I find 
this account unconvincing as the instructions were simple and everyone in both sample had 
attended or was currently attending university-level education in the UK, which requires a high 
level of English comprehension. Another, more serious problem with the current study was that 
there was no direct measure of executive functioning, despite the fact that our original 
hypothesis was informed by the reported executive functioning advantage in bilinguals. Such a 
test was not included in the original experiment because of concerns relating to participant 
fatigue as both the dot discrimination task and the working memory and non-verbal reasoning 
tasks are quite demanding. It was not included in the second experiment because we wanted to 
keep the experimental design as similar as possible, while controlling for the potential confound 
of response times to get as close to a direct replication of the original result as possible. That 
being said, the lack of a measure of executive functioning is a severe limitation as its inclusion 
would have allowed to directly explore the relationship between metacognition, executive 
function and bilingualism, and I would strongly encourage anyone who wants to extend this 
work to also measure executive functioning directly. It is also too early to tell what these results 
mean with regards to the cognitive consequences of bilingualism, while we tried to control for 
obvious confounds such as, age education and non-verbal reasoning ability we did not control 
for potential socioeconomic differences between the language groups, and second-language 
ability in the bilinguals were just captured by self-report. Future work in adult samples should 
control for, or at least measure, a broader range of socio-economic and demographic variables 
and objectively measure second-language ability so that these factors can be critically examined. 
The ongoing work on young children that I alluded to earlier in the discussion might provide 
more insight into how metacognitive ability relates to bilingualism by examining when these 
differences first manifest, and what other changes might coincide with them. However, while 
these results do not currently have strong implications for how bilingual cognition differ from 
monolingual cognition there may be interesting implications for metacognitive research. 
Specifically, the reported difference in metacognitive performance between the language groups 
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cannot be explained by differential sensitivity to evidence strength (here operationalised as dot 
difference) and response time, the two cues that have been most extensively studied in relation 
to confidence judgements in perceptual decision-making. This suggests that there might be other 
cues that influence confidence that remain to be discovered, I will explore some such potential 
cues in the subsequent chapters. 
The apparent bilingual disadvantage in metacognition discovered in this work highlight a 
potential cognitive cost of bilingualism in contrast to the many benefits that have been reported 
in previous studies. However, this finding seems to provide more question than answers. What is 
the computational mechanism behind this difference? Is it domain general? When does it 
manifest? What implications (if any) does it have for higher-order reasoning? All of these are 
open questions that will hopefully be addressed in future work. 
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4. Explicit Representations of 
Confidence Inform Future Value-based 
Decisions 
4.1. Summary 
People can report confidence in value-based judgments, but it is not obvious what the benefit of 
confidence is in the value-domain. In the perceptual domain confidence has been suggested to 
act as an error signal, which allows people to quickly correct mistakes. In this chapter I apply this 
idea to the value domain. Two experiments show that confidence judgments predict subsequent 
changes of mind, when the same options are repeated at a later time. I use a novel computational 
framework to show that these changes of mind lead to more transitive (internally consistent) 
choices in participants with high metacognitive ability but not participants with low 
metacognitive ability. This suggests that confidence is used to improve decision making in value-
based judgments as it does in perceptual judgments, and over a longer time-frame than has been 
tested previously. Previous work has shown that value-based choices are influenced by how long 
participants look at a given option (dwell time). However, it is unclear if the effect of dwell time 
depends on the value of the fixated option or not. In both experiments a model that treat dwell-
time as an additive boost to evidence accumulation fit the data better than an interactive model, 
or a null-model where dwell time has no effect. I also identify a novel predictor of confidence 
judgments from participant eye behaviour leading up to choice, this predictor appears in two 
snack experiments, but fails to replicate in an experiment with two-armed bandits where the 
expected value of each arm is learned.  
4.2. Introduction 
Value-based decisions are ubiquitous in human existence; deciding what to have for lunch, what 
career to pursue and who to marry are all value-judgments. In order to quantify and study these 
decisions, economists have long posited a general currency for value that allows us to compare 
disparate goods (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), such as buying a candy bar versus renting a movie 
versus going climbing. With the advent of neuroeconomics there is growing evidence 
demonstrating that this general value currency is not just a convenient abstraction, but a quantity 
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represented in the brain, particularly in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Levy & Glimcher, 
2012). 
However, there is another dimension that is almost as central to human decision making as 
value, but less understood: confidence. Confidence in choices relates to the value of the options 
in two ways, when options have similar values confidence in the final decision tends to be lower 
and when one or more options have uncertain values decisions tend to be less confident. The 
first statement should be intuitively obvious, but the second might require some clarification.  
Imagine that you are choosing between watching a film and going climbing. You know you enjoy 
climbing; you have never seen the film under consideration, but a friend you trust recommended 
it. In the end you decide to go climbing. Despite enjoying yourself (the option you picked had a 
high value), you are not very confident that you made the best decision because you are 
uncertain how much you would have enjoyed the film. This example illustrates that confidence 
captures something about a decision beyond point-estimates of the values of the available 
options. Recent empirical work shows that confidence only shares a small amount of variance 
with value (De Martino et al., 2013), and that self-reported confidence predicts choice behaviour 
above and beyond self-reported value of the options. 
Confidence is an explicit measure of uncertainty in value-based choice, but there are also other, 
implicit measures that imply uncertainty in the choice process. The strength of the evidence 
favouring a specific option and response time are both associated with the level of uncertainty in 
the choice process and tends to be associated with confidence judgments (Baranski & Petrusic, 
1994, 1998; De Martino et al., 2013; Festinger, 1943; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Ratcliff & Starns, 
2009; Vickers & Packer, 1982). Kiani, Corthell and Shadlen (2014) recently showed that the 
relationship between response time and confidence is not merely incidental but that response 
times causally influence confidence (Kiani et al., 2014). 
Eye tracking provides a promising avenue for finding additional behavioural markers of 
uncertainty, as fixations have been shown to influence the accumulation of evidence in value-
based choices. Specifically, Rangel and colleagues have suggested that fixating on an item allows 
the value of that item to be sampled more efficiently (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich, Armel, 
& Rangel, 2010). This account has since been challenged by Cavanagh and colleagues who 
suggest that looking at an object boosts the evidence accumulation in favour of that object, 
independent of its value (the evidence accumulation is additive rather than interactive; Cavanagh, 
Wiecki, Kochar, & Frank, 2014). To the best of my knowledge Cavanagh and colleagues are the 
only ones who have directly compared these models, but they examined this effect on stimuli 
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with learned values. Here, I will directly compare these accounts in snack data, which is closer to 
Krajbich and Rangel’s original research designs. I will also use eye tracking data to explore the 
relationship between eye movements and explicit confidence, something that, to the best of my 
knowledge, has not been attempted before this study. 
The computational underpinnings of confidence are still debated. One popular suggestion is that 
confidence captures noise in the stochastic evidence accumulation process leading up to a 
decision (De Martino et al., 2013; Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani et al., 2014). Lebreton and colleagues 
have suggested that confidence is an inherent property of value computations, and that 
confidence has a quadratic relationship to the value signal ( Lebreton, Abitbol, Daunizeau, & 
Pessiglione, 2015, see also Barron, Garvert, & Behrens, 2015) Several studies suggest that 
confidence for both value-based and perceptual decisions might be represented in the rostro-
lateral prefrontal cortex (De Martino et al., 2013; Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012; Fleming et 
al., 2010; Rounis et al., 2010). 
But why spend neural resources representing confidence? How does an explicit representation of 
confidence benefit the agent? One suggestion is that confidence allows people with different 
beliefs to quantify the relative strength of their beliefs, which might improve group decision 
making (Bahrami et al., 2012; Bang et al., 2014; Shea et al., 2014). Others have proposed that 
confidence judgments might be useful to the individual by helping to guide future decisions (Lau 
& Rosenthal, 2011). Proponents of this view suggest that confidence seems to improve learning 
under uncertainty (Meyniel, Schlunegger, & Dehaene, 2015), that confidence judgments and 
error correction seem to be driven by the same computations (Resulaj et al., 2009; Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2014), and that changes of mind and confidence judgments seem to operate on the 
same evidence scale (Van Den Berg et al., 2016). 
An open question regarding the utility of confidence is whether confidence judgments in a 
current choice can influence future decisions. Returning to the example from the beginning of 
the introduction: given that you weren’t very confident that climbing was the most enjoyable 
activity, are you more likely to pick the film when a similar choice comes up days later? 
Additional research from our lab indicates that you might. In another study, we allowed people 
to reverse a perceptual decision following a confidence judgment and to sample additional 
information about the chosen and unchosen options. We found that low-confidence judgments 
tended to predict changes of mind, and that people who are more metacognitive use their 
confidence judgments to sample the available information more effectively, which in turn leads 
to better decisions (Kaanders, Folke, & De Martino, in preparation). 
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The work presented here extends these findings by allowing time to pass between the initial 
choice and the potential change of mind. Here, people first chose between a set of snack items 
and subsequently gave a confidence judgment. Sometime later during the experiment, they would 
see the same options again (with positions counterbalanced) and be asked to repeat the choice. 
By predicting changes of mind from confidence in this context, I move away from an immediate 
error correction framework and suggest that confidence in a choice might have implications for 
long-term planning. 
Another key difference between the perceptual research cited above and this work is that 
perceptual decisions have correct and incorrect options, so one can legitimately ask if confidence 
judgments help improve decision making or not. There is no obvious measure of accuracy in the 
value domain because value judgments are, by their very nature, subjective. One way to 
approximate correctness is internal consistency: if I prefer an apple over a banana and a banana 
over a pear I should prefer an apple over a pear, or more formally and generally if A≻B and 
B≻C then A≻C.  This form of internal consistency is known as transitivity and is a normative 
prescription in utility theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). . The reason that transitive 
preferences are preferable is that they are rational; intransitive preferences lead to situations 
where a set of individually agreeable trades lead to a net loss. Say that an agent prefers apples to 
oranges, oranges to pears and pears to apples. The agent currently has an orange. It is now 
possible for a trader to offer an apple in exchange for the orange and some arbitrarily small 
amount of money (say one pence), then offer to trade the apple for a pear and another pence 
and finally offer to trade the pear for an orange and a pence. Given their preference structure the 
agent should accept all three trades and end up three pence poorer with the same orange they 
started with. What is worse, this transaction cycle could be repeated an arbitrary number of times 
creating arbitrarily large losses (See the dutch-book problem; Hájek, 2008). However, failure of 
transitivity has been reported in human choices and represents an exemplar violation of 
economic rationality and, more generally, of logical consistency (Camerer & Ho, 1994; Loomes, 
Starmer, & Sugden, 1991). In this research I used a novel method to generate the ordered 
ranking of items corresponding to the most transitive choices for each participant. I then tagged 
the choices that violated these optimal rankings (transitivity violations), which allowed me to 
explore how confidence relates to internal consistency.  
This chapter will provide a number of novel insights. First it will examine what factors 
contribute to the construction of confidence during the formation of a value-judgment, being the 
first work to include eye behaviour in such models. Second, it will directly compare additive and 
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interactive models of the role of fixations in value-based decision making. Third, it will explore 
how explicit representations of confidence subsequently inform and improve future decisions. 
4.3. Methods 
4.3.1. Experimental Procedures, Experiment 3 
Participants were required to make binary choices between 16 common snack items. Participants 
were asked to choose between each combination of the items (n = 120) twice, counterbalanced 
across the left-right spatial configurations (total number of choices = 240). After each choice, 
participants indicated their confidence in their decision on a continuous rating scale. The edges 
of the confidence scale was labelled “low” and “high” and participants were asked to give their 
confidence that they had picked their preferred option. No feedback was given on how 
participants used the confidence scale. Neither choices nor confidence ratings were time 
constrained. The second presentation of the same pair was randomly interleaved during the task 
with the only constraint being that the same pair was never repeated in immediately subsequent 
trials. Participant eye movements were recorded throughout this task. At the end of the 
experiment, one choice from this phase was played out and the participant had the opportunity 
to buy the chosen item by means of an auction administered according to the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) procedure (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964). This procedure encouraged 
participants to choose preferred snacks during the eye tracking choice phase since they only had 
a chance to win snacks they chose. Once a snack had been selected the experimenter randomly 
extracted a price from a uniform distribution (£0 to £3)—the ‘market price’ of that item. If the 
participant’s bidding price (willingness-to-pay) was below the market price, no transaction 
occurred. If the participant’s bidding price was above the market price, the participant bought 
the snack item at the market price. At the end of the experiment, participants had to remain in 
the lab for an additional hour. During this hour, the only food they were allowed to eat was the 
item purchased in the auction, if any. At the end of the waiting period participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. Participants were paid £25 for their time, 
deducting the cost of the food item, if they bought any. Both tasks were programmed using 
MATLAB 8.0 (MathWorks) running the Psychophysics toolbox  (http://psychtoolbox.org) as 
well as the Eyelink toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002). 
4.3.2. Experimental Procedures, Experiment 4 
Participants gave their willingness to pay for 72 common snack food items on a scale ranging 
from £0-£3, in a BDM procedure, similar to the one in Experiment 1. Next they completed a 
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choice task where, in each trial, they had to pick their favourite item out of three options. The 
triplets presented in the choice task were tailored for each participant from their willingness-to-
pay ratings. The items were divided into high-value and low-value sets by a median split. The 36 
high-value items were randomly combined into 12 high-value triplets; this procedure was 
mirrored to generate 12 low-value triplets. The high-value items and low-value items were then 
mixed to generate medium value triplets, so that there were 12 triplets consisting of two high-
value items and one low-value item, and 12 triplets showing the reverse ratio. This resulted in 48 
unique triplets, with counterbalanced spatial configurations (total trials =144), split into three 
blocks. The trial order was pseudo-randomised with the constraint that the same triplet was 
never shown twice in a row. In the subsequent choice task, the triplets were presented inside 3 
white squares in an equidistant 2x2 grid (one position on the grid was left empty, this was 
randomly determined). I used a gaze-contingent paradigm in which the items were only visible 
when the participant made a fixation inside one of the squares, so that the participant could only 
see one item at a time. Participants had unlimited time to make up their mind and could make as 
many fixations as they wished. After each choice, participants indicated their confidence in their 
decision on a visual analogue rating scale, similar to the one used in Experiment 3 (without any 
time constraints). Participants’ eye movements were recorded throughout the choice task. Both 
the choice task and the willingness to pay procedure were programmed in Experiment Builder 
version 1.10.1640, SR-Research, Ontario. Following the choice task, an auction based on the 
BDM-ratings took place (see Experiment 1). After the auction, participants had to remain in the 
lab for an additional hour, as in Experiment 1. At the end of the waiting period participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. Participants were paid £15 for their time, 
deducting the cost of the food item, if they bought any. 
4.3.3. Experimental Procedures, Experiment 5 
Participants completed a two-armed bandit task with the aim to maximise their earnings. Each 
bandit had the same reward magnitude (2.08 pence) but the rate of reward differed. In each trial 
two bandits were shown and participants selected one with a key press. Following the choice a 
circle appeared at the centre of the screen to cue participants to fixate on the centre prior to 
receiving feedback. Once participants fixated on the central circle it disappeared and boxes 
appeared around the bandits. The boxes were either orange or purple, and the colour indicated 
whether the bandit was rewarded or not during that trial (the colour associated with reward was 
counterbalanced between participants). The reward probabilities of the bandits were 
independent, so for any given trial both bandits could win, or no bandit could win, or one could 
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win but not the other.  Participants’ eye movements were recorded both during the choice phase 
and the feedback phase of each trial. For a visual representation of the task structure see Figure 
4.1. Participants first completed 20 practice trials with two bandits with stable reward rates (0.75 
and 0.25 respectively) in order to familiarise them with the task structure and to make sure they 
understood the aim of the task. The practice trials did not count towards the participant 
earnings. 
 
Figure 4.1.  Task Structure for Experiment 5 
Participants were asked to choose between one of two symbols on each trial, each with their own 
independent probability of yielding a reward. Choices were untimed and indicated with a button 
press. After the choice was made, feedback was displayed for each item after the participant 
fixated on a center marker for one second. The color of the box indicated the presence or 
absence of reward for both options (note that the reward rate of each item was independent). 
The color assigned to each outcome was counterbalanced across participants. Four different 
symbols were arranged in six unique pairs, and each pair was presented 40 times for a total of 
240 trials. Left-right presentation of each pair was counterbalanced within blocks of 12 trials. 
Then followed 240 main trials. These trials had four different bandits, making six unique bandit 
pairs that were shown 40 trials each. The screen positions of the bandits were counterbalanced 
for each pair. The four bandits started with reward rates of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 respectively. The 
reward rates were randomly assigned to the bandits at the beginning of each experimental 
session. The reward rates for the main bandits were not stable throughout the experiment. Each 
time a bandit was shown its reward rate changed by 0.03. If the reward rate of a bandit reached 0 
or 1, it “bounced” to 0.03 or 0.97 but other than that it drifted randomly. Participants were 
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aware that the reward rates of the bandits would change over time. The bandit task was 
programmed in Experiment Builder version 1.10.1640, SR-Research, Ontario. 
4.3.4. Participants, Experiment 3  
29 participants took part in the study. One participant was excluded because the BDM estimates 
were poor predictors of their choice (choose the high valued item 63% of the time, compared to 
the group mean of 83%, sd=7%). Thus 28 participants were included in the analysis (13 females, 
age: 19-73). All participants were required to fast four hours prior to taking part in the 
experiment. Blood glucose levels were taken to test their adherence to this criterion (mean 
glucose level =  83.57mg/dl, sd = 10.90mg/dl). 
4.3.5. Participants, Experiment 4 
30 participants completed the study. Of these thirty, three were excluded because of a limited 
range in their BDM ratings (they gave the exact same price for more than 28% of the items). An 
additional three participants were excluded for limited range in using the confidence scale 
(reporting the same level of confidence in more than half of the trials). 24 participants were 
included in the main analyses (17 females, age: 21-38). All participants were required to fast for 
four hours prior to doing the experiment.  
4.3.6. Participants, Experiment 5 
30 people participated in this study. One participant was excluded because their choices did not 
reflect the reward rates of the bandits for the second half of the main trials (a logistic model 
predicting choice by difference in reward rates did not predict choice better than an intercept-
only model, p = .70).  Thus the final sample included 29 people (20 female) with a mean age of 
26 (sd = 6.37). All participants gave informed consent and were paid a £10 show up fee and up 
to an additional £5 based on their performance. 
4.3.7. Eye Trackers 
For Experiment 3, eye gaze was sampled at 250 Hz with a head-mounted SR Research Eyelink II 
eye tracker (SR-Research, Ontario). For Experiments 4 and 5, eye movements were recorded at 
1000Hz with an EyeLink 1000 Plus (SR-Research, Ontario). 
4.3.8. Preparation of the Eye Data, Experiment 3 
Areas of Interest (AI) were defined by splitting the screen in half, creating two equal sized areas. 
Fixation on the left AI was assumed to be directed towards the left snack item, and vice versa. I 
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constructed two variables from the eye tracking data: the difference in dwell time between the 
two AIs (DDT), and gaze shift frequency (GSF). DDT was calculated by subtracting the total 
dwell time on the left side from the total dwell time on the right side.  GSF was a count of how 
many times participants shifted their gaze from one AI to the other during a given trial. 
4.3.9. Preparation of the Eye Data, Experiment 4 
AIs were pre-defined by the 3 squares that participants had to fixate to view the items. I derived 
four variables from the eye tracking data: the total dwell time in each of the three AIs for a given 
trial, and GSF.  Following Experiment 3, GSF measured the number of fixations in one AI 
immediately followed by a fixation in another AI. To ensure that participants paid attention, I 
excluded trials where participants did not fixate on every option available at least once. 13 trials 
out of 3457 were excluded from the analysis for this reason. 
4.3.10. Preparation of the Eye Data, Experiment 5 
AIs were predefined by the 2 squares on the screen (400 x 329 pixels) covering the bandits. I 
derived three variables from the eye tracking data: the total dwell time in each AI for a given trial, 
and GSF. In line with the two snack experiments, GSF measured the number of fixations in one 
AI immediately followed by a fixation in another AI. 
4.3.11. Hierarchical Models 
Note that all predictors entered into the hierarchical models are z-scored on the participant level, 
and that response time was log-transformed prior to being z-scored to make RT distributions 
approximately normal. All models reported in this chapter allowed for random intercepts and 
random slopes at the participant level.  The individual difference analyses investigating change of 
mind and transitivity did not depend on hierarchical parameter estimates but unpooled estimates. 
The rationale behind this choice was that for both analyses I was interested in studying between-
participant variations (Fig. 4c and Fig 5c) that could be potentially affected due to shrinkage of 
parameters towards the group mean that characterise hierarchical models (Gelman & Hill, 2006). 
4.3.12. Drift Diffusion Models 
I fitted three hierarchical drift diffusion models (DDM) to the choice data from Experiment 3 to 
evaluate whether fixation time influenced evidence accumulation in an additive or interactive 
fashion (see Chapter 2 for details on the software and fitting procedure). Recall that DDM’s have 
four important free parameters: drift rate (v), boundary separation (a), the starting point (z) and 
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the non-decision time (t). In order to make the models as similar to the models in the Cavanagh 
paper as possible I predicted the probability of picking the option with the highest BDM-value 
(trials where both options had the same value, about 3% of the dataset were excluded from these 
analyses). Boundary separation and non-decision time was allowed to vary between participants, 
whereas the starting point was set to 0.5 for everyone. The three models differed in how they 
calculated drift rates: 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙0: 𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × (𝐵𝐷𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐵𝐷𝑀𝑙𝑜𝑤) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎: 𝑣 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × (𝐵𝐷𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐵𝐷𝑀𝑙𝑜𝑤)  + 𝛽2 × (𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
− 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖: 𝑣 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × (𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ×  𝐵𝐷𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
− 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤  ×  −𝐵𝐷𝑀𝑙𝑜𝑤) + 𝛽2 × (𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑤 × 𝐵𝐷𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
− 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  ×  −𝐵𝐷𝑀𝑙𝑜𝑤) 
Where β0 was a random intercept parameter that was allowed to vary by participant and β1 and 
β2 were sensitivity parameters that were fixed across the entire sample. BDMhigh was the BDM 
value in pounds of the highest-valued option of that trial and BDMlow was the lowest valued 
option. Fixation ratiohigh was the proportion of the response time spent looking at the highest 
valued option and fixation ratiolow was the proportion of response time spent looking at the low-
value option. Note that the interactive model is a simplification of Krajbich and Rangel’s original 
aDDM because the original modelled the evolution of the drift throughout the trial and 
therefore accounted for the order of the fixations, here I model the drift rate, the average slope 
of the path of the particle throughout the trial, and ignore the order of the fixations, a 
simplification first introduced by Cavanagh and colleagues (2014). 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Relation Between Confidence and Choice 
First I tested whether confidence judgments related to accuracy in the value domain, by testing if 
high-confidence choices corresponded more with the participants stated preferences than low-
confidence choices. This was evaluated with a hierarchical logistic regression model that 
predicted the probability of the participant choosing a reference item (the right item in 
Experiment 3, the first item encountered based on western reading order in Experiment 4). 
Choices were predicted by difference in value (DV), operationalised as the difference in BDM 
value between the reference item and the second item (Experiment 3) or the mean of the other 
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two items (Experiment 4), confidence, summed value (SV; the total BDM value of all the 
options in that trial), difference in dwell time (DDT) and the interactions between DV and 
Confidence and DV and SV. In line with a wealth of previous research (Boorman, Behrens, 
Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2009; FitzGerald, Seymour, & Dolan, 2009; Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, 
Thirion, & Pessiglione, 2009; Levy, Lazzaro, Rutledge, & Glimcher, 2011; Plassmann, 
O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010) I found that difference in value (DV) was a reliable predictor of 
participants’ choices in both of the snack experiments (hierarchical logistic regression; 
Experiment 3: z =11.48, p< 10-10, Figure 4.2. c & f ; Experiment 4: z=6.66, p<10-9, Figure 4.2. b 
& e) . Both studies also showed a significant negative interaction between the summed value of 
all options (SV) and value difference (DV) (Experiment 3: z=-3.08, p=.002; Experiment 4: z=-
2.84, p=.005), indicating that participants were more able to use DV to guide their choice when 
item values were low, compared to when items were high in value (Figure 4.2. c & f). To my 
knowledge this effect has never been reported before but is consistent with the Weber–Fechner 
law in sensory perception, in which the resolution of percepts diminishes for stimuli of greater 
magnitude and it is compatible with the notion of divisive normalisation (Carandini & Heeger, 
2012; Louie, Khaw, & Glimcher, 2013; Soltani, De Martino, & Camerer, 2012). Confidence, 
unlike DV, was not in itself a predictor of choice (right or left item) but instead correlates with 
choice accuracy. Both experiments replicated this finding, which had previously been reported in 
De Martino et al. (2013). This effect is shown here (Figure 4.2. b & e) using a logistic regression 
model predicting choice. I found a significant positive interaction between DV and confidence 
(Experiment 3:  z=7.38, p<10-10; Experiment 4: z=5.78, p<10-8), with DV predicting choice 
more strongly for trials when confidence is high. 
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Figure 4.2.  Relation Between Confidence and Choice                 
Eye tracking tasks: (a) In Experiment 3, participants were presented with two snack items and 
were then required to choose one item to consume at the end of the experiment. (d) In 
Experiment 4, participants chose between three options, and the presentation of the stimuli was 
contingent on which box participants looked at. In both experiments, participants indicated their 
confidence that they had made a correct decision on a visual analogue scale, after each choice 
had been made. (b) Probability of choosing the item on the right as a function of the difference 
in value between the options. (e) Probability of choosing the reference item (see paragraph 
4.4.1.), as a function of the standardised value difference between the reference item and the 
mean value of the alternatives. Black line: high confidence trials, grey line: low confidence trials 
(as determined by a median split). (c and f) Fixed effects coefficients from hierarchical logistic 
regression models predicting choice (DV= difference in value; SV= summed value; DDT = 
difference in dwell time, DV x Confidence= Interaction of difference in value and confidence; 
DV x SV= Interaction of difference in value and summed value). The graph for Experiment 3 
(C) shows the coefficients predicting the probability of choosing the right-hand option; the 
graph for Experiment 4 (F) shows the coefficients predicting the probability of choosing the 
reference option. Error bars show 95% CIs. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05.  
4.4.2. Dynamics of Information Sampling  
I then examined the dynamics of eye movements between items during the choice – both the 
total amount of time participants spent looking at each item and also how frequently gaze shifted 
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between items. Replicating previous studies (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010) I 
found that gaze behaviour correlated with choice.  In line with Cavanagh and colleagues I found 
that difference in fixation time and difference in value predicted choice additively (Cavanagh et 
al., 2014). I compared the Krajbich and Cavanagh accounts of the influence of fixation time by 
fitting three drift diffusion models to Experiment 3, a null model that predicted drift rate only 
from the value difference between the options, an additive model that included an additive boost 
to drift rate for the option that had been fixated on longer, and an interactive model that that 
weighted the value of each option with how long it had been fixated (see the methods for 
details). I found that the additive model explained the data better than better than the null model 
and the interactive model (DIC0=19 704, DICa=19 305, DICi=19 989). Surprisingly, the null 
model fit the data better than the interactive model. For the winning additive model both 
difference in value and difference in fixation ratio positively predicted drift rate 
(coefficientvalue=0.80(0.02), coefficientdwellratio=0.79(0.04)). 
I also constructed a novel measure that captured the dynamics by which information was 
sampled. This new measure, called ‘gaze shift frequency’ (GSF), indexed how frequently gaze 
shifted between the options presented on the screen. This measure is independent of difference 
in dwell-time: for a constant allocation of time between the options (e.g. 3 seconds for the left-
hand option and 5 seconds for the right-hand option) one may shift fixation only once (e.g. 
switching from left to right after 3 seconds have elapsed; low gaze shift frequency) or shift many 
times between the two options (high gaze shift frequency). In practice DDT and GSF appears to 
be weakly correlated, both in Experiment 3 (r=.10, p<10-10), and in Experiment 4 (r=.06, p<10-
4). GSF was positively correlated with response time in Experiment 3 (r=.57, p<10-10) and 
Experiment 4 (r=.63, p<10-10), suggesting that participant moved their gaze more during longer 
trials.  For the learning experiment, I found no correlation between GSF and DDT (r=-.003, 
p=.79), and only a weak relationship between GSF and RT (r=.05, p<10-4). 
In order to test how these two gaze metrics influenced behaviour I ran a set of hierarchical 
logistic regression models that predicted choices from DV, DDT and GSF and interactions 
between DV and DDT and DV and GSF for Experiments 3, 4, and 5 (see Figure 4.3.). In 
Experiment 3 I found a double dissociation between the impact of difference in dwell time and 
gaze shift frequency on choice. In other words, dwell time produced a bias in choice (shift in the 
psychometric function; z=16.95, p<10-10) but did not affect choice accuracy (slope in the 
psychometric function; z=-0.87, p=.38). On the contrary, gaze shift frequency had no effect on 
choice per se (z=1.74, p=.08) but negatively predicted the accuracy of the choice (z=-4.17, p<10-
4). The results from Experiment 4 were noisier. As in Experiment 3, GSF negatively predicted 
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accuracy (z=-3.71, p<10-4), but it also produced a bias in choice (z=-2.46, p=.01), this bias in 
choice is probably an artefact of how GSF interacted with DDT, because if DDT was excluded 
from the model GSF did not predict choice on its own (but it still predicted choice in interaction 
with value, see Appendix 1). DDT had a strong main effect on choice (z=21.19, p<10-10), but 
also interacted with value difference (z=-2.29, p=.02). However, while the dissociation was not 
complete the main effect was much stronger for DDT than GSF, and the interaction effect was 
much stronger for GSF than for DDT. I reanalysed the data by simply predicting the probability 
of picking the highest valued item; here GSF predicted choices above unsigned value difference 
(z=-6.24, p<10-9), but unsigned DDT did not (z=-0.65, p=.52), in line with the idea that GSF 
correlates with choice accuracy but DDT does not. For the learning experiment, DDT 
influenced only bias (as in Experiment 3; z=16.92, p<10-10) and GSF did not predict bias (z=-
1.16, p=.24) or accuracy, z=0.34, p=.73). 
 
Figure 4.3. Dynamics of Information Sampling        
The plots show data from Experiments 3, 4, and 5 illustrating the differential effects of each eye 
tracking parameter on choice. The y-axes show the probability of choosing the reference item 
and the x-axes show difference in value (z-scored) for Experiments 3 and 4 and differences in Q-
values for Experiment 5. Data are split into values above the median (green line) and below the 
median (blue line) for difference in dwell time (a-c) and gaze shift frequency (d-f). Points 
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represent quartiles of DV. Error bars show standard errors. Difference in dwell time is 
associated with a shift of the logistic fit with no change in slope, consistent with a biasing effect 
on choice (i.e. people are more likely to pick the item they look at for longer, independent of 
difference in value). In contrast, gaze shift frequency modulates choice accuracy (change in 
slope) but is not associated with a bias in choice in the decision-experiments. Gaze shift 
frequency does not appear to influence choice in any way during the learning experiment. 
4.4.3. Factors that Contribute to Confidence 
I then investigated which variables contributed to the subjective representation of confidence 
during value-based choice. Previous work has shown an interrelationship between absolute 
difference in value (|DV|), response time (RT) and confidence (i.e. participants are more 
confident both when |DV| is high and their choices are faster; De Martino et al., 2013). These 
findings are in line with the conceptual relation between confidence, difference in stimulus 
strength (indexed by |DV| in the value-based framework) and RT (Kiani et al., 2014; Kiani & 
Shadlen, 2009). Using hierarchical linear regression models without intercepts, I observed this 
same relation in the current study. In both experiments I found that |DV| was a significant 
predictor of confidence (Experiment 3: t=12.62 p<.10-10; Experiment 4: t=8.12, p<10-7). I also 
found that RT was a negative predictor of confidence (Experiment 3: t=-11.00, p<10-10; 
Experiment 4: t=-7.57, p<10-6). Additionally, I found that summed value positively predicted 
confidence, meaning that participants tended to be more confident when the options were all 
high in value Experiment 3: t=3.58, p=.001; Experiment 4: t=4.77, p<10-4). This finding 
indicates that overall value might boost confidence. 
I also included the eye variables GSF and |DDT| in the model, to investigate how they related 
to confidence judgments. While |DDT| was a weak positive predictor of confidence in 
Experiment 3 (t=2.15, p<.05) it did not predict confidence in Experiment 4 (t=-0.52, p=.60). 
GSF was a robust negative predictor of confidence in both Experiments 3 and 4 (Experiment 3: 
t=-3.44, p=.002; Experiment 4: t=-7.41, p<10-6) see Figure 4.4. a and b. In other words, in trials 
in which participants shifted their gaze more often between the available options their 
confidence was lower, even accounting for changes in |DV| SV and RT. The four-way 
relationship between |DV|, RT, GSF and confidence is plotted in Figure 4.4. c and d. 
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Figure 4.4. Factors that Contribute to Confidence                   
(a-b) Graphs show coefficient plots for the fixed-effect coefficients in hierarchical regression 
models predicting confidence for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
*** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05. (|DV|= absolute difference in value; RT = reaction 
time; SV= summed value; GSF = Gaze Shift Frequency, |DDT|=absolute difference in dwell 
time). (c – d) 4-D heat maps showing mean z-scored confidence as a function of subject specific 
quantiles of response time, absolute difference in value and gaze shift frequency. Gaze shift 
frequency and confidence are both influenced by response time and the absolute value difference 
between the options. 
4.4.4. Confidence Predicts Change of Mind 
In the two snack experiments participants saw the same exact choice sets on more than one 
occasion. In Experiment 3 each pair was presented twice; in Experiment 4 each triad was 
presented three times (counterbalancing for different spatial locations). This design allowed me 
to determine factors affecting changes of mind when the same options are encountered again in 
a subsequent trial. Note that the way I define change of mind above is different from how it is 
often defined in perceptual decision making, namely as a choice reversal within the same trial 
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after further processing of sensory information (Bronfman et al., 2015; Moran et al., 2015; 
Resulaj et al., 2009; Van Den Berg et al., 2016). The hypothesis I sought to test was that an 
explicit representation of uncertainty in a choice (reported as confidence) would influence 
behaviour when the same options were presented again during a different trial. In a hierarchical 
logistic regression, lower confidence at the first presentation was indeed associated with increase 
in change of mind at the following presentation, in both Experiments 3 and 4 (Experiment 3:  
z=-6.16, p<10-9; Experiment 4: z=-5.21, p<10-6). The effect of confidence in predicting change 
of mind remained robust after controlling for all the other factors that might correlate with the 
stability of a choice such as |DV| and RT. Notably none of the eye tracking measures played a 
significant role as predictor of change of mind when included in the regression analysis (Fig. 4 
coefficients in blue). Note that this was still true when confidence was excluded from the regression 
analysis (GSFExperiment 3: z=-0.68, p=.49; |DDT|Experiment 3: z=-0.32, p=.75; GSFExperiment 4: z=0.59, 
p=0.55; |DDT|Experiment 4: z=-0.13, p=0.90).  
This is particularly interesting for GSF because of its significant negative relation with 
confidence (see Fig.3). This result suggests the hypothesis that the low level (and possibly 
implicit) measure of uncertainty gathered by GSF is insufficient to trigger a delayed change of 
mind. On the contrary, an explicit representation of uncertainty (expressed through confidence) 
allows individuals to capitalise on their ‘knowledge about their ignorance’ and make a difference 
choice when similar options are presented later. 
It is important to note that just because confidence predicted changes of mind in subsequent 
trials, it does not necessarily follow that low confidence judgments are causing subsequent 
changes of mind. We know that low confidence judgments are associated with a noisier decision-
process, leading to more decisions that violating the preferences of the participant. So perhaps 
confidence simply tags noisy decisions as part of some error monitoring process (Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012, 2014). When the same choice repeats the decision process is less noisy 
because of recursion to the mean and the less noisy decision process causes the highest-value 
option to be chosen. This results in a change of mind in relation to the first low-confidence 
choice, but confidence is not having any causal influence. I attempted to account for this by 
adding a dummy-variable coding whether the highest-value option was chosen in the original 
trial, and confidence still predicted future changes of mind in Experiment 3 (z=-4.79, p<10-5) 
and Experiment 4 (z=-4.88, p<10-5). Therefore, it seems probable that confidence causally 
influence future changes of mind. 
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Next, I examined whether individual differences in metacognition related to changes of mind. I 
reasoned that the impact of confidence on changes of mind would be more prominent in 
participants who have enhanced metacognitive skills, i.e. those whose explicit confidence ratings 
more accurately track the level of uncertainty underlying their decision process. In order to test 
this hypothesis I calculated an individual index of metacognitive sensitivity by computing the 
difference in slope between psychometric functions on high and low confidence trials (De 
Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014; De Martino et al., 2013; Fleming & Lau, 2014). I then ran a logistic 
model to predict changes of mind at later presentations using confidence measured at earlier 
presentations with the same stimuli. In line with my initial hypothesis, the impact of confidence 
on changes of mind is stronger in those participants with greater metacognitive accuracy (r= -
0.35, p=0.01; Figure 4.5.). Note that the relationship is negative because the influence of 
confidence on changes of mind should be negative (so that changes of mind are more probable 
when confidence in the initial choice is low). 
 
Figure 4.5. Confidence Predicts Change of Mind                   
(a-b) Coefficient plots for the fixed effects coefficients from hierarchical logistic regression 
models predicting future changes of mind. Error bars show 95% CIs. *** = p < .001; ** = p < 
.01; * = p < .05. (|DV|= absolute difference in value; RT = reaction time; SV= summed value; 
GSF = gaze shift frequency; |DDT|= absolute difference in dwell time) (c) Correlation 
between metacognitive accuracy and the coefficients for confidence ratings predicting future 
changes of mind (highlighted in pale green). Participants with greater metacognitive accuracy are 
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more likely to change their mind following a low-confidence judgment; note that the correlation 
is negative because the relationship between confidence and changes of mind is itself negative 
(lower confidence increases the probability of subsequent changes of mind). Participants from 
Experiment 3 are represented by black dots, participants from Experiment 4 are represented by 
grey squares. Both axes (x and y) are z-scored for each experiment separately. 
4.4.5. Link Between Confidence and Transitivity  
In the analysis presented in the previous paragraph I established a link between confidence 
judgments and changes of mind. A change of mind is agnostic to the quality of the decision 
because the result might be better or worse than the original choice. However, as mentioned in 
the introduction, not all choices are equal; some of them can result in a more closely consistent 
pattern of choices than others, a parameter that can be indexed measuring the level of transitivity 
across all decisions.  In order to test the relation between confidence and transitivity I estimated 
the (idiosyncratic) preference ranking of items that led to the lowest number of transitivity 
violations. Note that it is extremely complex to find an optimal ranking order for choice sets 
with more than a handful of items; however, a number of efficient algorithms that approximate a 
numerical solution have been developed for pairwise comparisons. Here I used the Minimum 
Violations Ranking (MVR) algorithm (Pedings, Langville, & Yamamoto, 2012) that minimizes 
the number of inconsistencies in the ranking of the items shown to each participant. This 
method enabled me to tag choices as transitivity violations (TV) of the optimal ranking 
calculated via the MRV algorithm. Because most of these methods are not suited for ternary 
choice the analyses presented in this section were performed only on data collected for the 
experiment using binary choice (Experiment 3). After having ordered the participants’ choices 
according to the MVR algorithm, 4.5% of all decisions were classified as transitivity violations. I 
then split the dataset into trials in which participants reported high confidence and trials in which 
they reported low confidence (median split). Most of the transitivity violations took place during 
low confidence trials (85% of the transitivity violations) as opposed to high confidence trials 
(15% of the transitivity violations). While these results are consistent with previous evidence 
provided in this paper and elsewhere (De Martino et al., 2013), it is important to highlight that 
for this analysis did not rely on BDM value estimates and that my approach to generate the 
optimal ranking did only include choice trials. These show that that the link between confidence 
and the quality of a value-based decision is robust independently of the method used to assess 
quality.  In order to test which factors accounted for transitivity violations on a trial-by-trial basis 
I constructed a set of hierarchical logistic regression models. Absolute difference in value 
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(|DV|) was a robust negative predictor of TV (z=-6.41, p<10-9) meaning that participants were 
more likely to violate transitivity during trials when the items were closer in value. Critically, this 
same model showed that even when |DV| was accounted for, confidence was a negative 
predictor of transitivity violations (z=-6.25, p<10-9). In other words, participants felt less 
confident during those trials in which they went against their best-fitting preference order. Both 
response time (z=4.17, p<10-4) and summed value (z=2.46, p=.01) positively predicted 
transitivity violations: trials in which the value of both options was higher and/or in trials in 
which their responses were slower, participants’ choices were more likely to result in transitivity 
violations. Note that this is another metric showing that summed value appears to be associated 
with lower quality choices, despite being a positive correlate of confidence. Finally, GSF 
negatively predicted transitivity violations value (z=-2.56, p=.01), meaning that participants 
shifted their gaze less during trials that violated transitivity when the other variables were 
accounted for. This negative relationship between GSF and transitivity violations is surprising, 
because I suspect that GSF is a low level measure of choice uncertainty. However, because of 
the high-correlation between RT and GSF this coefficient estimate might not be reliable 
(Gelman & Hill, 2006). Indeed, removing RT from the model causes GSF to become 
insignificant (z=0.21, p=.83), but does not influence the other predictors. Additionally, 
decoupling GSF from RT by making it into a rate (GSF/sec) also makes it an insignificant 
predictor of transitivity violations (z=-1.13, p=.25). Finally, removing GSF from the full model 
did not reduce model fit (BICFull Model=2314, BICFull Model-GSF =2222). Similar to the change of mind 
analysis, difference in dwell time did not reliably predict transitivity violations (z=-1.11, p=.26),. 
Note that this was still true when reported confidence was excluded from the regression analysis 
(z=-1.27, p=0.20).  
I then examined how intersubject variability in metacognitive ability affected transitivity 
violations. I reasoned that if a well-calibrated, explicit representation of uncertainty plays a role in 
guiding future decisions, participants with greater metacognitive ability will show a decrease in 
the number of transitivity violations when the same option was presented a second time. In line 
with this hypothesis participants with greater metacognitive ability showed a marked reduction in 
transitivity violations between the first and second presentation of the same choice (beta=0.85, 
SE=0.42, z(26)=2.03, p<.05). I also confirmed that this effect was not due to a relationship 
between metacognition and choice instability: the total number of transitivity violations was 
unrelated to metacognitive accuracy (beta=-1.83, SE=1.61, z(26)=-1.14, p=0.25). 
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Figure 4.6. Link between Confidence and Transitivity                   
(a) Heat maps showing the number transitivity violations for the full sample and for high and 
low confidence trials (median split). The graphs are structured so that the items are ordered by 
increasing value from top to bottom for the items displayed on the left side of the screen and 
from left to right for the items displayed on the right side of the screen. The middle diagonal line 
is empty because no item was ever paired with itself. Note most transitivity violations took place 
in the low-confidence trials. (b) Coefficient plot for the fixed effects coefficients from a 
hierarchical logistic regression model predicting transitivity violations (|DV|= absolute 
difference in value; RT = reaction time; SV= summed value; GSF = gaze shift frequency; 
|DDT|= absolute difference in dwell time). Error bars show 95% CIs. *** = p < .001; ** = p < 
.01; * = p < .05.  (c) Decreases in transitivity violations between the first and second 
presentation for each participant, as a function of metacognitive accuracy. The graph shows that 
participants who are more metacognitively accurate tend to become more transitive over time. 
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4.5. Discussion 
This chapter attempted to answer two questions: What factors contribute to value-based 
confidence judgments and what is the benefit of explicit confidence judgments in value-based 
decisions? In response to the first question I found two novel factors contributing to value-based 
confidence judgments that predicted confidence above and beyond the well-known factors of 
RT and stimulus strength (Kiani et al., 2014; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009). Specifically I found that the 
total value of the response options predicted confidence, perhaps suggesting that some aspect of 
the value judgments leak into the confidence judgments, in support of the idea that the 
computations of confidence and value are intrinsically linked (Barron et al., 2015; Lebreton et al., 
2015). 
I also found that the extent to which participants switched between fixating on the options 
negatively predicted confidence. This might be because the brain reads these low level 
exploratory behaviours as one component when it constructs explicit confidence judgments. 
Alternatively, a low level representation of uncertainty might cause higher switch rates as a form 
of information seeking and also influence the post-decision confidence judgments. A third 
explanation would be that the BDM-values are only a noisy estimate of the true preference of the 
items, so the recorded unsigned difference in value (|DV|) is only a noisy estimate of the true 
unsigned difference in value (|DV*|). If that is the case, both confidence and GSF might be 
independently driven by |DV*| and the fact that GSF predict confidence beyond recorded 
|DV| can be explained by measurement noise. It is impossible to distinguish between these 
hypotheses by the results presented here, but future research could distinguish between these 
hypotheses behaviourally by manipulating switch-rates and testing how that influences certainty, 
or neurologically by finding neural substrates for GSF from EEG or MEG data (it has to be 
EEG and MEG rather than f(MRI) because the temporal resolution of f(MRI) is too poor to 
reliably link specific neural activity with GSF). These signals could then be compared to known 
value-and uncertainty signals. 
It is worth noting that GSF is different from the more established eye metric DDT. 
Conceptually and empirically the two are only weakly correlated, and behaviourally they seem to 
have distinct effects. My work supports Cavanagh’s (2014) finding that DDT has an 
independent, additive effect to difference in value. Or, in other words, the longer you look at an 
item the more likely you are to choose that item. Note that the size of this bias towards the 
fixated item is independent of its value. GSF, on the other hand, appears to change the steepness 
of the psychometric function of the value difference, so the less the participant moves his/her 
108 
 
gaze back and forth between the items, the more likely he/she is to choose the highest value 
item, in line with the idea that GSF is a low level measure of uncertainty. However, GSF did not 
seem to correlate with choice in the-two armed bandit study. 
There are a number of potential explanations for this discrepancy. First, maybe the stimuli need 
to have some hedonic value to trigger the kind of eye behaviour we see in the two snack 
experiments. Second, maybe GSF only relates to uncertainty when the stimuli are visually 
complex. Third, maybe GSF only works when the participants are forced to sample one item at a 
time. The first explanation is unlikely because we observe the influence of dwell time on choice 
in the bandit task and it seems unlikely that the diagnosticity of GSF is tied to the hedonic value 
of the items, but the dwell time effect on choice is not. Additionally we replicated the effect of 
dwell time and GSF for perceptual choices (see the next chapter), and those perceptual stimuli 
lacked hedonic value to the same extent as the bandits.  The second explanation is more 
plausible as the visual stimuli in the snack task and perceptual task were more complex than 
those in the bandit task. The third explanation, that GSF only captures uncertainty when 
participants have to sample one item at a time is also congruent with the data. The perceptual 
task and the second snack experiment only showed the item participants fixated on, meaning 
that they could only take in visual information from one item at the time; the bandits, on the 
other hand, were comparably close together on the screen and their presentation was not gaze 
contingent, meaning that participants might have attended to a different item than the one they 
looked at, thus reducing the diagnosticity of GSF. This explanation is somewhat contradicted by 
the fact that dwell time still influenced choice in the two-armed bandit task and that the first 
experiment was not gaze contingent and still showed the GSF effect. Clearly further work is 
needed to establish the boundary conditions for when GSF captures decision-uncertainty and 
when it does not. If these conditions could be better understood GSF could be utilised as an 
easy way to capture trial-by-trial uncertainty in non-human animals (captured by head 
movements in rodents). This would be a valuable methodological contribution as previous work 
in animals has measured uncertainty as post-decision wagering (Kepecs & Mainen, 2012; Lak et 
al., 2014). The downside of post-decision wagering is that it behaviourally combines the choices 
the animals make with their confidence judgments, and conflates uncertainty estimates with 
economic preferences such as loss aversion (Fleming & Dolan, 2010).  
This brings us to the second question: What is the benefit of having an explicit confidence 
representation in value-based choices? Previous work has shown that tracking decision 
uncertainty can improve learning (Meyniel, Schlunegger, et al., 2015), help agents to determine 
whether to exploit the current option or explore alternatives (Badre, Doll, Long, & Frank, 2012; 
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Daw, O’doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006), or allow individuals to evaluate evidence in 
favour of alternatives (Boorman et al., 2009). Here I found that low confidence in a choice 
increased the chances of changes of mind when the same option(s) appeared again. Additionally 
I found that the relationship between low confidence in the first presentation and subsequent 
changes of mind was stronger for individuals with higher meta-cognitive accuracy (whose 
confidence judgments better reflected whether they had chosen the items they valued more). At 
the neural level, such a link between meta-cognitive accuracy on the one hand and confidence-
driven behaviours on the other are not entirely surprising. The rostrolateral prefrontal cortex has 
been shown to be central both in tracking trial-by-trial variations in confidence (Rushworth, 
Kolling, Sallet, & Mars, 2012; Yoshida & Ishii, 2006) and modulating uncertainty-driven 
behaviours (Badre et al., 2012; Boorman et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2006; Meyniel, Schlunegger, & 
Dehaene, 2015; Payzan-LeNestour, Dunne, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2013). Additionally the 
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex and the frontal poles have been associated with metacognitive 
abilities in a number of studies (De Martino et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2010; Lau & Rosenthal, 
2011; Rounis et al., 2010). In other words, the relationship between meta-cognitive accuracy and 
changes of mind reported here fits a neurocomputational model where the same brain network is 
responsible for estimating trial-by-trial uncertainty and using that uncertainty estimate to guide 
behaviour, even though this study did not test neural hypotheses directly. 
It is important to point out that the observed relationship between confidence and changes of 
mind can also be explained without postulating a causal relationship between the two. As 
mentioned earlier, recorded |DV| might just be a noisy measure of |DV*|. As such, confidence 
low confidence might just signal that |DV*| is smaller than is implied by our measure |DV|, 
therefore confidence would simply diagnose trials where the decision process is particularly 
noisy, and is subsequently more likely to be associated with a different choice when the options 
repeat. According to this account, confidence provides additional information to the 
experimenter about when a participant is likely to change their mind, but both the change of 
mind and the confidence judgement is a consequence of the internal computation leading up to 
choice, confidence has no special causal influence over changes of mind. This account cannot be 
ruled out from the current data, but an experimental design that influences confidence while 
keeping first-order performance constant might provide some insight (there are a number of 
such designs in relation to metamemory, see Chapter 1). If trials with artificially modulated 
confidence show a greater or lower incidence of changes of mind relative to control trials despite 
choice accuracy being the same would provide support for the causal role of confidence, if on 
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the other hand, the confidence manipulation did not influence subsequent changes of mind that 
would damage the credibility of the causal role of confidence.   
So do changes of mind lead to better decisions? It is problematic to talk about correct and 
incorrect choices in the value domain because the value of a choice is inherently subjective, but 
internal consistency (transitivity) might serve as a proxy for accuracy in the value domain. I used 
a novel mathematical algorithm (Pedings et al., 2012) to tag choices that violated transitivity and 
showed that high-confidence decisions are more likely to be transitive, and hence more rational.  
This suggests a potential function of confidence in value-based decision making, because low 
confidence highlights choices that are more likely to violate the agent’s overall preference 
patterns, and thus leave them open for economic exploitation. Furthermore, individuals who 
have higher metacognitive performance showed a greater reduction in transitivity violations, 
suggesting that people who have a more accurate internal representation of uncertainty are also 
able to use that representation to improve their decisions. It seems likely that the role of 
confidence in value-based judgments is closely related to the relationship between confidence 
and error correction in perceptual judgments as suggested by Boldt & Yeung (2015) and  Yeung 
& Summerfield (2014, 2012) and recently confirmed in our lab (Kaanders et al., in preparation). 
This relationship with perceptual decision making highlights another strength of this study: 
applying psychophysics paradigms to value-based decision making (Summerfield & Tsetsos, 
2012). By finding ways to parametrically manipulate value and repeat a great number of trials 
inside the same people, researchers can ask more precise questions about the processes 
informing value-based decisions than has historically been the norm (Houser & McCabe, 2014). 
To summarise, these studies have extended our understanding of confidence in value-based 
decision making by finding that the summed value of the options and the amount of gaze shifts 
between options predicts confidence above and beyond value difference and response time. I 
have showed that confidence judgments after an initial decision predict the probability that the 
agents will change their minds in subsequent decisions with the same options. I have also shown 
that the relationship between low initial confidence judgments and changes of mind is stronger 
for highly metacognitive individuals. Lastly I have shown that confidence tends to be higher for 
transitive choices. This may suggest that low confidence highlights choices that might be 
irrational to the decision-maker, allowing them to change their mind and improve their choices 
over time. 
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5. The Timing of Confidence Judgments 
Influences Metacognitive Performance 
5.1. Summary 
It has been reported that the accuracy of confidence judgments differs as a function of when 
they are elicited in relation to the choice they evaluate. However, to the best of my knowledge, 
no study has compared these two confidence timings within the same individuals. Applying a 
within-participant comparison where only the timing of the confidence judgment relative to 
choice differs between conditions, I find that simultaneous confidence judgments are associated 
with lower second-order performance despite similar first-order performance. I investigated 
whether this difference in metacognitive efficiency can be attributed to differences in processing 
time with inconclusive results. Sequential confidence judgments were more sensitive to response 
time than simultaneous confidence judgments. A mediation analysis suggests that this greater 
sensitivity to response time fully explains the higher metacognitive accuracy of the sequential 
judgments. Additionally, the influence of dwell time on choice previously reported in the value 
domain replicates in the perceptual domain, and the association between gaze-shift frequency 
and confidence that was reported in the previous chapter replicates as well.  
5.2. Introduction 
An enigma lies at the heart of the study of confidence. On the one hand, almost every human 
has an intuitive sense of confidence, and if we are asked to give confidence judgments for our 
decisions, these judgments tend to track decision accuracy (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Nelson & 
Narens, 1994). On the other hand, there is an on-going controversy among the world’s leading 
experts about what this subjective sense of confidence actually corresponds to (Fleming and 
Daw, 2017). Specifically, there are disagreements about two central aspects of confidence: First, 
what is the underlying computational quantity that confidence captures, i.e. is confidence a 
measure of the probability that a choice is correct or some heuristic approximation? (Aitchison, 
Bang, Bahrami, & Latham, 2015; Navajas et al., 2017) Second, how is confidence computed; is it 
based on the same internal evidence computation as the choice it evaluates? (De Martino et al., 
2013; Fleming & Daw, 2017; Kiani et al., 2014; Maniscalco & Lau, 2016; Van Den Berg et al., 
2016). It is possible that the conflicting findings fuelling these controversies may partially be 
explained if the nature of the confidence computation depends on the task structure in which it 
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is evaluated. Yeung and Summerfield (2012) expressed a similar idea. They pointed out that error 
correction and error monitoring, though long thought to have the same substrate, seem to rely 
on different computations. Because confidence judgments seem to be driven by the same 
process as error monitoring (Boldt & Yeung, 2015), it is possible that different forms of 
confidence judgments depend on different computations. Fleming and Daw (2017) approached 
this idea from a different angle: in their recent review they suggest a signal detection theoretic 
model that can account for all the reported findings by modelling choices and confidence 
judgments as resulting from separate but correlated evidence streams. By varying the strength of 
the evidence correlation and the relative level of noise in each evidence stream, they can account 
for all of the major confidence findings with the assumption that these variables vary as the 
result of task structure.  
One simple variation in task structure that seems to influence the computation of confidence is 
the timing of the confidence judgment relative to the choice. To the best of my knowledge, the 
first study to empirically test how confidence differed for different response timings was 
conducted by Aitchison, Bang, Bahrami, and Latham (2015). Aitchinson and colleagues (2015) 
compared two groups of people who both performed the same visual discrimination task, where 
one group reported confidence sequentially and the other group reported their choices and their 
confidence judgments simultaneously. The confidence judgments of the first group were a 
monotonic function of a Bayes-optimal computation of the probability of being correct 
(p(correct)), given the current state of evidence, whereas the confidence judgments of the second 
group was a mixture of p(correct) and a heuristic approximation (the stimulus strength of the 
chosen option). More recently, Siedlecka and colleagues (2016) found that metacognitive 
accuracy (the extent to which confidence was diagnostic of performance) was higher when 
participants reported their decision before their confidence, rather than the reverse. Participants 
were presented with masked scrambled letters and had to judge if a subsequently shown word 
was an anagram of the scrambled letters, with the order of the choice and the confidence rating 
reversed between conditions (it also contained a third condition when confidence was given 
before the target word was shown, but this is irrelevant for this discussion and will be ignored). 
Fleming and Daw (2017) explain this performance difference by arguing that the choice itself can 
influence the confidence judgment when the internal evidence streams driving confidence and 
choice are weakly correlated (when they are strongly correlated the same information influences 
the choice and the confidence, so the confidence judgment does not receive any new 
information from observing the choice). In other words, Fleming and Daw argue that 
confidence judgments following choice might be computationally distinct from confidence 
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judgments preceding them. Researchers who believe that a single evidence stream drives both 
confidence judgments and choices might explain the superior metacognitive performance of the 
retrospective confidence judgments by pointing out that participants had more time to process 
the information relative to the prospective confidence judgments (Van Den Berg et al., 2016). 
However, that explanation is unlikely in this case because first order accuracy was similar across 
conditions, and there is no reason why additional processing time should influence first-order 
and second-order performance differently if they both rely on the same evidence stream. 
Finally, Kiani, Corthell and Shadlen (2014) reported discrepant results in the patterns between 
confidence, stimulus strength and accuracy for confidence judgments reported simultaneously 
with choices relative to the pattern that is commonly found for sequential confidence judgments. 
Typically confidence is positively associated with stimulus strength for correct decisions but 
show a negative or flat relationship with confidence during error trials (Kepecs et al., 2008; Lak 
et al., 2014; Sanders et al., 2016; Chapter 3 in this dissertation). Kiani and colleagues found a 
positive relationship between confidence and stimulus strength for both correct and error trials 
when the confidence judgment was reported simultaneously with the choice. They theorised that 
the reason for this pattern was that simultaneous confidence judgments force the participants to 
use the same evidence for correct and error trials, so stimulus strength has the same influence on 
both trial types, whereas sequential confidence judgments allow for additional post-choice 
processing which enables error detection. This error detection is stronger for trials with higher 
stimulus strength because the additional evidence samples from the extra processing time are 
more likely to contradict the error. Fleming and Daw (2017) used simulations to show that this 
account is untrue: even in cases when confidence and choice derive from exactly the same 
evidence signal, stimulus strength would be positively associated with confidence for correct 
trials but negatively associated with confidence for error trials. The reason for this is technical 
but relates to the dissociation between the internal evidence signal (that is known to the 
participant but unknown to the experimenter) and the stimulus strength (which is known by the 
experimenter, but not by the participant). However, recently Navajas and colleagues (2017) 
provided a new explanation for Kiani’s findings. They demonstrated that confidence judgments 
show the traditional pattern when they computationally capture the p(correct), but that they 
show the pattern reported by Kiani et al. when they computationally capture the precision of the 
internal evidence. Together, these findings imply that confidence might be computed differently 
when it is reported simultaneously with choice, relative to when it is reported following choice. 
The studies reviewed above provide an indication that confidence may differ systematically 
depending on when it is timed relative to choice, but the existing evidence is not conclusive. The 
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main reason for this uncertainty is that the studies that have tested the effect of timing on 
confidence judgments have used between-participants designs. Aitchinson and colleagues (2015), 
who found systematic differences with regard to what computational quantity best captured the 
confidence judgments, compared 15 participants who provided simultaneous judgments with 11 
participants who provided sequential judgments. This is a major problem, because Navajas et al. 
(2017) have since established that there are individual differences in the computational 
underpinnings of confidence that are independent of task structure. Siedlecka and colleagues did 
not report how many participants they had in each group, but they analysed data from a total of 
86 participants split between three conditions. Provided that these participants were divided 
evenly, that translates to approximately 29 participants per group; given the variation in 
metacognitive accuracy between individuals (Ais et al., 2016; Song et al., 2011), this is a fairly 
small sample. Lastly, while Kiani et al., (2014) did have four participants complete both 
simultaneous and sequential confidence reporting in the same task, the effect of these conditions 
was not formally compared in the paper, and only some of the data from the sequential trials 
were reported in the supplementary materials. Therefore, to better explore the systematic 
differences between simultaneous and sequential confidence judgments, a within-participant 
design is desirable. 
Assuming that metacognitive accuracy does differ systematically between sequentially and 
simultaneously reported confidence judgments, it would be interesting to know what might cause 
such a difference. The previous chapter showed that confidence was a function of stimulus 
strength, response time, and eye behaviours in the value domain. In this study I recorded the 
same variables to test if they influence sequentially and simultaneously reported confidence 
differently. Additionally, recording eye movements here allowed me to test if eye behaviours 
inform choice and confidence in a similar way in the perceptual domain as they do in the value 
domain. Specifically, I wanted to test whether the time spent looking at an option influences 
whether it is chosen, as it does in the value domain (Cavanagh et al., 2014; Folke et al., 2016; 
Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Lim et al., 2011). I also wanted to test whether 
the number of times participants shifted between looking at each option negatively predicted 
confidence and choice accuracy above and beyond stimulus strength and response time, in line 
with my results in the value domain (Folke et al., 2016). 
To summarise, previous research suggests that the timing of confidence judgments relative to 
choice may influence various aspects of the confidence computation. I want to extend this work 
by comparing confidence judgments that are reported simultaneously with the choice to 
115 
 
confidence judgments that are reported sequentially after a choice. Specifically, I want to answer 
the following questions: 
1. Siedlecka and colleagues (2016) found that participants who made their confidence 
judgments after they reported their choice were more metacognitively accurate than 
participants who made their confidence judgments before they reported their choice. Can 
I replicate this timing effect when the same participants complete both conditions? 
2. If I discover a difference in metacognitive accuracy, can it be explained by differences in 
processing time between the conditions, or does it imply that that the timing conditions 
somehow influence the computations that underlie confidence? 
3. I established a set of predictors of confidence in the value domain (Folke et al., 2016); do 
these predictors influence confidence differently depending on whether it is reported 
sequentially or simultaneously? 
4. If they do, can these differences explain any observed difference in metacognitive 
accuracy? 
5. Does confidence relate to stimulus strength differently for correct and error trials when 
confidence judgments are reported simultaneously relative to when they are reported 
sequentially? If the pattern differs, it might be indicative of distinct computational 
underpinnings for the two types of confidence judgments (Navajas et al., 2017). 
6. Does eye behaviour inform choice and confidence in perceptual decision making as it does 
in value-based decision making? 
In order to answer these questions, I revisited the task from Chapter 3, where participants had to 
pick which one of two circles contained more dots, and the dot difference changed according to 
a 1-up-2-down staircase procedure. This procedure has many benefits. A perceptual two-
alternative forced choice task is the bread and butter of confidence research, so using such a 
design assures comparability with much of the existing literature. The fact that participants have 
to compare the stimulus strength of two stimuli means that they have to shift their visual 
attention between two different objects. Thus, I can test whether the relationships between eye 
behaviour and choice that I explored in the value domain work in the same way for perceptual 
discrimination. Finally, the staircase procedure keeps first order accuracy fixed between sessions 
and participants, so any observed variations in metacognition will not be contaminated by 
variation in first-order performance. The task was also slightly modified from Chapter 3, in that I 
made the presentation of the dots gaze-contingent to ensure that participants could only sample 
information from one source at the time. Additionally, participants used fixations to report their 
choices and their confidence judgments. This was done so that confidence and choice would 
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result from a single ballistic motor action for the simultaneous condition to ensure that choice 
and confidence was determined simultaneously and to minimise the motor latency between when 
the decision was made and when the response was recorded (Kiani et al., 2014). Confidence and 
choices were also reported by fixations in the sequential condition to make the conditions as 
similar as possible. For these reasons, this experimental design is well suited for answering the 
research questions and exploring the influence of the timing of confidence judgments on 
metacognition. 
5.3. Methods 
5.3.1. Experimental Procedure 
Participants completed a two-alternative forced choice visual discrimination task. They were 
instructed to determine which one of two circles on a computer screen contained more dots.  
The presentation of the dots was gaze-contingent, so that participants only saw the dots of a 
given circle when they looked inside it.  The participants could look inside either circle however 
many times they wanted for however long they wanted. Participants were instructed to respond 
as fast as they could while maintaining accuracy, but apart from this verbal instruction, response 
times were not constrained. The difference in dots was updated online in a 1-up-2-down 
staircase procedure to keep performance close to 70% correct. Participants indicated their 
confidence in their choice on a visual scale. The scale was unlabelled but colour coded with a 
transition between blue and green (see Figure 5.1.). Participants were instructed to treat the blue 
edge as “guessing” and the green edge as “certain”.  First-order and second-order performance 
in this task was incentivised according to a linear scoring rule described later in the methods. The 
experimental trials were split into two sessions that were conducted on different days. In one 
session participants gave their confidence at the same time they made their choice. In the other 
session, they gave their confidence after they had reported their choice. The order of the sessions 
was counterbalanced between participants. Participants indicated their choices and confidence 
judgments with their eyes (see Figure 5.1.). This ensured that participants could provide their 
confidence judgments and choices simultaneously with a single ballistic eye movement, in line 
with previous work (see Kiani & Shadlen, 2014).  
Each session consisted of 300 trials split into 12 blocks with 25 trials in each. The first two 
blocks in each session consisted of practice trials that were used to calibrate the staircase 
procedure that determined the difficulty of the task. Participants were informed that their 
performance on these trials would not count towards their earnings and that these trials were 
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excluded from all analyses. Participants received feedback after their choices during the first 
block in each session. During the practice blocks the experimenter monitored how the 
participants used the confidence scale, and reminded them of the instructions if they consistently 
provided confidence judgements near the extremes of the scale. For the remaining blocks 
participants received no feedback on their performance apart from seeing their cumulative total 
score between blocks.  
Performance during the main blocks was incentivised according to a linear scoring rule. Points = 
50 + correct × (confidence÷2)  (see Figure 5.1. c), where correct was a dummy coded as 1 for 
correct trials and as -1 for error trials, and confidence was scaled from 0 (guessing) to 100 
(certain). In other words, participants earned more points for being highly confident when they 
were correct and less points for being highly confident when they made errors. Participants were 
informed that every 4000 points corresponded to an extra pound in their participation payment 
(rounded to the nearest ten cents at the end of the session) and were shown their total score 
between blocks in order to maintain their motivation throughout the task. The reason why there 
was no option to report “certain errors” in the sequential condition is two-fold: first, I wanted to 
maintain the same scale for both conditions to ensure comparability, second when piloting an 
untimed version of this perceptual discrimination task I included an option to report certain 
(motor) errors and it was never used, so I judged it unlikely that excluding it would meaningfully 
impact the results. The gaze-dependent dot-discrimination tasks were programmed in 
Experiment Builder version 1.10.1640, SR-Research, Ontario. 
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Figure 5.1. Experimental Procedure         
Participants completed two sessions of a forced choice perceptual discrimination task, which 
involved picking the circle containing the most dots. The presentation of the dots was gaze-
contingent so participants only saw the dots inside the circle they were fixating on. During one 
session (a) they first made their choice by fixating on the words “left” or “right” on the top and 
bottom of the screen and then gave a confidence judgment by fixating somewhere on a visual 
scale in the middle of the screen. During the other session (b) they made their choice and 
confidence judgment simultaneously by fixating somewhere on the upper confidence scale for 
the left choice and somewhere on confidence scale below for the right choice. The size of the 
confidence scales was the same across sessions. The order of the two sessions, whether left was 
associated with up or down and whether high confidence were to the left or the right in the two 
step session were all counterbalanced between participants. Participants were instructed to 
respond as quickly as they could while still being accurate, but other than that their response 
times and interjudgment times were unconstrained. (c) The choices and confidence judgments 
were incentivised according to a linear scoring rule, so that they earned more points for high 
confidence judgments when they were correct and less points for high confidence judgments 
when they were incorrect.  
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5.3.2. Participants 
32 participants (25 female) completed this study (an additional 3 started the experiment but had 
to abort because of technical difficulties with the eye tracker). The mean age of the sample was 
26.3 years (sd = 6.6). All participants gave informed consent prior to participating. They were 
paid a £10 show-up fee for each session they attended and could earn up to £10 more based on 
their performance. Actual payments ranged between: £26.60 and £28.50. 
5.3.3. Eye Tracking 
Eye movements were recorded at 1000Hz with an EyeLink 1000 Plus eye tracker (SR-Research, 
Ontario).  Participants sat approximately 60 cm away from a 68.58 by 59.77 cm computer screen. 
A headrest kept their heads immobile during the blocks to maximise the accuracy of the eye 
tracker. Participants were told to report if their confidence judgments did not land where 
intended, in which case the eye tracker was recalibrated. Areas of interest (AIs) were predefined by 
the 2 squares with the same length as the circumference of the stimulus circles containing the 
dots (400 x 400 pixels). I derived two variables from the eye tracking data: the total dwell time in 
each AI for a given trial, and gaze shift frequency (GSF). GSF measured the number of times 
participants shifted immediately between the AIs (saccades that started in one AI and ended in 
the other AI). Saccades within the same AI and to other parts of the screen were ignored. 
5.3.4. Hierarchical Models 
Note that all predictors entered into the hierarchical models are z-scored on the participant level, 
and that response time was log-transformed prior to being z-scored to make RT distributions 
approximately normal.  
4.3.5. Drift Diffusion Models 
I fitted three hierarchical drift diffusion models (DDM) to the combined data from both sessions 
to evaluate whether fixation time influenced evidence accumulation in an additive or interactive 
fashion (see Chapter 2 for details on the software and fitting procedure). The three models are 
similar to the models reported in Chapter 4 with the difference that they predicted picking the 
circle with most dots rather than the highest valued snack item and that they used the number of 
dots in each circle rather than the BDM value of the options as a measure of stimulus strength. 
The interactive model had not converged after 2000 samples (Gelman-Rubin>1.1), so I reran the 
analysis with 4000 samples per chain and a burn-in of 200. The longer chains showed good 
mixing, indicating convergence (Gelman-Rubin=1.02). 
120 
 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. First Order Choices 
Before evaluating whether metacognitive accuracy changed as a function of the timing of the 
confidence judgments, I wanted to compare whether the first order performance differed 
between the sessions. As Table 5.1. indicates, accuracy, stimulus strength (dot difference), 
response times and total dwell time all seem to be similar across experiments. These similarities 
are illustrated by the Bayes Factors which suggest weak evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
these quantities are being drawn from the same distribution in both sessions. 
Table 5.1. First-order response comparisons (DF=31) 
 
  Simultaneous Sequential t p BF 
Accuracy (%) 72.1 (1.1) 72.2 (1.5) 0.55 0.59 4.6 in favour of H0 
Dot Difference (dots) 3.36 (0.90) 3.54 (0.86) 1.61 0.11 1.7 in favour of H0 
RT (ms) 4283 (1969) 4065 (1470) 1.01 0.32 3.3 in favour of H0 
Total Dwell Time (ms) 2987 (1669) 2964(1216) 0.13 0.90 5.3 in favour of H0 
GSF 3.59 (1.51) 3.80 (1.13) 1.29 0.21 2.5 In favour of H0 
 
While exploring the first order responses I found a response bias favouring the right option over 
the left option. For example, in a hierarchical logistic model predicting correct responses from 
stimulus strength, response timing condition, and an interaction term between the two, the 
intercept was shifted to favour the right option (z=2.76, p<.01) and this effect was stronger for 
the sequential trials than the simultaneous trials (z=3.80, p<.001). I have not been able to find 
the cause of this response bias, but it should balance out as the position of the correct options 
was randomised (left was the correct option 49% of the time for both response timings). 
However, to ensure that this spatial bias does not unduly influence my findings, I will control for 
it algebraically by including it in all regression models that predict first-order accuracy or 
confidence. 
I also wanted to test whether dwell times influenced choices additively, as they did for value (see 
Chapter 4). As for Chapter 4, I compared three DDM models: a null model that predicted drift 
rate from dot difference, an additive model that predicted drift rate from the additive effect 
between dot difference and dwell time ratios, and an interactive model that weighted the dots in 
each circle by how long that circle was fixated. In line with previous research, the additive model 
outperformed the other two models (DIC0=79566, DICa=78937, DICi=79169). The winning 
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additive model showed that the influences of dot difference and difference in dwell ratio on 
choice were both positive (coefficientdot difference=0.07(0.003), coefficientdwell ratio=0.81(0.03)). 
5.4.2. Three-way Interaction Between Confidence, Stimulus Strength and Accuracy does not 
Depend on Timing of Confidence Judgments 
 
Figure 5.2. The Relationship Between Confidence and Stimulus Strength for 
Simultaneous and Sequential Responses.            
Stimulus strength corresponds to dot difference, quartile binned on the participant level. The 
smallest dot difference is furthest to the to the left, the greatest dot difference is furthest to the 
right. Confidence was z-scored at the participant level. Confidence was typically higher for the 
sequential confidence judgements relative to the simultaneous confidence judgements. For both 
the sequential and simultaneous confidence judgements confidence increased with stimulus 
strength for the correct trials and decreased with stimulus strength for error trials. 
In order to explore how confidence related to stimulus strength for correct and error trials, I ran 
two hierarchical linear regression models with participantwise variation in intercepts and fixed 
slopes, one model focusing on error trials and one model focusing on correct trials. During the 
correct trials sequential confidence judgments were in general higher than simultaneous 
confidence judgments (t=5.35 p<10-7; see Figure 5.2), stimulus strength was associated with 
more confident responses for both conditions (t=5.85 p<10-8) but this effect was stronger for 
the sequential confidence judgments (t=3.05 p<.01). During the error trials, there was no 
difference in confidence between the conditions when the role of stimulus strength was 
controlled for (t=0.46, p=.65), stimulus strength negatively predicted confidence (t=-3.36, 
p<.001) to the same extent for simultaneous and sequential trials (t=0.59, p=.56). Additionally, 
the spatial bias in choice persisted in confidence in that participants were less confident when the 
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left option was chosen when the dot difference of the trial was controlled for both for error trials 
(t=-4.26, p>10-4) and correct trials (t=-8.49, p>10-10). 
5.4.3. Metacognitive Efficiency is Higher for Sequentially Reported Confidence than 
Simultaneously Reported Confidence 
 
Figure 5.3. Sequential Confidence Responses are Associated with Higher Metacognitive 
Efficiency             
(a) The joint posterior distribution of the mean Mratio for the sequential trials (Y) and the 
Simultaneous trials (X). ρ in the upper right corner reports the mean and the 95% HDI for 
spearman’s rho between the parameters. There does not appear to be a strong correlation 
between metacognitive performance in the sequential and simultaneous versions of the dot 
discrimination task. (b) The mean Mratio difference between sequential confidence ratings and 
simultaneous ratings as estimated by the hierarchical Bayesian model. The Mratios are higher for 
the sequential confidence judgements than the simultaneous confidence judgments. 
To estimate metacognitive efficiency I used the Mratio, a ratio of metacognitive sensitivity, 
captured by meta-d’, and first-order sensitivity, captured by d’. I used a hierarchical Bayesian 
estimation method discussed in Chapter 2 to fit the Mratios (Fleming, 2017). The confidence 
data were binned into participantwise tertiles prior to the Mratio estimation. I fitted both 
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conditions simultaneously by estimating the mean Mratio for each condition from a bivariate 
distribution (Figure 5.3. a). I did this to account for the paired nature of the estimate, as each 
participant would have an estimate of metacognitive efficiency from each of the timing 
conditions. Two results are noteworthy: first, the posteriors for the sequential and the 
simultaneous confidence responses are hardly correlated (ρ=.08, HDI=(-.89, 91)), but note that 
this might just reflect the extreme uncertainty around this estimate. Second, the posterior mean 
Mratio for the sequential confidence judgments was much higher than for the simultaneous 
confidence judgments. I subtracted the posterior mean of the sequential confidence judgments 
with the posterior mean from the simultaneous confidence judgments to quantify this difference. 
99.56% of the probability mass was greater than 0 (posterior odds =228 :1; Figure 5.3. b), 
providing strong evidence that sequentially reported confidence resulted in higher metacognitive 
efficiency than simultaneously reported confidence. Note that this difference cannot be 
explained by differences in the distribution of confidence responses between the sessions. Mean 
confidence judgments were slightly (but not significantly) higher for the sequential sessions 
compared to the simultaneous sessions (mean difference = 3.97 points on a 100-point scale, 
t(31)=1.84, p=.08, BF=1.2 in favour of H0). The participantwise standard deviations were similar 
across sessions (mean difference = 0.12 points on a 100-point scale, t(31)=0.13, p=.90, BF=5.3 
in favour of H0). Mean confidence judgments were highly correlated across the 
conditions(r=.80, t(30)=7.39, p<10-7), as were the standard deviations (r=.64, t(30)=4.52, p<10-
4). Appendix 2 shows the confidence distributions for each participant. 
5.4.4. Can Differences in Processing Time Account for Differences in Metacognitive 
Efficiency? 
The previous section established that the marked difference in metacognitive efficiency between 
sequential and simultaneous confidence judgments could not be explained by any obvious 
differences in the distribution of confidence judgments. Next, I wanted to test whether the 
difference in metacognitive efficiency could be explained by differences in processing time. 
While the simultaneous and sequential trials had similar response times (see Table 5.1.), the 
sequential trials had additional interjudgment time (IJT) between the choice and the confidence 
judgment, so the total response times (RT + IJT) were longer for the sequential sessions (mean 
difference = 705 ms, t(31)=3.19, p=.003, BF=11.6 in favour of H1). While variations in IJT were 
unrelated to variations in confidence, difficulty, or first-order or second-order accuracy (see 
Appendix 3) it is still possible that the extra processing time they afforded caused the observed 
increase in second-order performance. 
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If the within-participant difference in metacognitive accuracy between the sequential and 
simultaneous trials could be explained by additional processing time, the participants who 
showed an improvement in metacognitive efficiency between sessions should also have slower 
total response times in the sequential session relative to the simultaneous session. To test this 
hypothesis I ran a correlation comparing the difference in Mratios between the sequential session 
and the simultaneous session with the difference of mean total response times between the 
sessions (see Figure 5.4. c). I found that there was no relationship between metacognitive gains 
for the sequential session and increases in total response time (r=-.01, t(30)=-0.08 p=.94, BF=3 
favouring the null). 
Though variations in interjudgment times were independent of metacognitive efficiency for the 
sequential sessions and the increases in total RT did not predict increases in metacognitive gains, 
I have not ruled out that the observed difference in metacognitive efficiency is due to additional 
processing time. Shadlen and colleagues have shown the last ~400 ms of evidence is not utilised 
in the initial choice because of the lag between the internal commitment to a decision and motor 
onset, but that this information  may drive subsequent changes of mind and confidence if 
participants have enough time to alter their motor response (Resulaj et al., 2009; Van Den Berg 
et al., 2016).  It is therefore possible that metacognitive efficiency is higher for the sequential 
confidence judgments because they benefit from these 400 ms of extra evidence integration, 
while all the variation in IJT is due to variation in the motor response times rather than 
processing times. According to this hypothesis the sequential confidence judgments benefit from 
additional processing time that is constant across trials and is therefore not captured by IJT. In 
order to control for this possibility I wrote a sorting algorithm that matched simultaneous trials 
and sequential trials on total response time. For each participant, the algorithm cycled through 
the simultaneous trials in random order, trying to find a sequential trial with matching total RT. 
For each simultaneous trial, the algorithm listed the sequential trials that had a total RT (RT + 
IJT) +- 20% of the standard deviation of simultaneous response times for that participant. If 
there were several possible matches the algorithm selected the sequential trial with the smallest 
absolute total RT difference to the simultaneous trial. If a match was found, the matching trials 
were stored in a separate data frame, and the sequential trial was removed from the prospect 
pool to prevent the same sequential trial from being matched with multiple simultaneous trials. 
Trials without any matches were discarded. The matched subset consisted of 7434 trials, 48% of 
the total sample. Each participant had an average of 116 matched trials from each session (range: 
29-139). Following the matching algorithm there were no significant differences in mean trial 
length between the sequential sessions and the simultaneous sessions (mean difference = 0.5 ms, 
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t(31)=-0.72, p=.48, BF=4.2 in favour of H0; see Figure 5.4. a). The conditions did not differ in 
terms of average dot difference for the matched trials (mean difference= 0.2 dots, t(31)=-1.45, 
p=.15, BF=2 in favour of H0), but the sequential sessions were associated with slightly higher 
accuracy (mean difference=3%, t(31)=2.15, p=.04, BF=1.5 in favour of H1). 
Second-order accuracy was somewhat higher for the sequential session than the simultaneous 
session for the matched trials as 78.85% of the probability mass was greater than 0 (posterior 
odds =4:1; Figure 5.4. b). This difference is too weak to support the conclusion that Mratios are 
reliably higher for the sequential session when total RTs are matched. 
 
Figure 5.4. Second-order Accuracy as a Function of Total Response Time    
(a) Difference in mean total response times between the sequential session and the simultaneous 
session for the full dataset and for a subset of trials selected to match in total response time. (b) 
The difference in Mratios between the sequential and simultaneous sessions for the subset of 
trials with matched response times. The sequential session is weakly but not reliably associated 
with higher metacognitive accuracy for the response time matched subset. (c) Correlation 
between difference in Mratios between the sessions and difference in mean total response time. 
126 
 
Differences in response time between the sequential and simultaneous sessions are not 
associated with changes in metacognitive efficiency. 
5.4.5. Sequentially and Simultaneously Reported Confidence Cause Differences in 
Sensitivity to the Variables Predicting First-order Accuracy and Confidence  
In the previous chapter I reviewed a set of variables that predicted confidence judgments and 
choices in the value domain. Here I tested whether the timing of the confidence responses 
influence how sensitive first-order accuracy and confidence judgments are to these predictors 
and whether any such differences can explain the observed difference in metacognitive 
efficiency. I will begin by exploring what variables predicted first-order accuracy. 
A hierarchical logistic regression model with random slopes for the main effects but fixed effects 
for the interaction terms showed that stimulus strength positively predicted first-order accuracy 
(z=16.33, p<10-10; see Figure 5.5. a) and that there was no difference in the strength of this 
relationship across conditions (z=-0.91, p=.36). Participants showed a spatial bias favouring the 
right option (z=3.49, p<10-4) and this bias was stronger in the sequential trials than the 
simultaneous trials (z=-3.17, p=.002). Response times negatively predicted accuracy (z=-2.66, 
p=.007), and this effect did not differ significantly between sessions (z=-1.50, p=.13). With 
regards to the eye tracking variables, difference in dwell time between the correct and incorrect 
items predicted accuracy (z=6.82, p<10-10) and this effect was stronger for the sequential sessions 
than the simultaneous sessions (z=3.23, p=.001; See Figure 5.5. b). Gaze shift frequency 
negatively predicted accuracy (z=-3.45, p<10-4), in line with the idea that it is a low level signal of 
uncertainty (Folke et al., 2016). The strength of this effect did not differ significantly between 
groups but was slightly stronger for the simultaneous condition than the sequential condition 
(z=1.75, p=.08).  Also, when all the other variables were accounted for, the intercept was still 
marginally higher for the sequential session (z=2.19, p=.03). Together these results show that the 
same variables that predicted choices in value-based decisions also influence choice in perceptual 
discrimination tasks. Additionally, most variables predicted accuracy to the same extent both for 
sequential and simultaneous trials; one noteworthy exception is difference in dwell time, which 
was a stronger predictor of choice for the sequential trials than the simultaneous trials. 
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Figure 5.5.  Predictors of First-order Accuracy and Confidence                 
(a) Coefficient plot for a hierarchical logistic regression predicting the probability of picking the 
correct option. DDT was the only predictor that significantly differed between the sequential 
and simultaneous conditions (highlighted in orange). (b) Logistic regression predicting the 
probability of choosing the correct option as a function of DDT (z-scored on the participant 
level). DDT was a stronger predictor of accuracy for the sequential trials relative to the 
simultaneous trials. (c) Coefficient plot for a hierarchical linear regression predicting confidence. 
Response time was the only predictor that significantly differed between the sequential and 
simultaneous conditions (highlighted in orange). (d) Linear regression predicting how response 
times relate to confidence (both variables z-scored on the participant level). Response time 
negatively predicted confidence to a greater extent in the sequential trials relative to the 
simultaneous trials.  (RT= response time (log-transformed); DDT = difference in dwell time, 
GSF = gaze shift frequency). Error bars show 95% CIs. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < 
.05 
A hierarchical linear regression model with random intercepts but fixed slopes showed that 
participants were more confident for trials with larger dot differences (t=3.56, p<.001; see Figure 
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5.5. c) and that there was no difference in the strength of this relationship across conditions 
(t=1.46, p=.14). As for accuracy, there was a spatial bias favouring the right option (t=4.53, 
p<10-5) but the strength of this confidence bias did not differ between the sessions (t=-0.61, 
p=.54). Faster response times predicted higher confidence (t=-4.60, p<10-5), and this effect was 
stronger for the sequential confidence judgments (t=-6.45, p<10-9; Figure 5.5. d). With regards to 
the eye tracking variables, difference in dwell time between the correct and incorrect items did 
not predict confidence judgments (t=1.68, p=.09), and there was no reliable difference in this 
effect between sessions (t=0.02, p=.98). Gaze shift frequency was by far the strongest predictor 
of confidence (t=-18.37, p<10-10), and the strength of this relationship was independent of the 
timing of the confidence judgments (t=1.68, p=.09). Additionally, sequential confidence 
judgments were associated with higher confidence when all other effects were accounted for 
(t=7.86, p<10-10). This difference was probably driven by greater confidence in correct trials (see 
Figure 5.2.). There are two main takeaways from this section: GSF was a strong predictor of 
confidence even when stimulus strength and RT was controlled for, suggesting that the 
relationship between GSF and confidence that I first discovered in value based choice seems to 
hold for perceptual decision making as well. Additionally, RT was the only variable predicting 
confidence that was reliably moderated by the timing of the confidence judgments. One possible 
reason for this difference between conditions is that RT was a cleanly and directly related to 
choice in the sequential version of the task whereas in the simultaneous reporting condition RT 
became a noisier measure of choice quality because it was contaminated by aspects of the 
confidence judgement (for example, previous work suggests that higher confidence judgements 
are associated with faster confidence RT, see Moran et al., 2015). There are two reasons to be 
sceptical of this account. First, if RT was a noisier measure of choice in the simultaneous trials 
because it was contaminated by the confidence judgement we would expect RT in the 
simultaneous condition to be more weakly associated with choice accuracy relative to the 
sequential condition, whereas RT appears to be equally diagnostic of choice accuracy in both 
conditions (Figure 5.5. a). Second, in the sequential condition IJT (Confidence RT) is not 
associated with reported confidence, choice accuracy or evidence strength. Therefore it is hard to 
see how confidence RT could systematically bias choice RT in the simultaneous trials as 
confidence RT does not seem to systematically track anything in this particular task. 
Given that the sensitivity of confidence judgments to RT differed between sequential and 
simultaneous trials, I wanted to test whether this difference was categorical or gradual. That is, 
did the influence of RT increase monotonically with processing time after the choice, or was 
there a distinct cut-off between simultaneously and sequentially reported confidence judgments? 
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To compare these theories I tested whether RT interacted with IJT for the sequential trials, my 
reasoning being that if there was a gradual benefit of additional processing time on RT 
integration, higher interjudgment times would increase the sensitivity of confidence to RT. A 
hierarchical linear regression model with random intercepts and slopes failed to find evidence for 
such an interaction (t=1.52, p=.14; See Figure 5.6. a). 
5.4.6. Differential Sensitivity to Response Times Explains Differences in Metacognitive 
Efficiency  
Finally, I wanted to investigate whether the differential sensitivity of confidence to RT between 
the sequential and simultaneous trials could explain the difference in metacognitive sensitivity. 
Given that response times negatively predicted accuracy for both the sequential and 
simultaneous sessions and had a stronger influence on confidence during the simultaneous 
session, it is possible that the difference in metacognitive accuracy between the sessions can be 
explained by differences in how sensitive the confidence reports are to RT. To test this 
hypothesis I ran a hierarchical moderated mediation analysis where I predicted confidence from 
accuracy with RT as a mediator and dot difference and an interaction between dot difference and 
accuracy as covariates. I allowed intercepts and the slopes of accuracy on RT and confidence to 
vary between participants. Accuracy was a stronger predictor of confidence for the sequential 
trials than for the simultaneous trials, in line with the Mratio analyses (see Figure 5.3. b). 
Additionally, the RT mediation was stronger for the sequential trials than the simultaneous trials 
(coefficient = -0.07, p<10-10) and the direct effect of accuracy on confidence did not differ 
between the sequential and simultaneous trials when the RT mediation was controlled for 
(coefficient=-0.003, p=.92). In other words, it appears as if the observed difference in second-
order accuracy between the simultaneous and sequential confidence judgments can be explained 
by the fact that confidence is more sensitive to response time in the sequential case (see Figure 
5.6. b).    
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Figure 5.6.  The Relationship between RT and Confidence 
(a) Interjudgement time was split into participantwise tertiles; the relationship between z-scored 
confidence and z-scored log-transformed response times are displayed for each bin. 
Interjudgment times do not mediate the influence of response time on confidence for the 
sequential trials.  (b) Coefficient plot for a mediation analysis predicting confidence based on 
accuracy, with response condition (sequential or simultaneous) as a moderator, response time as 
a mediator and dot difference and an accuracy-dot difference interaction as covariates. The effect 
of accuracy on confidence (the direct effect) is the same across conditions when the mediation of 
response time is controlled for. In other words, the difference in metacognitive accuracy between 
the response conditions appears to be fully explained by the difference in confidence sensitivity 
to response time. 
5.5. Discussion 
This experiment compared sequentially and simultaneously reported confidence judgments in a 
perceptual discrimination task. First order performance was similar across the experiments with 
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the exception that the time spent looking at the options influenced choice more in the sequential 
sessions. Despite similar first-order performance in terms of difficulty, accuracy and response 
times across the sessions, sequential confidence judgments were associated with higher 
metacognitive performance than simultaneous confidence judgments. These results align well 
with results from previous studies on the timing of confidence judgments which used between 
participant designs (Aitchison et al., 2015; Siedlecka et al., 2016). Importantly, this difference 
could not be explained by differences in the confidence distributions between the sessions. In 
fact the means and standard deviations of the confidence ratings correlated highly between the 
sessions, in line with previous work on the stability of confidence distributions over time (Ais et 
al., 2016). However, in contrast to Ais and colleagues, my measure of metacognitive performance 
did not correlate strongly between the sessions, despite the constant task structure. This may 
imply that simultaneous and sequential confidence judgments depend on different abilities that 
are only weakly correlated, but it might also be that the current dataset was too small to reliably 
estimate the correlation coefficient for a multivariate normal posterior, as is suggested by the 
very wide confidence intervals for the correlation estimate. 
There is an ongoing controversy in confidence regarding whether confidence and choices 
depend on a single evidence stream (see Fleming & Daw, 2017 for a review). Proponents of the 
single stream account would argue that the difference in metacognitive efficiency between 
simultaneously and sequentially reported confidence can be fully explained by sequential 
confidence judgments benefitting from additional processing time (Kiani et al., 2014; Van Den 
Berg et al., 2016). I evaluated this hypothesis in three different ways. First, I reasoned that if 
additional processing time leads to better confidence judgments, longer interjudgment times 
should be associated with better metacognitive performance for the sequential confidence 
judgments. In fact, longer interjudgement times have been reliably linked to better confidence 
discrimination within participants in a series of experiments on perceptual and knowledge-based 
decision making by Yu, Pleskac and Zeigenfuse (2015). However, I failed to find any evidence of 
this either within or between participants (see Figure 5.3, Figure 5.5 and Appendix 3). The 
reason for the discrepancy between my findings and those reported by Yu and colleagues is 
probably that the first-order judgements in their experiments were under speed stress, whereas 
this study had unconstrained response times. Work by Baranski and Petrusic (1998) suggests 
participants simultaneously process choices and confidence judgements when choice response 
times are unlimited, but compute confidence post-choice when response times are constrained. 
Second, if additional processing time drove the increase in metacognitive efficiency the 
participants with the greatest increase in total response time between the sequential and 
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simultaneous session should also see the greatest increases in metacognitive efficiency. There was 
no evidence of such a relationship. However, both of these tests assume that there is a 
monotonic relationship between metacognitive efficiency and response time. The Shadlen lab 
has presented evidence that the last ~400 ms of information presented before motor onset does 
feed into the initial choice (because the latency between an internal commitment to a decision 
and motor onset) but that this information may inform subsequent confidence judgements or 
changes of mind (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Van Den Berg et al., 2016). This means that 
confidence judgements in the sequential trials automatically benefit from ~400 ms worth of extra 
evidence integration. The fact that IJTs were not diagnostic of metacognitive accuracy does not 
count as evidence against this account as this evidence was integrated in the last 400 ms of the 
choice trial, so it is conceivable that variations in IJTs are mostly driven by motor-noise rather 
than additional processing. In order to control for this possibility I wrote a sorting algorithm that 
matched simultaneous trials with sequential trials of a similar length from the same participant. 
Note that this method slightly disfavours the sequential trials as 99% of IJTs were longer than 
400 ms. First-order accuracy was higher for the sequential session than the simultaneous session 
for this subset of the data, but this is controlled for mathematically in the Mratio estimation. 
Crucially the difference in difficulty between the sessions was small and not statistically 
significant. Though the Mratio hyperparameter was still higher for sequential trials than the 
simultaneous trials for the matched subset of the data, this difference was not reliable enough to 
draw a strong conclusion. Larger sample sizes could resolve this uncertainty; a follow-up study 
that does not require an eye tracker but where responses could be recorded by a button press 
would allow for much larger samples through sites like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
I found that DDT influenced choices in an additive fashion and that GSF influenced confidence, 
replicating the role of visual attention in evidence accumulation that I first discovered in the 
value domain in perceptual domain. A high GSF was associated both with lower-first order 
performance and with lower confidence when the other variables were accounted for, supporting 
the idea that GSF might be a low level marker of uncertainty during evidence accumulation. 
Difference in dwell time, on the other hand, strongly predicted first-order accuracy but did not 
predict confidence. This is the result of how these models were coded; because difference in 
dwell time was designed to predict the correctness of a response, it was constructed as the 
difference in dwell time between the correct option and the incorrect option, capturing the 
additive effect of visual attention on evidence accumulation (Cavanagh et al., 2014). However, 
the participant was not aware if they had focused more on the correct option or not, so they 
could not use that gaze behaviour as a marker of confidence. It might seem confusing that the 
133 
 
choice model was written to predict accurate choices in this chapter but captured the probability 
of picking an item in a specific reference position in the previous chapter. I chose the accuracy-
based format here because it allows for a comparison of the relative predictive power of a 
variable for accuracy and confidence; this option was not available for the value-based 
experiments where no option can be said to be objectively correct. 
Previous work has compared simultaneous and sequential confidence judgments in the same task 
(e.g. Aitchison et al., 2015; Siedlecka et al., 2016), but to the best of my knowledge this is the first 
within-participant comparison. Making a within-participant comparison allowed me to rule out 
individual differences as the cause of the observed difference in metacognitive performance 
between the sessions (Ais et al., 2016; Navajas et al., 2017). One example of potentially 
conflating effects from response timing and effects due to individual differences come from 
Kiani, Corthell and Shadlen (2014). They reported that simultaneous confidence responses 
became more positive the stronger the stimulus strength of the trial, independent of the accuracy 
of the first order response, in contrast to most studies that find that stimulus strength influence 
confidence differently as a function of the accuracy of the trial (Kepecs et al., 2008; Lak et al., 
2014; Sanders et al., 2016). Navajas et al. (2017) provided a novel interpretation of these findings 
as they showed that computations corresponding to the probability to correct captured the well-
established dissociation between error trials whereas computations capturing uncertainty in the 
evidence stream (the precision of the posterior belief) scaled positively with stimulus strength 
independent of first order accuracy. However, Navajas and colleagues also recorded individual 
differences in whether confidence judgments reflected probability correct or whether they 
reflected posterior precision. Additionally, the sample in the Kiani study consisted of 6 people. 
Thus there are two possible explanation of the Kiani effect: they had discovered evidence of 
distinct computations for sequential and simultaneous confidence judgments, or they happened 
to test participants who conceptualised confidence more as precision than the probability of 
being correct and misattributed this individual difference to their experimental design. Here I 
directly compared sequential and simultaneous confidence judgments from the same 
participants, and I have found no evidence that confidence scales positively with stimulus 
strength for error trials for either sequentially and simultaneously reported confidence, adding 
some plausibility to the individual differences account.  
 The within-participant design also allowed me to run a mediation analysis to test if the 
differential sensitivity to response time between sequential and simultaneous confidence 
judgments could explain the difference in metacognitive accuracy. I found that RT completely 
mediated the difference in the relationship between accuracy and confidence for the different 
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confidence timings. In other words, the difference in confidence between correct and incorrect 
trials was the same within people across conditions when the mediating effect of RT was 
controlled for. The sensitivity of confidence to response time differed between the sequential 
and simultaneous sessions, but did not vary between the sequential sessions as a function of 
interjudgment time, suggesting that there is a discrete step between simultaneous and sequential 
confidence judgments rather than a continuous shift based on increase processing time. These 
observations suggest that a discrete manipulation can lead to a graded effect (i.e. RT matters for 
confidence for both simultaneous and sequential responses, the effect is just stronger for the 
sequential ones). Interestingly this is not the first time this mix between a discrete manipulation 
and a graded effect has been reported in relation to confidence timings. Aitchinson and 
colleagues (2015) had a similar finding when they explored the computational underpinnings of 
confidence judgments. They tested which of three different computational substrates best 
captured the confidence judgments: the difference in stimulus strength between the chosen and 
unchosen option (the difference model), the stimulus strength of the chosen option only (the 
max model) or the probability of being correct as a function of the choice and the evidence for 
each option (the Bayesian model). They found that the Bayesian model fit the data best for 
sequential confidence judgments, but that a mix between the Bayesian model and the max model 
fitted the simultaneous response data best. In other words, in line with the current findings, their 
results indicate that the sequentially reported confidence judgments had a greater second-order 
accuracy than the simultaneously reported confidence judgments. Their findings may also be 
complementary with the current results. Kiani, Corthell and Shalden (2014) have argued that 
response time provides independent evidence of the probability that a choice is correct. 
Therefore, by combining my findings with the results of Aitchinson et al., one might speculate 
that sequential confidence, for most people, is an estimate of probability correct, and as such is 
partly dependent on response time. Simultaneous confidence judgments do not reflect 
probability correct, perhaps because the agent cannot compute the probability of being correct 
while the choice is being made. Instead simultaneous confidence judgments estimate p(correct) 
from a mixture of a partially completed Bayesian estimate and heuristic information. Because the 
sequential confidence report is completely based on a Bayesian computation, it is more accurate, 
and it also correlates more strongly to response time. Response time could easily be integrated 
into the Bayes-optimal computation of confidence because response time is a function of the 
area under the ramping curve in the decision phase. As such, a representation of response time 
can be captured from the same neurons that encode the evidence strength of the various 
options, provided that the decision threshold is fixed (Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2012). 
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Readers might wonder about the discrepancy between my work and Aitchinson’s work in that 
confidence for the sequential session in Atchinson’s model was based on a mixture between a 
model computing confidence from the evidence for the chosen option and a Bayesian model, 
whereas I computed stimulus strength as a difference. Indeed, other work has also suggested that 
the evidence for the unchosen option is irrelevant for confidence judgments (Maniscalco, Peters, 
& Lau, 2016; Zylberberg et al., 2012). In the case of Aitchinson’s work the contrast between 
their findings and mine are mostly illusory, because simultaneous confidence in the Aitchinson 
study appeared to be a mixture of the max model and the Bayesian model, where the Bayesian 
model captures the influence of both negative and positive evidence. In fact, my results fit these 
findings well in that positive evidence predicted confidence more strongly than negative evidence 
in the current data, but the increased model fit relative to a difference model is not sufficient to 
justify the additional model complexity of adding an additional variable (see Appendix 4). 
Another difference between this work and experiments that have found that confidence is 
derived from positive evidence only is how the stimuli are presented. The experiments that only 
find an effect of positive evidence on confidence have presented the response options 
sequentially and under time constraints, as opposed to the free-viewing in the current 
experiment. This suggests that confidence judgments might rely more strongly on positive 
evidence in situations where memory-decay is a problem and response time is limited. In support 
of this theory, the second experiment reported by Zylberberg and colleagues (2012), which 
presents both options simultaneously and allows for free-viewing, shows a relationship between 
confidence and negative evidence, in line with my findings.  
This study has extended previous work by showing that metacognitive accuracy is higher for 
sequentially reported confidence than simultaneously reported confidence within the same 
participants and that this finding can be explained by the additional influence of response time 
on the confidence judgments. This suggests that simultaneously and sequentially reported 
confidence differs, even within the same task. I explored whether this effect could be explained 
by differences in processing time, and while I could not rule out such an explanation, the 
evidence suggests that variations in additional total response time did not correspond to changes 
in metacognitive performance. I also replicated the role of eye behaviours in confidence and 
choice that I introduced in the previous chapter. These results suggest that the dynamics of 
visual attention play a similar role in perceptual and value-based decision making. 
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6. General Discussion 
6.1. Summary 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the main findings from the empirical chapters, 
followed by a discussion of their implications. With regard to the consequences of confidence, 
results from the value chapter imply that explicit confidence judgments serve a function to tag 
poor choices, which in turn enables agents to explore different options when they encounter a 
similar choice set in the future. This is contrasted from previous work on changes of mind that 
has studied changes occurring before a single trial is completed and as such might have more in 
common with error correction in perceptual decision making than confidence judgments and 
error monitoring. Ways to extend the current findings, by applying tasks that allow both for the 
objective evaluation of accuracy and for distinct choice sets that are recognisable by the 
participant, are discussed. The causes of confidence discuss two novel predictors of confidence, 
the summed value of the options presented in value-based choice and the amount of time the 
various options are fixated. This PhD suggests that eye behaviours relate to choice and 
confidence the same way in the perceptual domain and the value domain, suggesting that the 
dynamics of visual attention might have domain-general influences on decision making. Finally, 
the computational underpinnings of confidence are discussed in relation to the differences in 
metacognitive performance discovered between bilinguals and monolinguals, and between 
confidence judgments conducted simultaneously with or after choice.  
6.2. Overview of Findings 
The empirical chapters in this thesis have focused on three questions: (1) what factors influence 
confidence judgments, (2) how are confidence judgments computed, and (3) how do confidence 
judgments influence subsequent behaviours? The two experiments reported in Chapter 3 showed 
a previously unknown link between metacognitive accuracy and a trait: bilingualism. Specifically, 
the monolingual participants showed greater metacognitive accuracy than the bilingual 
participants in a visual discrimination task that controlled for first-order performance (and first-
order response times in Experiment 2).  The monolingual advantage in metacognitive accuracy 
was not caused by monolingual confidence judgments being more sensitive to response time or 
difficulty, nor could it be explained by a non-linear combination of the two.  This opens up for 
the possibility that there are predictors of choice accuracy that inform confidence that have not 
yet been considered. 
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Experiments 3, 4 and 5 reported in Chapter 4 showed a potential candidate for such a novel 
predictor: Gaze shift frequency (GSF) – the number of times that participants shifted their visual 
attention between the available options – predicted between-trial fluctuations in confidence 
above and beyond choice difficulty and response time for both perceptual discriminations 
(Experiment 6) and value-based choices (Experiments 3 and 4). Additionally, GSF correlated 
with accuracy when response time and difficulty was controlled for (Experiment 6). Experiments 
3 and 4 also showed that the summed value of the options positively predicted confidence whilst 
at the same time making participants less likely to pick the highest value option. This dissociation 
between confidence and performance will be further discussed in subsequent sections. Whereas 
Experiments 1 and 2 found a novel predictor of individual differences in metacognitive ability, 
Experiment 6 presented in Chapter 5 showed that changes in the timing of the confidence 
judgments relative to the choice alter participants’ metacognitive sensitivity. Specifically, 
confidence judgments that followed first-order decisions were more strongly influenced by 
response time than confidence judgments that were made simultaneously with the choice. 
Response times were equally associated with accuracy for the sequential and simultaneous 
confidence judgments, hence sequential confidence judgments were more accurate than 
simultaneous confidence judgments because they captured the information in response time 
more effectively. 
With regard to the consequences of confidence, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that confidence 
predicted changes of mind when the same choice was presented in subsequent trials. This 
extends the argument that confidence may serve as an error detection mechanism (Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012, 2014) in the value domain when internal consistency of preferences serve as 
a proxy for accuracy. It also shows that confidence judgments may influence subsequent 
behaviours on a greater time scale than has been previously studied. Next I will explore this 
argument in a bit more detail. 
6.3. The Consequences of Confidence 
Much has been written about the function of confidence. On a neurological level it has been 
argued that representing the uncertainty of different information streams allows the brain to 
weight them based on their reliability, which results in better internal models (Beck et al., 2008; 
Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006). This basic idea can be extended to the level of explicit 
confidence of an agent, in that confidence judgments may enable an individual to weight 
information sources based on their reliability, in order to make more accurate decisions. 
Alternatively, confidence might help an individual determine when they should search for more 
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information prior to making a decision (Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). 
Explicit confidence representations may also support learning by enabling the agent to focus on 
the cues that are most predictive of the outcome (Meyniel & Dehaene, 2017). Furthermore, 
confidence may serve as a prediction error signal, enabling unsupervised learning in contexts 
where feedback is absent (Guggenmos et al., 2016). The ability to weight information sources 
may provide further benefits when we consider groups of individuals, as explicit confidence 
judgments could improve group decision making as the group assigns more weight to the 
accounts of the most confident members (Shea et al., 2014). However, this benefit may be 
mediated by the extent to which the group members have shared terminology for expressing 
their confidence estimates (Fusaroli et al., 2012).  
One central function of confidence is allowing agents to change their minds. This aspect of 
confidence was first studied in the perceptual decision making literature in the context of error 
correction (Rabbitt, 1966) and was considered a separate area of enquiry until recently (Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012, 2014). In perceptual decision making tasks it is common to distinguish 
between fast errors and slow errors (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Rabbitt, Cumming, & Vyas, 
1978; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). Fast errors tend to occur under speed stress and may be resolved 
by motor-adjustment within the same trial. This form of online motor adjustment is called error 
correction in the perceptual decision making literature and does not seem to require conscious 
awareness (Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001). In instances were fast errors 
are not corrected before an action is completed, it is often obvious to the agent that an error has 
been committed, perhaps because fast errors are the result of motor-interference rather than 
noisy evidence integration (Rabbitt et al., 1978; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). Slow errors, on the 
other hand, are not dependent on speed stress and are the result of noise in the stimulus or the 
decision making process. Slow errors can also be detected, but agents tend to be less certain as to 
whether they committed an error. Yeung and Summerfield (2012, 2014) showed the similarity 
between error monitoring of slow errors and confidence judgments and suggested they share the 
same mechanism. This assertion has since been supported empirically, as the EEG markers for 
error correction also predicted graded confidence judgments for correct trials (Boldt & Yeung, 
2015). 
Error monitoring for slow errors comes with several benefits apart from the opportunity to 
correct an immediate mistake (Resulaj et al., 2009). For example, it might allow agents to adjust 
their response threshold so that subsequent errors become less likely (Yeung & Summerfield, 
2012). In the language of dynamic models of choice such as a drift diffusion models, the 
boundary separation might increase after an error, so that stronger evidence is required before an 
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action is initiated. This may explain the well-known phenomenon of post-error slowing 
(although the rareness of errors is almost certainly also a factor, see Notebaert et al., 2009). The 
relationship between error monitoring and boundary separation might be particularly valuable 
for complex tasks, where more than one step needs to be completed successfully to achieve a 
reward. Van den Berg and colleagues (2016) ran an experiment were participants completed pairs 
of visual discriminations. Participants were only rewarded if both discriminations were accurate. 
Using a computational model, the researchers found that participants adopted a laxer response 
criterion for the second trial if they reported low confidence in the first trial, so that they spent 
less time on trials that were unlikely to be rewarded. Together these results suggest that 
conscious error monitoring may allow the agent to adapt their boundary separation to maximise 
their chance of subsequent reward.  
Previous research has illustrated many ways in which explicit confidence judgments might lead to 
better outcomes by influencing immediately subsequent decisions. Results from Experiments 3 
and 4 in Chapter 4 extend this work by suggesting that confidence judgments may lead to better 
outcomes over time by causing changes of mind when the same options are encountered again. 
Perceptual decision making paradigms are poorly equipped to address this question because the 
stimuli in such tasks rarely have discrete identities, so even if the exact same choice were 
presented to a participant at multiple times during an experiment, it is unlikely that the 
participant would realise that they were encountering the same options. In Experiments 3 and 4 I 
addressed this issue in the domain of value-based choice by having hungry participants choose 
between common snack items. I found that participants who reported low confidence the first 
time they encountered an item set were more likely to change their mind the next time they 
encountered the same item set. Note that this definition of change of mind is quite different 
from the changes of mind that has typically been reported in the decision making literature, 
where people change their mind within the same trial as part of an ongoing decision process 
(Resulaj et al., 2009; Van Den Berg et al., 2016). 
The fact that low confidence judgments predict changes of mind in future trials does not 
necessarily mean that confidence causes subsequent changes of mind. An alternative explanation 
follows. Low confidence trials are trials when the choice process was particularly noisy, because 
confidence acts as an error detection mechanism. This noise causes the worse of the two options 
being chosen at presentation one. When the same options are presented again the decision-
process is less noisy and the best option is chosen, not as a result of the low confidence 
following the first choice but because the decision process for the second presentation will on 
average be less noisy because of regression to the mean. There are two reasons to be sceptical of 
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this account. First, I also found that highly metacognitive individuals became more internally 
consistent over time compared to their less metacognitive peers. It is unclear why this would 
happen if the confidence judgments did not influence subsequent decisions. Second, if we take 
the individual BDM-ratings to capture each person’s true value representation of each item, low 
confidence predict changes of mind regardless of whether the item with the highest BDM value 
was chosen originally, for both experiments. In other words, low confidence following the first 
encounter with a choice set lead to an increase chance of a change of mind, regardless of 
whether participants chose the “best option” or not. 
As the previous section illustrates, the main challenge of applying the error-monitoring/error 
correction models from perceptual decision making to the value domain is that it is difficult to 
assess accuracy in the value context, because value is an inherently subjective quality. In this 
dissertation I used internal constancy as a proxy for accuracy, because inconsistent preference 
rankings allows an agent to be exploited and is therefore objectively suboptimal (Hájek, 2008; 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). However, this approach is not perfect because while the 
algorithm used provided the most consistent item rankings for each participant, it did not 
guarantee that it was a unique solution (i.e. there might be many potential “best” rankings for 
each choice set; Pedings, Langville, & Yamamoto, 2012). Additionally, it is possible that a 
participant genuinely changed their preferences during the course of the experiment; it is 
impossible for an outside observer to differentiate between an “error” where a participant picked 
a less preferred option by mistake from a “change of mind” where a participant genuinely 
changed their preference. 
Fully investigating the relationship between confidence, long-term changes of mind and error 
monitoring would require two things. First, each option presented needs to be identifiable to the 
participant so that they are aware that choice sets repeat. Most perceptual discrimination tasks 
fail this criterion. Second, each choice needs to have an objectively correct option so that the 
accuracy of the initial choice can be controlled for when assessing the role of confidence on 
subsequent changes of mind. The value tasks presented in this dissertation fail this criterion 
because value is inherently subjective. One task that would fulfil both these criteria would be a 
memory task where participants learn a set of word associations, and then have to pick the target 
word linked to a cue from a set of options. After each choice participants would indicate their 
confidence in their accuracy, and after a set of trials the same choice would recur.  Such an 
experiment would extend our knowledge of the role of confidence in long-term-changes of mind 
outside of the value domain. Additionally it would provide s stronger causal test of the role of 
confidence in changes of mind, as the influence of confidence could be evaluated when 
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controlling for the difficulty of the item, the response time of the participant and the accuracy of 
the original choice. 
6.4. The Causes of Confidence 
It has long been known that confidence is associated both with response time and stimulus 
strength (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994, 1998; De Martino et al., 2013; Festinger, 1943; Kiani & 
Shadlen, 2009; Ratcliff & Starns, 2009; Vickers & Packer, 1982) and recently Kiani, Corthell and 
Shadlen (2014) demonstrated that response time has a causal influence on confidence judgments. 
The relationship between confidence, response time and trial difficulty is often explained in 
relation to sequential sampling models, as a low drift rate, which is associated with difficult trials 
would result in both slower responding and more errors (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Vickers & 
Packer, 1982). Recent work in the value domain suggests that drift rate is influenced by visual 
attention (Ian Krajbich et al., 2010; Ian Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Lim et al., 2011). The original 
work from Rangel’s lab suggested that the time spent looking at the item interacted with the item 
value to determine drift rate, but subsequent work suggests that the effect is in fact additive in 
that the fixated item gets a small constant boost, independent of its value (Cavanagh et al., 2014). 
I have replicated this additive effect of fixation time in both the value domain (Experiment 3) 
and in relation to perceptual choice (Experiment 6). The replication in the value domain is 
important because the items used for the value-based experiment was much closer to Krajbich 
(who also used snack items) than Cavanagh (who used bandits whose values had been taught in 
the same experiment), so the results suggest that visual attention influences drift rate in an 
additive fashion even when the participants have extensive experience with the items. The results 
from the perceptual task suggest that fixation time additively influences drift rate for visual 
discriminations as well, suggesting that this effect might be domain general. Given the effect of 
visual attention on evidence accumulation, I wanted to examine how it relates to confidence. 
I did not find a reliable relationship between fixation time and confidence in value-based or 
perceptual choice (Experiments 3, 4 and 5). However, the number of times that a participant 
shifted their gaze between the options (Gaze Shift Frequency, GSF) negatively predicted 
confidence. The influence of GSF on confidence was reliable even when response time and trial 
difficulty was controlled for, in both perceptual judgments and for value-based choice. GSF is a 
novel measure of uncertainty that is both conceptually and empirically independent from 
differences in total fixation time. It is currently unclear if GSF is associated with confidence 
because an internal representation of GSF feeds into the confidence judgment or whether 
participants simply move their eyes more when they are more uncertain, and this uncertainty is 
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also reflected in their confidence judgment. In other words, it is currently not clear if GSF 
causally influences confidence, or whether both GSF and confidence are driven by an internal 
uncertainty representation. The easiest way to establish the causal relationship between GSF and 
confidence would be to run an experiment where GSF is independently manipulated while 
keeping other important variables (notably difficulty and response time) constant. If externally 
manipulated GSF still predicts subsequent confidence judgments it would suggest that it has a 
causal influence. 
Another interesting question is whether GSF is specific to the visual modality or whether it is a 
more general mechanism for how humans sample evidence from a set of options. This question 
can be further subdivided into a motor component and a perception component. Specifically, is 
there something about eye movements that is associated with confidence, or alternatively, is 
there something about visual evidence sampling that is associated with confidence? Both these 
questions could be investigated in a single perceptual two-alternative-forced-choice task with a 2-
by-2 design. One dimension would be the modality of the perceptual judgment (for example 
sight and sound). Each option would be sampled sequentially so that participants can shift 
between the modalities with a motor action. The second dimension would be the type of motor 
action; evidence sampling would either be controlled by ocular movement or some other motor 
action (e.g. pressing a button). This would result in 4 conditions: 
(1) Visual discrimination trials where the options are sampled by ocular motor action (similar 
to the perceptual discrimination task in Experiment 6) 
(2) Visual discrimination trials where changing between the options does not require ocular 
movements (e.g. one option is shown at the middle of the screen, and this option is 
replaced by a button press) 
(3) Auditory discrimination trials where options are sampled by an ocular action (for 
example a pitch discrimination where the participant has to determine which of two 
tones are the lowest and the tone heard is determined by where participants look on the 
screen)  
(4) Auditory discrimination trials where changing between the options does not require 
ocular movements (for example a pitch discrimination where the tone heard is 
determined by button press)  
 
If the number of times participants shift between sampling each option predicts confidence 
across all conditions, that would suggest that the shift rate between the options matter, regardless 
143 
 
of modality. If only the eye movement conditions (1 & 3) were associated with confidence, that 
would suggest that confidence is informed by some form of motor-readout that is specific to the 
visual system. If only the visual perception conditions (1 & 2) found an association between 
shifting and confidence, that would imply that there is a special relationship between confidence 
and visual attention in humans. Finally, if the relationship between confidence and shifting only 
appeared for the first condition, that would suggest that this relationship requires both visual 
input and ocular motor output.  
If GSF is proven to be robust and domain-general it could be a useful measure of uncertainty in 
non-human animals. This would be a valuable methodological contribution as previous work in 
animals has measured uncertainty as post-decision wagering (Kepecs & Mainen, 2012) or waiting 
time (Lak et al., 2014). The downside of post-decision wagering is that it behaviourally combines 
the choices animals make with their confidence judgments and therefore conflates uncertainty 
estimates with economic preferences such as loss aversion (Fleming & Dolan, 2010). 
Additionally, post-decision wagering is a binary uncertainty-driven behaviour and as such is 
poorly suited to evaluate parametric models of confidence. Lak and colleagues (2014) invented a 
parametric measure of confidence in non-human animals. After a successful perceptual 
discrimination, the animal was rewarded after a random time interval, during this interval the 
animal could at any time start a new trial. Because the waiting time is associated with an 
opportunity cost, animals should only chose to wait on trials when they are certain they are 
correct and thus certain they will receive a reward, and the amount of time they are willing to 
wait should scale with their confidence. Unfortunately, waiting time is a noisy measure of 
confidence for most correct trials, as it is cut short whenever the reward appears. Consequently, 
Lak and colleagues withheld rewards on a small proportion of the correct trials, and used these 
uninterrupted waiting times as a measure of parametric confidence, meaning that only a small 
amount of the total choice trials came with a confidence estimate. GSF would address all of 
these problems as it would be a parametric measure of uncertainty that would be available for all 
trials (correct and incorrect) without being conflated with economic considerations. 
Consequently it would be well suited as a behavioural marker of uncertainty in the search for the 
neural substrates of decision confidence. 
GSF is not the only new predictor of confidence presented in this dissertation. In Experiments 3 
and 4 I showed that the summed value of the presented options positively predicted confidence 
when other predictors such as the value-difference between the options, the response time and 
GSF was accounted for. Summed-value is interesting because it is associated with both increased 
confidence and with making choices less sensitive to the value difference between the options. 
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To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time a variable in value-based choice has been 
shown to be associated with both increased confidence and decreased choice quality. There are 
two explanations that might account for the effect of summed value, one relating to its role in 
confidence, and the other relating to its role in choice quality. First, summed value might lead to 
higher confidence because the value signal might somehow contaminate the confidence signal. 
Neuroscientific work lends some credence to this idea as vmPFC – which has been implicated in 
value computations – also appears to be involved in confidence judgments (De Martino et al., 
2013; Lebreton et al., 2015). Second, total value might decrease the sensitivity of the value 
difference in predicting choice because value difference is actually encoded as a ratio of the total 
value (e.g. a value difference of £0.5 is relatively smaller when the options are valued at £2.5 and 
£3.0 than when they are valued at £0.5 and £0). This fits the notion of divisive normalisation 
that has been observed in some neural codes (Carandini & Heeger, 2012; Louie et al., 2013; 
Soltani et al., 2012) . Neural evidence could help test both these hypothesis. In order to explore 
these effect one could design choice sets with much more pronounced differences in total value 
than the ones presented here. Choices could then be explored both in terms of behavioural 
outcomes and with regards to BOLD response in the vmPFC. 
6.5. The Computation of Confidence 
This dissertation has not only introduced novel predictors of confidence, it also contains a novel 
moderator of existing predictors. Specifically, Experiment 6 in Chapter 5 showed that the 
influence of response time on confidence is moderated by whether the confidence judgment is 
reported simultaneously with the choice or after the choice. Previous work has explored how the 
timing of the confidence judgments influences the underlying computation (Aitchison et al., 
2015; Kiani et al., 2014; Siedlecka et al., 2016), but they have all relied on between-participant 
comparisons. Because of reliable individual differences in metacognitive abilities (Ais et al., 2016) 
and processing styles (Navajas et al., 2017) any between-participant comparison is problematic. 
To the best of my knowledge, Experiment 6 is the first study to directly assess the influence of 
the timing of confidence judgments within the same participants. This allowed me to account for 
any variation due to individual differences and therefore made the results more reliable, and their 
interpretation more straightforward compared to previous work. I found that sequential 
confidence judgments were more accurate than simultaneous confidence judgments. These 
results are in line with the findings of Siedlecka and colleagues (2016) who compared the 
accuracy of confidence judgments conducted before and after a first order decision and who 
found that retrospective confidence judgments were more accurate. One potential explanation 
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for this difference in performance is put forward by Aitchison and colleagues (2015) who found 
that sequential confidence judgments mostly reflect the probability correct (p(correct)) whereas 
simultaneous confidence judgments are also influenced by simpler heuristics (in their case the 
sensory magnitude of the chosen option). I found that the influence of response time on 
confidence was weaker for the sequential confidence judgments and that this difference in 
sensitivity to response time fully explained the difference in metacognitive efficiency. It is 
important to note that these explanations are not mutually exclusive as response time is 
predictive of p(correct) (Kiani et al., 2014). It is possible that it is challenging for the brain to 
compute p(correct) before an action has been taken (Fleming & Daw, 2017), and that it therefore 
relies on heuristics until a decision has been made. Once the first-order decision has been made 
the probability of being correct can be computed, and reaction time can be taken into account in 
this computation.  
One way to evaluate the idea that simultaneous and sequential confidence judgments reflect 
different computational quantities is to look at the relationship between confidence and stimulus 
strength for correct trials and error trials. Navajas and colleagues (2017) showed that confidence 
judgments based on p(correct) show a positive association between confidence magnitude and 
stimulus strength for correct trials but a negative relationship for errors. However, confidence 
judgments that reflect the precision of the posterior evidence distribution (a heuristic 
approximating p(correct)) show a positive association between confidence and stimulus strength 
for correct trials and for error trials. Kiani and Shadlen (2014) noted that stimulus strength 
positively predicted confidence both for the correct trials and the error trials for the participants 
who made simultaneous confidence judgments and choices, in conflict with much previous 
research on sequential confidence judgments (Kepecs et al., 2008; Lak et al., 2014; Sanders et al., 
2016). In Experiment 6 I found a positive relationship between confidence and stimulus strength 
for correct trials but a negative association between confidence and stimulus strength for error 
trials, with no evidence that the timing of the confidence judgments moderated this pattern. 
Navajas and colleagues (2017) offer a simple explanation of these discrepancies, they found that 
confidence reflected some mixture of probability correct and the posterior precision for about 
47% of their participants, whereas it just reflected probability correct for an additional 43%, they 
also found that the tendency to base confidence on specific computational quantities where 
stable across time. Because Kiani and Shadlen only tested six participants in their simultaneous 
confidence judgment task, it is possible that these six participants happened to base their 
confidence judgments primarily on the posterior precision. Thus it is possible that the small 
sample size, together with the between-participant design made the researchers misattribute an 
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effect that was caused by individual differences to their research manipulation. Such 
misattributions could have been avoided if they had compared the performance on both tasks 
within the same participants, further highlighting the importance of within subject comparisons 
when evaluating the influence of response timings on confidence judgments.  
My results also include a difference in metacognitive performance that is not due to an 
experimental manipulation, but rather due to a group difference. Specifically I found that 
bilinguals were less metacognitively accurate than monolinguals in a visual discrimination task, 
despite comparable first-order performance between both groups (Experiments 1 and 2). This 
difference could not be explained by confidence being more sensitive to difficulty or response 
time in the monolingual group. In fact, these two variables seemed to influence confidence the 
same way in both groups. Future research is required to explain this difference. One potential 
explanation would be difference in sensitivity to GSF. The plausibility of this idea depends on 
the magnitude of the GSF effect. In Experiment 6, which used a similar design to the bilingual 
experiments, GSF was the strongest predictor of confidence. However, stimulus presentation 
was gaze contingent in Experiment 6 and it is possible that this manipulation inflated the size of 
the effect. Fleming and Lau (2017) has suggested that the choice itself can provide information 
to confidence judgments if the internal evidence streams causing confidence and choice are at 
least partially uncorrelated. This opens for the possibility that the metacognitive insight is better 
among monolinguals because their evidence streams for confidence and choice are more 
independent than their bilingual peers. This could be evaluated by having monolinguals and 
bilinguals completing two versions of a perceptual discrimination task where they either have to 
provide confidence judgments before or after they report their choice. If the bilingual 
disadvantage disappears for trials where confidence judgment precede choice but persist for trials 
were confidence judgments follow choice this would suggest that monolingual confidence 
judgments are more accurate because their choice and confidence evidence streams are more 
decoupled.  
Additionally, because bilinguals reported systematically higher confidence ratings in Experiments 
1 and 2 it would be interesting to test which group is better calibrated.  This could be tested in 
any follow-up experiment just by presenting the confidence scale explicitly in terms of 
probability correct. Finally, it is possible that I failed to discover the cause of the performance 
difference between monolinguals and bilinguals because dot difference is a coarse measure of 
stimulus strength. The difficulty of the dot discrimination task also depends on the distribution 
of the dots: trials are harder when the dots are clustered or overlap. Navajas and colleagues 
developed an elegant experimental design that provides stricter control over a set of parameters 
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that influence difficulty. They present participants with a series of Gabor patches drawn from a 
uniform distribution with a mean tilt either to the left or to the right. Applying such a design to 
bilingual and monolingual samples would allow them to be compared in terms of their sensitivity 
to the magnitude of the evidence (difference in degrees between the left-tilting samples and the 
right-tilting samples), evidence variance (the width of the uniform distributions) and number of 
evidence samples. Such a design has the additional benefit that it would be easy to compute the 
posterior distribution of the tilt at the time of choice (assuming a flat prior at the start of each 
trial) and would therefore allow for a direct test of the extent to which confidence is a function 
of posterior precision relative to probability correct for monolingual and bilingual participants. It 
is worth pointing out that if such a difference exists it is likely to be small because it is not 
captured by the relationship between confidence and stimulus strength for correct trials and 
error trials in either of the experiments in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.9.). 
Some models of confidence view it as the result of the continuation of the same evidence 
accumulation process that cause first-order decision (Kiani et al., 2014; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 
2010; Van Den Berg et al., 2016). I mentioned in the introduction that these theories cannot 
provide a complete picture of confidence judgments because they cannot account for differences 
in metacognitive accuracy for trials with the same response times (Vlassova et al., 2014). They 
also struggle to account for effects where a variable influences first-order and second order 
accuracy in opposite directions, as was the case for summed value, reported in Chapter 4. Single 
stream theories also have trouble with order effects, i.e. how confidence judgments alter based 
on whether they happen before or after a first-order decision (Fleming & Daw, 2017; Siedlecka 
et al., 2016). Experiment 6 in this thesis records another such order effect, but fails to 
conclusively rule out that this order effect is caused by differences in processing time or 
cognitive load. Together, these findings leave us with a dilemma; some results suggest that a 
single evidence stream best explains confidence and choice, whereas other results are 
incongruent with such models. One potential solution comes from the research on error 
detection: in their review paper Yeung and Summerfield (2012) point out that there are two 
error-sensitive signals in the brain, one that emphasise immediate error correction and one that 
emphasise error monitoring. In real world contexts where tasks are less clearly delineated than 
the lab it is possible that the error-correcting code does not just correct immediate errors but 
supports online motor adjustments for activities like walking or riding a bike, that require 
constant calibration between incoming sensory data and motor output. On the other side of the 
spectrum we have an error-monitoring/confidence signal that operates on discrete actions and 
judge their probability of success in the service of learning and strategic decision making (e.g. 
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how long to wait for a reward, whether to adjust response boundaries to be more careful and 
accurate, whether to keep exploiting a current resources or explore the environment). It would 
be adaptive for this online motor code to be a direct extension of the evidence accumulation 
process that controls the initial action because it is a natural extension of that process (in fact, it 
might be exactly the same process, arbitrarily delimited by the tasks we use in the lab). On the 
other hand, the slower system that explicitly monitors the probability of success likely transforms 
the sensory evidence signal into a probability estimate. If current research on confidence 
conflates these two signals, it would explain many of the seemingly conflicting findings we see 
today. These two signals might be disentangled with neuroimaging techniques as suggested by 
Yeung and Summerfield since error correction and error monitoring are associated with different 
EEG signals (ERN and Pe respectively). Using EEG to capture the input of these two 
components into confidence judgments in various experimental setups would be a useful 
research project. Only once we have a better sense of what neural and computational quantities 
underlie self-reported confidence in different contexts can we gain a complete understanding of 
the function of confidence. 
 6.6. Conclusion 
Uncertainty is an inherent property of the world and of the neurological system we use to model 
it. Therefore understanding uncertainty is central for successfully negotiating our existence. This 
thesis has explored our ability to consciously quantify uncertainty as confidence, and what 
benefits we derive from doing so. It has uncovered a number of novel predictors of confidence: 
internal predictors like eye behaviours, situational predictors like the total value of the options 
under consideration and interpersonal, and trait-like predictors such as the number of languages 
one speaks. It has made a novel suggestion for the function of confidence, namely that it tags 
poor decisions so that when similar situations arise in the future different options may be 
chosen. Finally, it has added to our understanding of the computational underpinnings of 
confidence by demonstrating that confidence judgments capture different information based on 
how they are timed in relation to choice. Together these findings support an emerging consensus 
that self-reported confidence judgments correspond to different computational quantities as a 
function of task structure as well as individual differences. Future research must continue to map 
what computational and neural quantities underlie different forms of confidence judgments. 
Only when that mapping is clearer can a complete model of the pragmatics of confidence be 
attempted. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of stimuli in Experiment 3: 
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Appendix 2: List of stimuli in Experiment 4: 
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Appendix 3: GSF Does Not Predict Choice, but Interacts With 
Stimulus Strength in a Model that does not Include DDT 
A hierarchical logistic regression model with participantwise variation in interecepts and slopes 
predicted the choice of the reference item (the first item encountered in western reading order) 
from the difference in value between the reference item and the mean value of the other two 
items, GSF and a value difference GSF interaction. Value difference strongly predicted choice 
(z=8.59, p<10-10), as did the interaction term (z=-4.26, p<10-4) but GSF alone was not a 
significant predictor of choice (z=1.42, p=.16). 
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Appendix 4: Confidence Distributions for Simultaneous and 
Sequential Confidence Judgments in Experiment 6 
 
Figure A1. The Response Distributions for Sequentially and Simultaneously Reported 
Confidence 
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Appendix 5: Interjudgment Times Are Not Associated with 
Confidence, Accuracy or Stimulus Strength in Experiment 6 
 
Figure A2. Relationship Between Interjudgment Times and Confidence, First-order 
Accuracy, Stimulus strength and Second-order Accuracy. 
I ran a set of hierarchical regression models with varying slopes and intercepts to test whether 
interjudgment time interacted with any of the other variables. All variables reported in these 
analyses were z-scored. Interjudgment times did not predict the magnitude of reported 
confidence (t=1.31, p=0.16), nor were they associated with the accuracy of the choices (z=-0.09, 
p=.93), nor were they associated with the stimulus strength of the trial (here dot difference; 
t=0.14, p=.88). To test whether interjudgment times were related to second order accuracy I 
created a confidence accuracy score (CAS): Confidence * Correct. Where confidence ranged 
between one and 100 and correct was set to 1 for correct trials and -1 for incorrect trials. 
Interjudgment time did not predict CAS (t=-0.01, p=.99). For reference, RT did predict CAS 
(t=-12.68, p<10-10), as did stimulus strength (t=20.17, p<10-10).  
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Appendix 6: Confidence is Influenced by Both Positive and 
Negative Evidence for Both Sequential and Simultaneous 
Confidence Judgments in Experiment 6 
To evaluate whether both positive and negative evidence influenced confidence I ran two 
hierarchical linear regression models with intercepts varying by participants. Both positive 
(t=11.17, p=10-10) and negative evidence (t=-8.99, p<10-10) predicted confidence for the 
simultaneous confidence responses. And both positive (t=14.09, p=10-10) and negative evidence 
(t=-13.95, p<10-10) predicted confidence for the sequential confidence responses. Therefore, 
while a model with separate weight parameters for positive and negative evidence fitted the data 
better than a model that only included the difference(BICDifference Model=44 118 BICSeparate Weights 
Model=43 747), I opted for the simpler representation of stimulus strength, given the complexity 
of some of the models in Chapter 5. 
